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Summary 
 
This dissertation is a study on confidentiality and authenticity of document using public 
key cryptography researched through 1992 to 2007 by the author who is enrolled at 
Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. and Graduate School of Information Science and 
Technology, Osaka University. 
With the spread of the Internet, threats to confidentiality and authenticity of 
office document have become to be actual; the most typical example is leakage of 
customer data by lost of storage media or harmful e-mail from persons. Against such 
threats there are the following countermeasures. Firstly, as for countermeasure for lost 
of media, wiretapping, and sender spoofing, technologies such as encryption, 
authentication, and integrity check of document, are used with public key cryptography 
based on the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Secondly, countermeasures to 
unauthorized access to documents on a server are authentication of accessing entity and 
access control on the server. Thirdly, a typical countermeasure for virus is anti-virus 
software based on pattern matching with signature of known viruses. However, there is 
also a system which is comprised of two virtual workstations running on a single PC 
hardware to protect data from unknown viruses; one is used for secret file and the other 
is used for non-secret file that may contain viruses. Even if the second workstation for 
non-secret is infected with virus, the first workstation is safe because the two 
workstations run on separated virtual machines. 
However, other problems appear from the point of view of usability and 
operation when the above technologies are used. Firstly, Multiparty Signature 
Generation (MSG) is a useful technology to protect a signature key, especially the 
private key of a Certification Authority (CA) which is the root of trust of the PKI. 
However, the MSG of Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) requires simultaneous 
operations of key holders, and generation process does not fit workflow process which is 
sequential, not simultaneous. Sequential and one-round MSG is required to realize an 
efficient signing process. Secondly, the PKI itself has a problem; when a public key 
certificate is revoked with a reason of personnel change or lost of private key, 
corresponding signatures become invalid, because the public key is invalid with the 
revocation. Considering use of signed documents, the signatures should be valid after 
the public key revocation unless the documents are tampered, and an additional scheme 
is required to the PKI. Thirdly, along with the two problems of key management, there 
is another problem of encryption and signing of documents; when a structured 
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document containing multiple chapters, tables and pages is exchanged in a group, 
multiple signatures and encryption of such parts are required, but an existing 
cryptographic envelope does not support such function. Considering document creation 
by multiple authors and access restriction within the group, an encryption and signing 
technology for structured documents is required. Fourthly, as for access control to 
documents on a server, the reference monitor model within a single security domain 
works well, but the authorization model is not well formulated in a multiple domain 
environment. A model of privilege delegation crossing domain boundary is required to 
realize authorization of the Internet scale. Finally the system comprised of two virtual 
workstations for virus protection is safe against unknown virus, but the user should 
change workstations according to processing information category and this is burden for 
the user. A system which does not make end user be aware of information category is 
desirable. 
This dissertation is composed of seven chapters and proposes systems or 
schemes which satisfy the above requirements. Chapter 1 lists security threats to 
confidentiality and authenticity of documents, discusses problems of existing 
countermeasures against the threats, and then describes strategies to solve the 
problems. Chapter 2 proposes the scheme of MSG of DSA without simultaneous key 
holders’ operations, and performance evaluation of a prototype on a smartcard, security 
against adaptive chosen message attack, and application to other signature scheme are 
discussed. Chapter 3 introduces an attribute with validity period and a certificate 
verification service with time stamp in order to solve the signature invalidation problem 
after public key certificate revocation. Performance of the service is evaluated as well as 
security. Chapter 4 discusses security requirements of document interchange, and 
security of Office Document Architecture (ODA) of ISO standard is introduced. 
Compatibility problems of the two standards, ODA and PKI, and resolutions are 
discussed in details, followed by discussion on problems on integration with an existing 
ODA editor. Chapter 5 treats problems of authorization in multiple domains; after 
requirements of authorization on a document server are specified, an authorization 
scheme with the combination of a Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) and a Control 
Attribute Package (CAP), and privilege delegation scheme crossing boundary of 
domains are proposed and evaluated. Chapter 6 proposes “Windows Vault” which solves 
the usability problem of the two virtual workstations system. After describing gateways 
connecting the two workstations realizing safe integration of e-mail clients on the two 
workstations, performance and security extension of the gateway are discussed. Finally 
Chapter 7 concludes this study and discusses directions for the future research. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
In the mid 1990’s, when a commercial internet service started, the main security 
problem was attack from the Internet, such as destruction of web page, denial of service, 
or virus contained in e-mail message. However, the situation has changed since the 
personal information protection law [ACT2003]; all organizations including commercial 
companies and government organizations are required to keep personal information 
secret and correct. Another aspect of data security is to keep document unchanged for 
years; organization can store electronic documents instead of printed papers which 
retention time is regulated, with the guarantee that documents have not been changed 
since creation [ACT2004]. 
In general, information security is defined as maintenance of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of information asset. The three security attributes of 
information are defined as follows: 
 
 Confidentiality 
The information is accessed only by authorized subject which is permitted to access. 
 Integrity 
The information and process of the information are accurate and complete. 
 Availability 
Authorized subject can access or process the information whenever the information 
is needed. 
 
The theme of this dissertation is the security of office documents or files which 
are the most familiar data for end users. In case of office documents, the following 
attribute is more meaningful than integrity: 
 
 Authenticity 
The information is created by the subject as claimed and has not been changed 
since it was created. 
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Afterwards, this research focuses on authenticity instead of integrity except that strict 
distinction is required. 
Table 1.1 shows security threats to office documents, which are classified with 
the view of three aforementioned attributes and document location. Office documents on 
a client PC are created not only by the end user; they are sent as attached files of e-mail 
or retrieved from a document server. Such files are stored in a Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) memory as well as local hard disk. Office documents on network are not only on 
line but also on mail servers on which the documents are temporary stored. Office 
documents on servers are those on a file server on Local Area Network (LAN) or Web 
server connected to the Internet. In the following, each threat shown in Table 1.1 is 
described. 
 
Table 1.1: Security Threats to Documents 
 
 Client Network Server 
Confidentiality  theft/lost of media
 leakage by virus 
 intentional 
leakage by 
authorized user 
 wiretapping  leakage by 
unauthorized 
access 
 leakage by 
manager 
Authenticity  tamper by virus 
 tamper by user 
 sender spoofing 
 denial of sending
 tamper of 
communication 
data 
 tamper by 
unauthorized 
access 
 tamper by 
manager 
Availability 
 
 data lost by 
failure 
 deletion by user 
 deletion by virus 
 failure of 
network 
device/line 
 denial of service 
 deletion by 
unauthorized 
access 
 deletion by 
manager 
 denial of 
service 
 
Theft or lost of storage media is the most typical threat to confidentiality; the 
memory size of the current storage media is so large that a user can store millions of 
customer data, and the lost of such information leads to disrepute of the organization. 
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Some virus leaks local files of PC; the most famous virus leaks the files to a peer-to-peer 
network, and copies of the files are scattered over the network. It is impossible to delete 
all the copies and the files can be accessed by everyone forever. There is an intentional 
leakage by an authorized user; the methods of leakage are use of network, storage 
media, etc. 
A cause of lost of authenticity, strictly integrity, of documents stored on a client 
PC is virus. Some virus rewrites files and adds itself to the files. An authorized user can 
rewrite files and change the time of last modification time. Document files are 
unavailable with some causes; typical reason is failure of hardware or software, but a 
user may delete files by carelessness. Another cause is a virus; the virus deletes files or 
encrypts them to kidnap. 
Wiretapping is a cause of lost of confidentiality of documents on network; 
unencrypted network traffic of wireless LAN can be monitored by anyone who can 
receive the electric wave. People who can access router or switch can monitor the traffic 
through the monitor ports of the network devices. 
Lost of authenticity on network does not only caused by rewrite of 
communication data; sender spoofing happens more frequently. Typically an office 
document is sent via e-mail, and the recipient considers that the document is sent from 
the sender in the ‘From’ field of the e-mail message. However, there is no authentication 
mechanism in the mail protocol, SMTP [PJ1982], and the field can be spoofed easily. 
There is another threat to authenticity. Denial of sending is the threat that the sender 
denies the fact of sending; even if the recipient shows the message from the sender, the 
sender insists that the ‘From’ field is spoofed and she/he did not send the message. 
Availability of network is lost typically with failure of network devices or 
communication lines. Another reason is denial of service attack; the attacker sends lots 
of bogus network packets to server up to exceed the capacity of the server, and it cannot 
process regular requests. 
If an attacker gets privilege of a network server, confidentiality, authenticity, 
and availability of the data on the server are lost. This is also true when a malicious 
operator manages the server. 
The main theme of this dissertation is security against the threats to 
confidentiality and authenticity, because the most serious threat of availability is data 
lost and this threat is basically covered by data backup. Countermeasures for the two 
threats are divided into two categories as shown in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2: Protection Methods 
 
Method Threat Technology Problem 
Private key 
protection by 
dividing 
All key holders must 
sign simultaneously. 
Revocation of 
public key 
certificate with 
CRL 
Digital signature 
becomes invalid with 
certificate revocation.
Protection by 
document itself 
 Encryption 
 Digital 
signature 
 theft/lost of media 
 leakage by virus 
 intentional leakage 
by authorized user 
 wiretapping  
 sender spoofing 
 denial of sending 
 leakage by 
unauthorized access
 leakage by manager
Encryption and 
signing of 
document part 
Partial encryption 
and signing are not 
supported. 
Access control 
with security 
attribute 
Access control in 
multiple domains is 
insufficient. 
Protection 
outside 
document 
 Access 
control 
 Virus 
protection 
 tamper by virus 
 tamper by user 
 tamper of 
communication 
data 
 tamper by 
unauthorized access
 tamper by manager
Protection from 
unknown virus 
with system 
isolation 
Multiple client use 
changes user 
operation. 
 
The first category is protection by document itself, and two methods belong to 
this category, encryption and digital signature. The two technologies protect document 
files from the following threats: theft/lost of storage media, leakage by virus, 
wiretapping, sender spoofing, denial of sending, intentional leakage by authorized user, 
leakage by unauthorized access, and leakage by manager. While documents stored on 
media are encrypted with symmetric encryption algorithm, those transferred between 
users via network are encrypted with both symmetric and public key encryption 
algorithms [SB1996]; a document itself is encrypted with a randomly generated 
symmetric key and the key is encrypted with the public key of the recipient user. As far 
as the private key of the recipient user is protected, the document is safe. On the other 
hand, digital signature is the combination of a hash function and a public key 
encryption; the hash function calculates the fingerprint or hash value of the document, 
and the signature of the document is calculated with the fingerprint and the private key 
of the signer. The signature is verified with the public key of the signer. 
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Document protected with encryption and digital signature is safe, if the 
authentic public key of recipient or signer is available. In order to get the public key, the 
public key infrastructure (PKI) [CCITT1988, HR1999] is used. Every user of the PKI 
trusts a third party, Certification Authority (CA), who distributes the authentic public 
key through a public key certificate. The certificate contains subject identity, her/his 
public key, validity time of the certificate, the CA identity, etc., and all the information is 
digitally signed with the private key of the CA. With verification of the certificate, the 
correct public key of a user can be obtained and used for encryption and verification of 
digital signature. However, there are problems inside and around the PKI; in the 
following, problems of protection of private key, invalidation of digital signature, and 
security of structured office document are described. 
 
(1) Protection of Private Key by Dividing 
Protection of a private key is a serious problem, especially the key of a CA. If the key is 
stolen, the damage is very enormous, because fake user certificates are created freely, 
and the infrastructure collapses. A typical technology to protect the signature key is 
Multiparty Signature Generation (MSG) and a CA introduced the MSG technique 
[CC2002]; in the MSG scheme, the signature key is divided into multiple pieces which 
are hold by multiple key holders, and the key holders cooperate to make a signature 
without revealing the divided keys to the others. Since a valid signature cannot be 
generated even if there is a malicious key holder, this technique realizes high level 
security. 
While an RSA signature can be generated with one-round sequential 
operations of the key holders, a signature generation of the Digital Signature Algorithm 
(DSA) [NIST1998] requires simultaneous operations of the key holders, and a work flow 
system cannot be used to the signature generation process. This is inconvenient and 
non-effective from the view of business process within an enterprise. This is the first 
problem. 
 
(2) Revocation of Public Key Certificate with CRL 
A public key certificate itself is a static data and it may include old, incorrect 
information. The certificate may become invalid with some reasons: lost of private key 
in case that a user forgets the password protecting the key, or old title and department 
after personnel change, etc. In such a case, the user requests revocation of the 
certificate and the CA publishes a Certification Revocation List (CRL) to transfer the 
information of revoked certificates. Once the certificate is revoked, the signature of the 
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user becomes invalid, because the public key used for the signature verification becomes 
invalid. This invalidation of the digital signature in accordance with the certificate 
revocation is the second problem. 
 
(3) Encryption and Signing of Document Part 
Encryption and signing are applied to a whole data basically. However, if a document is 
composed of multiple pages, paragraphs, figures, etc. and the parts are written by 
different authors, it is desirable that each part is signed by each author. Moreover, some 
parts may need access control; limited members are permitted to read the parts. As a 
result, encryption and signing of parts of document are required. This is the third 
problem. 
 
The second category is protection outside document, that is, access control to 
document. Access control is realized mainly by OS, however the current mechanism of 
access control of the OS is not enough for protection from virus with two reasons. The 
first reason is that the OS cannot distinguish the accessing entity is a correct user or 
not. Some virus is contained in a document file and it is activated when a user opens the 
file. In this case, the subject of the activated virus is the user, and the OS allows the 
access of the virus to the resources that the user can access. The second reason is 
vulnerability of OS or application programs. Some virus exploits the vulnerability, and 
gets privilege of the user of application or the administrator, and the OS fails to 
distinguish the accessing subject again. With these reasons virus protection software 
which distinguishes virus is required. But there remain problems in both access control 
itself and virus protection software. 
 
(4) Access Control with Security Attribute 
A typical access control mechanism depends on the subject identity or group, and access 
type; this is sufficient if both the subject and object belong to the same domain which is 
a collection of users, computers and other resources that are under a single 
administration. However, if the subject and object belong to different domains, the 
access control mechanism does not work, and privilege delegation of subject is required. 
This is the fourth problem. 
 
(5) Protection from Unknown Virus with System Isolation 
The current virus protection software distinguishes virus with pattern matching, and as 
a result, an unknown virus which pattern is not contained in the pattern database 
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cannot be detected. As a countermeasure against the unknown virus, there is a system 
which is comprised of two virtual workstations integrated into a single PC hardware 
with virtual machine technology; a workstation is used for secret and the other for 
non-secret or public. The system is very secure because the secure workstation is 
virtually separated at physical level from the unsecure workstation which may be 
infected with virus. The fifth problem is that the user needs to distinguish the two 
workstations and change them according to processing information. It is desired not to 
change operations from the current PC usage. 
 
As described above, the current technologies to protect confidentiality and 
authenticity of documents have the five problems from the viewpoint of convenience and 
flexibility as shown in Table 1.2. In this dissertation, the following problems are 
resolved while keeping the security of the current technology: 
 
 All divided signature key holders must sign simultaneously. 
 Digital signature becomes invalid when the public key certificate is revoked. 
 It is impossible to encrypt and sign parts of document. 
 Access control in multiple domains is not sufficient. 
 User is required to change client operations of multiple virtual workstations system 
from current PC usage. 
 
1.2 Related Works 
In this section, researches related to the technologies mentioned in the previous section, 
private key protection by dividing, revocation of public key certificate, encryption and 
signing of document, access control with security attribute, and protection from 
unknown virus with system isolation are described. 
 
(1) Protection of Private Key by Dividing 
In order to protect a private key from a malicious key holder, division of the key is a 
typical solution, and there are many researches of this technology. As far as RSA 
cryptosystem [RR1978, RSA1993], the generation of divided keys is very difficult 
[GN1999, MM1999a], but use of the private key, decryption or signature generation, is 
straightforward, and researchers focused on restriction of decryption by investigating 
authority; in a key escrow system, much attention was paid to the restriction on use of 
deposited decryption key, and one of the restriction measure was division of the key 
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[MS1992, YY1996, SY1997b]. 
On the MSG based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP), Schnorr’s type 
signature can be generated efficiently [SC1989, PC1996, MK2001], but the MSG of DSA 
requires much computation [CM1993, GR1996]. A signature based on the DLP contains 
a random number, and the efficiency of signature generation depends on arithmetic 
relation between the random number and the signature key; the Schnorr’s signature 
contains sum of the two numbers and the signature is generated very efficiently, but the 
DSA signature contains quotient of the signature key divided by the random number 
and this makes the generation process complicated and inefficient. Moreover, the 
process requires simultaneous computation of the key holders, and it is impossible to 
generate the DSA signature with one-round sequential process of the key holders. 
 
(2) Revocation of Public Key Certificate 
There are several problems around certificate revocation of the PKI: size of CRL, timely 
distribution of revocation information, and invalidation of signature. An approach to the 
first problem is delta-CRL [ISO1995]; the delta-CRL contains the certificate data 
revoked after the previous issued CRL. Not all the revoked certificates are contained in 
the delta-CRL. The delta-CRL is smaller than the ordinary CRL, and the CA can issue 
the delta-CRL more frequently. Therefore, a user can get timely revocation information 
and this is a partial answer to the second problem. But the user needs to collect all the 
delta-CRLs and verify a signature, so the verification cost increases. Another approach 
to the first problem is Certification Revocation Tree (CRT) [KH1999]. The revoked 
certification information is represented in the form of a tree a leaf of which corresponds 
to a revoked certificate, a node to the hash value of the lower level nodes, and the root 
node is digitally signed. In order to get revocation status of a certificate, a user retrieves 
partial tree, and the size of the tree is smaller than the CRL. As a result, the CRT is a 
solution to the second problem. 
Another approach is an on-line verification service; the IETF standard, Online 
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [MM1999b] service receives a request containing a 
certificate identity, and sends back the certificate status with the signature of the CA. 
This approach solves the second problem, however, there still remains the third 
problem. 
 
(3) Encryption and Signing of Document Part 
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) [RB1999] give a content type 
and an extension for encryption and signing of MIME [FN1996] data; MIME bring a 
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structure into an e-mail message and it supports multiple parts, which types are mixed, 
alternative, digest, parallel, and the data types of each part are image, audio, video, and 
application data. However, S/MIME are not for structured document in general. RSA 
PKCS#7 envelope [RSA1993b] supports multiple signature to any data, but it does not 
support partial encryption nor signing. 
 
(4) Access Control with Security Attribute 
While an Access Control List (ACL) model implemented on Windows OS and Linux is 
the most typical access control model and easily understandable, multilevel security of 
TCSEC [DD1983] based on the Bell-LaPadula model is one of the most secure access 
control model, and it is used in a military system. There are significant works on 
authorization or access control in a centralized system other than these two models. 
Boolean Expression Evaluation [MD1989] introduced a generalized policy free access 
control mechanism, and a unified solution of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) and 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies is proposed in [MC1990]. However, they 
cannot be extended to a distribution system environment in a straightforward way, 
because delegation of privilege is out of scope and the representation of authorization 
information is simple and does not have enough ability to express the semantics of 
privileges of different security domains. 
The ACL scheme, which makes the authorization based on user’s identity or 
group, fits an environment where the number of users is relatively small, such as a local 
area network in an office. However, in the environment of an organizational scale 
network to which thousands of hosts are connected or a much bigger scale network such 
as the Internet, the ACL scheme may not be appropriate because the authorization may 
be required to depend on not only the user’s identity but also various information such 
as user’s title/role, network location, privilege class, and access time. 
The OSF/DCE security architecture [YH1995] and the Secure European 
System for Application in a Multivendor Environment (SESAME) [KP1994] have 
adopted the Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC), which contains user’s privileges, 
restrictions on the privileges and identifiers for auditing and charging, and the PAC is 
well structured to transmit authorization information of the user. However, the 
architectures do not specify the access control information of objects being accessed such 
as files, application entities, nor how the authorization is made. 
 
(5) Protection from Unknown Virus with System Isolation 
Current approach to detect unknown virus is to monitor its behavior. However, the 
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emergence of targeted attack may make this approach may become less effective, 
because the attacker tunes the virus behavior not to be detected by the anti-virus 
software of the target user. Another reason is the number of viruses is small and the 
viruses may not be detected by observation network of a virus vendor. 
NetTop [HP2004, MR2000] is a composite of multiple virtual workstations and 
safe against unknown virus because each workstation is virtually separated with 
virtual machine and secure OS. But the target of NetTop is mainly intelligence 
community; the user of NetTop is required to have awareness of data isolation or 
multilevel security. 
 
1.3 Research Strategies 
As shown in Section 1.1, there are two categories of measurements for security threats 
of document, but each technology realizing the measurements has problem in usability, 
flexibility or coverage. Solutions against the problems are proposed, which relations to 
the problems are shown in Table 1.3. 
 
(1) Multipart DSA Signature Generation without Simultaneous User Operations 
DSA is a standard digital signature and promising because its scheme is applicable to 
elliptic curve encryption [KN1994]. However, it requires simultaneous user operations, 
when the private key is divided. Since the users, divided key holders, need to share a 
random secret and then calculate a signature with the random secret and private key, 
the users are required simultaneous broadcast communications to calculate the 
signature from two numbers. 
Since the random secret can share before signature generation, the first 
number for the next signature can be calculated during the current signature 
generation, that is, the second number of the current signature. In this research, the 
interaction is processed via a server; the exchanged data between the key holders are 
put on the server in encrypted form. In order to show the solution is realistic, the 
performance of a prototype on a smartcard is evaluated. It is also proved the solution is 
as safe as the original DSA. 
 
(2) Reducing Certificate Revocation and Certificate Verification Service with Time 
Stamp 
The reason of signature invalidation is the revocation of signer’s certificate after the 
signature verification. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove the validity of the certificate at 
 10
that time of the verification. Certificate Verification Service with Time Stamp (CVSTS) 
is the service to give the proof; the service gives the proof of the status of the public key 
certificate of the signer and existence of the signed document at a time point. The 
verifier can prove that the verification succeeded at that time. The scalability of the 
service should be evaluated. 
 
Table 1.3: Research Strategies 
 
Method Technology Problem Solution 
Private key 
protection by 
dividing 
All key holders 
must sign 
simultaneously. 
Multiparty DSA signature 
generation w/o simultaneous 
user operations 
Revocation of 
public key 
certificate with 
CRL 
Digital signature 
becomes invalid 
with certificate 
revocation. 
Reducing certificate revocation 
and certificate verification 
service with time stamp 
Protection 
by 
document 
itself 
Encryption and 
signing of 
document part 
Partial encryption 
and signing are not 
supported. 
Partial encryption and signing 
for ODA document 
Access control 
with security 
attribute  
Access control in 
multiple domains is 
insufficient. 
Authorization with security 
attribute and privilege 
delegation 
Protection 
outside 
document 
Protection from 
unknown virus 
with system 
isolation 
Multiple client use 
changes user 
operation. 
Integration of network clients 
in system isolation with 
gateway 
 
(3) Partial Encryption and Signing of ODA Document 
The Open Document Interchange Format (ODIF) of the Office Document Architecture 
(ODA) [ISO1988] is an international standard of structured office document format; the 
format contains profiles, objects and its classes such as chapter, section, page, etc., and 
content portions. The ODA Security Addendum [ISO1990] defines encryption and 
signing method of ODIF, and realized partial encryption and signing. However, the 
standard is inconsistent with the PKI standard [CCITT1988] and there is a problem 
during editing process. In the research, solutions to the inconsistency are proposed. 
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(4) Access Control with Security Attribute and Privilege Delegation 
While a client computer is basically used by a single user, a server computer is accessed 
by multiple users, and user authentication and authorization to resources are inevitable. 
In the research, firstly authorization requirements for document servers are defined, 
and security attributes used for access control are categorized. Secondly privilege 
delegation across security domain boundary is discussed. 
 
(5) Integration of Network Clients in System Isolation with Gateway 
In order to make system secure fundamentally, system isolation technology is adopted; 
multiple workstations are used according to information categories, and the 
workstations are integrated into a single PC with virtual machine and secure OS. The 
user of an existing such system has to be conscious of multiple categories, but a normal 
user, for example those of a commercial company, does not have such awareness. In the 
research, information is categorized into two, one is safe secret and the other is unsafe 
non-secret which may contain virus, and secure integration of e-mail clients of the 
different categories is realized with gateways with one-way information flow property. 
 
 
1.4 Outline of the Dissertation 
The reminder of this dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 proposes a multiparty DSA signature generation without 
simultaneous key holders’ operations [SY2001, SH2001, SY2004]. The generation 
scheme has the following properties: (1) valid signatures are generated with odd  
split private keys, (2) broadcast messages between the key holders are hidden from 
them, so that the  key holders do not need to process signature generation 
simultaneously, and (3) even if up to 
n
n
)2/)1((  nt  split keys are stolen, the adversary 
can get no information on the private key. Performance evaluation of prototype on 
smartcard and security consideration are described as well. 
Chapter 3 proposes the attribute with validity period which reduces certificate 
revocation and CVSTS [SY1997a]. After the problem of public key certificate revocation 
is described, the attribute and service are defined. Next, performance of the CVSTS is 
evaluated followed by security evaluation. 
In Chapter 4, firstly requirements of document interchange are discussed. Next 
ODA and its security are described as well as researches of security of ODA document as 
a whole. Then compatibility problems with the PKI standard and resolutions are 
discussed in details followed by problems of combination with existing ODA editor 
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[SY1995, SY1996]. 
Chapter 5 treats problems of access control or authorization of access to 
documents on a server [SY1997c]. Firstly authorization requirements of a document 
server are defined followed by the problems of the ACL. Next, an authorization scheme 
with the combination of a PAC and a Control Attribute Package (CAP) is proposed and 
how it matches the requirements is discussed. Moreover, problems of privilege 
delegation across domains and solutions with the PAC are discussed as well as a 
prototype on WISA server. 
In Chapter 6, as a protection system of secret document leakage and virus 
infection, ‘Windows Vault,’ an integrated system of two Windows workstations [SY2005, 
SY2007] is introduced. Firstly, its concept is described followed by problems of an 
existing system. Next, the architecture including gateways connecting the two 
workstations securely is described, and performance of a prototype is evaluated. 
Security of Windows Vault is considered in detail as well as discussion on enhancement 
of the gateways and usability of network applications. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the results from this research and shows 
directions for the future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Multiparty DSA Signature Generation 
without Simultaneous User Operations 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, Multiparty Signature Generation (MSG) of DSA without simultaneous 
operation [SY2001, SH2001, SY2004] is described. 
A typical method to protect signature key is to use smartcard, but the 
smartcard cannot prevent a malicious key holder from abuse. MSG is a technology to 
protect signature key from such threat; the signature key is divided into multiple pieces 
which are hold by multiple key holders, and the key holders cooperate to make a 
signature without revealing the divided keys to the other key holders. The multiparty 
RSA signature generation is straightforward, but the MSGs of DSA [CM1993, GR1996] 
are complicated and less realistic; the signature generation process requires broadcast 
messages between the key holders, and the key holders must process the MSG at the 
same time. It is out of touch with reality that all the key holders gather for each time of 
signature generation. Considering use in real world, it is much better that each key 
holder executes the signature operation at her/his convenience. 
This chapter presents an MSG scheme of DSA without simultaneous 
operations of the key holders; the broadcast messages are hidden from the key holders, 
so that they do not need to execute signature generation at the same time. The key idea 
is simple and obvious, however, it brings great convenience. The key holders calculate 
signature parameters before the actual signature generation process, that is, during 
signature generation, each key holder calculates secret and public shares used for 
future signature generations. The data required to compute the shares are exchanged 
via a server; each key holder calculates temporary data, puts them on the server, 
retrieves them from the server, and these processes are repeated until the key holder 
obtains the shares required to generate the signature. 
The benefit of the new scheme is illustrated in Figure 2.1. In this example, key 
holders ,  and  are in office, and can execute the signature generation 
operations du  and ,  and , and respectively. Even if all the key 
1U 2U
ring 
3U
11I 12I 21I 22I 3I  
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holders wish to sign a message at 0 , the signature cannot be generated in the existing 
schemes until ll the key hold  in office and execute the signature 
generation operations simultaneo ly. In contrast to the existing schemes, 1U , 2U  
and 3U execute e signature generation operations at 1t , 2t and 3t  respectively, and 
the signature is generated at 3t  in the proposed scheme. 
After the approach to realize the new MSG of D A described in Section 2.2, 
preliminaries of the original DSA and the verifiable secret sharing are described in 
Section 2.3, the MSG is presented in Section 2.4 and its 
t
us
4t  
 th
when a ers are
p rformance is
Section
resent
2.2 Approach to
This section describes outline of th
where 
S is 
e
e new MSG of DSA. The DSA
 estimated
 sign
 in 
ature 
 
   
2.5. The security of the MSG is described in Section 2.6 and the extension to 
threshold signature in Section 2.7. The application to other schemes is presented in 
Section 2.8, related works in Section 2.9 and conclusions in Section 2.10. 
 
Figure 2.1: Benefit of P ed MSG 
 
 New MSG of DSA 
consists of two numbers and looks like as follows: 
)/)(,(),( cramessagegsr c  , 
g  is a fix number, a  is the signature key, and c  is a random number which is 
generated every time of signing to message . In the  and the 
num r are d as follows: 
MSG, the key random 
be divide
ZYX aaaa   and 
ZYX cccc   
where Xa , Ya , and Za  are t ivided keys of khe d ey holders X , Y , and Z  
12I
1U
11I  
21I 22I
2U
3I
3U
time 
0t  4t3t2t  1t  
A signature is generated at  earlier than 
when all the key holders gather. 
4t  3t
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respectively, and so on. The MSG calculates signature of the same form: 
 key h e
te parts of the 
signature from secrets. 
 the signature
ocess; during signature generation, each key holder calculates 
the secre nature gene
itions, 
each key
))/())((,(),( ZYXZYX
cc cccaaarmessagegsr ZYX    c
without revealing secrets, Xa , Ya , Za , Xc , Yc , and Zc , to the other olders; th  
key holders exchange public and secret shares of each secret, and calcula
The first number of , ZXcg  , can be calculated without 
message or document, so the key holders calculate the number before the actual 
signature generation pr
Y ccr 
t and public shares used for future sig rations. The data required to 
compute the shares are exchanged via a server; each key holder calculates temporary 
data, puts them on the server, retrieves them from the server, and these processes are 
repeated until the key holder obtains the shares required to generate signature. 
However, the exchange has two conditions that are required from security; 
firstly the key holders should have the same public shares of each key holder, secondary 
the shares should be exchanged at the same time. In order to satisfy the cond
 holder sends commitment of the public shares via the server before the key 
holder sends the public and secret shares; Figure 2.2 illustrates the share exchange of 
X  mainly. 
In the generation step, each key holder calculates its shares Share and 
commitment Commit , and sends Commit  to the server. At the end of this step, the 
mitments ofcom y holders are  the server. Next in the di ep, 
each key
er r e other’s d  that all of them ar me. 
 th ,  are exchange
 all ke
 end of t
trieves th
e four steps
 stored on
shares o
HashAll ’s
 the public and secret
stribution st
e the sa
d satisfying two 
 holder retrieves the commitments of the other key holders, and sends its share 
Share . At the his step, the f all key holders are stored on the server. In 
the verification step, each key holder retrieves Share ’s of the other key holders and 
verifies that the commitment is calculated from the share of each of the other key 
s. If the verification succeeds, each key holder calculates the hash value of all the 
public shares of all the key holders, HashAll , and sends it to the server. At the end of 
this step all HashAll ’s are stored in the server. Finally in the production step, each 
conditions. The first condition, all share should be the same, is confirmed in the 
production step by checking that all HashAll ’s are the same. The second condition, 
holder
key hold
Through
e   an  verifies
 shares
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shares should be exchanged at the same time, is satisfied by sending  Commit  before 
Share ; no key holder can change his share before receiving other’s share. The details of 
 
Key Holder 
exchange are described in Section 2.4.2. 
X  Y and Z  Server 
(1) Generation  
 calculates , 
 
 
e as 
XShare XCommit  
sends Co  Xmmit   
sam X
Xmmit
, ZCommit
Co  
YCommit  
(2) Distribution 
es , retriev YitComm ZCommit  
sends Share  X
 
 
 
same as X
 
 
XShare
Y , ZShare
 
Share  
(3) Verification 
es , 
verifies , , 
 and Se s 
e as 
retriev YShare ZShare  
YCommit ZCommit
X
 
 
 
 YShare , and ZShare  
calculates nd XHashAll  
 
 
 
 
 
sam
XHashAll
HashAll
 
YHashAll , Z  
(4) Production 
compares , , 
retrieves YHashAll , ZHashAll  
XHashAll YHashAll
ZHashAll  
  
and 
       
re 2.2: Share Exchange between Key Holders via Se
 
mall, bec ginal 
private key i hold by 
any key holders even if it is split. 
2.3.1 Notations 
Table 2.1 describes the notations used in the paper. The 
Figu rver 
ause the ori
y is 
It is assumed that the number of the split keys is s
s very important and it is difficult to consider such critical ke
m
 
2.3 Preliminaries 
-th power of  is F over pZx
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written as ),exp( xF ; usually it is written as xF  mod p , but the former notation is 
any calcul such as used, because there are m ations in the power part 
pF
qa
ij
j
j
n
i ij
mod
mod1      
and the following notation is easier to read 
)mod,exp( n qajF . 
1  i ij jij
 
No ns 
 
Notaition Description 
Table 2.1: tatio
iU  Key holder indexed with  n,1i ,  
p  Large prime number 
q  Large prime number dividing 1p  
pZ  Finite field of order p  
qZ  Finite field of order q  
G d Element of pZ  of or re  q  
),exp( xF  x -th power of F  over p  Z
mssg  Message to b signed e 
hash C tion wh range is  ryptographic hash func ose qZ  
  ),( jiEmssg  mssg  encrypted with key sh  and ared by iU jU  
  ),( jiSmssg  Keyed hash value of mssg  
 
It is assumed that each pair of th y holders shares a secret key of a e ke
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symmetric key encrypt  notation ion algorithm. The   ),( jiEmssg  represents the 
ncrypted data generated by with the following properties: 
 
e iU  
 Only iU  and jU  can access to mssg . 
 U can verify that m  is originated from U . j ssg i
 
an genera  such ta by encryptio  tc  te da n of he concatenation of mssgiU , sender 
entifier , receiver id i identifier j  and the hash value of mssg , wi ared key. 
The notation repr ts the keyed hash value
th the sh
  ),( jiSmssg  esen  of mssg , that is, the hash 
value of the concatenation of mssg  and the shared key. U can confirm mssj g  is 
originated from ecking the equality of the received  iU  by ch   ),( jiS  and the one 
generated by jU  itself. The integrity of mss
mssg
g  is also checke
 
In this subsection, the DSA [NIST1998] is de A specifies the Secure Hash 
A
d. 
2.3.2 The Digital Signature Algorithm 
scribed. The DS
lgorithm One (SHA-1) [NIST1995] as the hash function, and it is written as 
older chooses randomly 
()hash  
simply. 
 
(1) Key Generation 
A key h  and calculates pZaGP  ),exp(
ple of 
qZa .  The 
ublic key is the tuprivate key of the key holder is a , and the p p , q , G  and . 
and calculates the signature  as follows: 
P
 
(2) Signature Generation 
For each signature generation, the key holder generates randomly non-zero number, 
c qZ  ),( sr
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,mod)mod,exp( 1 qqcGr   
.mod))(( qcramssghashs   
Note that the random number c  and the first part of the signature r  are independent 
to the signed message mssg , and can be generated and calculated before th
is calculated with pre-computed 
e message 
is given [S  scheme utilizes this property; the key holders 
calculate c s given, and
and 
C1989]. The presented
and r before message i  s  c  
r . 
 
(3) Signature Verification 
If the following equation holds, then ),( sr  is a valid signature of the message mssg : 
 
 
.mod)),))(,(exp( 11 qrsPsmssghashGr   exp(
2.3.3 Verifiable Secret Sha
The ),,( Mnt  threshold verifiable secret sharing )1( Mnt
ring 
  is a scheme that a
d
 
eal utes shares of a secret  to er distrib s M  key olders h
fo
MUU ,,1  with the 
llowing properties: 
onstruct in polynomial time. 
ach key uted by the de
 key ho
rrect secret. 
 Any corrupted key holders up to cannot get any information of . 
d
PT1
 
4
SG schem
ey holders and a server 
rs and may be corrupted. The corrupted key holders and 
 
 Any group of at least n  key holders can rec
 E holder can verify that his share distrib aler is correct, that is, 
after verification, all the key holders can make sure that any lders can 
reconstruct the co
 s  
n  
t  s
 
Pe ersen showed a ),1,( Mtt   threshold verifiable secret sharing scheme [PT1991a, 
991b] described in Appendix A. 
2.  MSG of DSA 
In this section, the M e of the DSA is described. The following is assumed to 
realize the scheme: 
 
 The scheme consists of k
 Up to 1t  key holde
iU  S . 
S  
S  may do the eavesdropping, halting or malicious attacks [GR1996]. The scheme 
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prevents the private key from the eavesdropping attack, however, the key and 
signature generation procedures stop in the case of the halting and malicious 
mb d
attacks. 
 The nu er of the key hol ers is 312  tn . Extension to the threshold 
gnature, where the private key is split into si M  keys such that 1 nM , is 
described in Section 2.6. 
The communication channel may not be secure except during the execution of the 
first thre
 
e steps of the key generation procedure described in the next subsection. 
2.4.1 Key Generation 
secu s 
used rocedures. A ter the three steps, each pair of two key holders shares a 
. In the following the key holders are indexed with 
 
During the first three steps, S  and the communication channel are assumed to be 
re. This condition is required to keep the authenticity of the initial exchange of key
 in the later p f
key used for secure communication
or 
i  
j  in  n,,1 . 
 
(1) iU  chooses  a random polynomial of degree t  over qZ : 
 t0,  , tiiii xhxhhxh ,1,)(  
qtii Zhh ,,0, ,,  and ,where 0tih
miA , ’s and commitment of th
. 
e p
iU  
u
calculat
blic shares 
es the
iA : 
 secret shares s, public 
shares 
 
 
jia , ’
),(mod)(, ijqjha iji   
),0(mod),exp( ,, tmphGA mimi   
 , 
and sends  to . 
(2) After all the key holders finish the above step,  retrieves  from 
and then sends to 
),,( ,0, tiii AAhashA 
iA S
 
iU )( ijAj  S , 
)0(, tmA mi  S . 
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(3) After all the key holders finish the above step,  retrieves   
 
iU ),0(, ijtmA mj 
from S , and verifies the following: 
).(),,( ,0, ijAAhashA tjjj    
If the verification fails, t e key generatiohen th  n procedure stops and  quits from 
ed by e other key
 calculates 
iU
 th
,0,jA
the procedure. This leads to the stop of the procedure execut  
holders. Otherwise iU )exp( 0,, iji hK  . 
 red secret key  ijjji KhhGK ,0,0,1, ),exp(  is the sha  between  and iU jU  
[DW1976]. iU  puts the following on S : 
   ),( jiSi 'A  where  AAA ,,'  , tni ,0,1
 
),(, jiEji
a . 
(4) After all the key h e step,  retrieves iU   ),(' ijSjAolders finish the abov  and 
 
),(, ijEij
 a  S ( j   ffrom  and verifies the ollowing for each )i , ij  : 
 ij ), 


t
m
m
mj piAaG
0
,, ,mod)),exp((exp(  
  
),(
'
ijSj
A  is consistent with 'iA . 
rification fails, then the key generation procedure stops. If the ve
 
The public key of the key holders is  where ),,,( PGqp P  is calculated as follows:  
    ni ini i hGAP 1 0,1 0, (modexp(),exp( ni ihG 1 0, ), p).  
 
2.4.2 Random Sharing 
The first part of signature r  is indepe e message to be signed, and can be ndent to th
calculated through the random sharing procedures before the actual message is given. 
This is the same idea of the preprocessing of the random number exponentiation 
C1989]. The procedure consists of four procedures, that is, generation, distribution, [S
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verification and production procedur
During the procedures, 
(polynomials), distribute their secret and public shares in verifiable form using the 
verifiable secret sharing. In the end of the procedures, the key holders share secret 
qZc  and can generate qcGr mod),exp( 1 , which correspond to c  and 
es described in the following clauses. 
the key holders generate random numbers 
r  
respectively described in Clause 2.2.2.2. When a message is given, the key ders 
ures and the signa s
 and whose constant t  are zero, and calculates 
mputes ublic shares 
 
hol can 
calculate the other part s  of the signature with the secret shares of c  and the private 
key through the signature generation procedure described in the next subsection. Each 
of the procedures must be executed for each signature. 
The outline of the four proced ture generation of the l -th message i  
described in the following.  
 
(1) Random Generation Procedure 
iU  generates two random polynomials of t  degree ib  and ic , two random 
polynomials of t2  degree 
)(l
erms
lso co
)(l
 the p
)(l
iv
)(l
iw  
the secret shares )(,
l
jib , 
)(
,
l
jic , 
)(
,
l
jiv , and 
)(
,
l
jiw  for jU . iU  a
)(
,
l
miB , 
)(
,
l
miC , 
)(
,
l
miV , and 
)(
,
l
miW  shared by all the key holders, and sends the commitment to 
S : 
  ),()( jiSliCMT where  )(2,)(1,)(2,)(1,)(,)( 0,)(,)( 0,)( ,,,,,,,,,, l tilil tililtililtilili WWVVCCBBCMT  . 
 
(2) Random Distribution Procedure 
U  retrieves   )(
),(
)( ij
ijS
l
j   
S : 
CMTi and then sends the encrypted secret shares and the 
public shares to 
  
),(
)(
,
)(
,
)(
,
)(
, ,,, jiE
l
ji
l
ji
l
ji
l
ji wvcb  and 
 . )(,)(,)(,)(, ,,, lmilmilmilmi WVCB
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(3) Rando fication Procedure 
U  retrieves the sec
m Veri
ret and public shares, and verifies that i   ),()( ijSljCMT
are consistent. After the verification, 
 and 
, , , , , ,  
sends the following: 
)(
,
l
ijb , 
iU
)(
,
l
ijc
)(
,
l
ijv
)(
,
l
ijw
)(
,
l
mjB
)(
,
l
mjC
)(
,
l
mjV
)(
,
l
mjW  
   ),()( jiSliBCVW where  )( 2,)(1,1)( 2,)(1,1)( , ,,,,,, l tnll tnlltn WWVVC )( 0,1)( ,)( 0,1)( ,,,,, lltnlli CBBBCVW 
 
i
. 
(4) Production Procedure 
 retrieves U   )(
),(
)( ijBCVW
ijS
l
j 
iU  itself. iU  can confirm t
shares with this verification. After the v
 and verifies they are the same as the one 
generated by hat all the key holders have the same public 
erification, sends the production of two 
ecrets with random number: 
 . 
 
ocedure, the key holders execute firstly the random 
eneration procedures of the first through forth signature generations ( ), 
secondly the random distribution p  of the first through th
 ( ), thirdly the rand  procedures
econd sign nerations ( ), and finally the random production p
iU  
s
 
n nn
j
l
(5) Start-up Random Sharing 
After the key generation pr
g
 
 

j j
l
ij
l
ijij
l
i qvcbd
1 1
)(
,
)(
,
1
)(
,
)( mod)))(((
4,3,2,1l
ird signature 
 of the first and 
rocedure of 
rocedures
generations om verification3,2,1l
ature ges
th
2,1l
e first signature generation ( 1l ). The st
procedures, and is executed only once after th
art-up procedure consists e 
e key generation procedure. 
 of the abov
This is the 
shares, an
preparation for the signatures of the first through forth messages to be signed. At the 
end of the start-up procedure, the key holders have the secret and public d 
they can compute the first signature ( 1l ) with the shares. Table 2.2 illustrates the 
relation of the sub-procedures and the signature generation procedure. 
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RG S S S S L1 L2 
RD S S S L1 L2 … 
RV S S L1 L2 … 
RP S L1 L2 … 
SG L1 L2 … 
RG: Random Generation  S:  executed as the start-up procedure  
RD: Random Distribution  L1: executed during the first SG ( ) 
RV: Random Verification  L2: executed during the second SG ( ) 
RP: Random Production 
SG: Signature Generation 
 
The table shows the relation of the procedures; for example, the RG, RD, RV 
procedure of the second signature (
1l
2l
2l ) are processed as the start-up 
procedure (S), and the RP procedure during the first SG(L1) 
 
2.4.3 Signature Generation 
The following describes the -th signature generation procedure. As the first step of the 
procedure, the -th message is put on . 
 
(1)  retrieves  and  from . After confirms to sign 
calculates t : 
 
l
l )(lmssg  S
iU
iU  
 )()( ijd lj 
h
)(lmssg
e following and sends them t
S
o 
iU  
)(lmssg , 
S

 

 
n
j jk
l
j
n
j
l
j
l
i qqdjk
kBr
1
)(
1
)(
0,
)( mod)mod)(,exp( １  and 
 . 
(2) executes the random generation sub-procedure of the (
  
  

n
j
n
j
n
j
l
ij
l
ijij
l
i
ll
i qwcarmssghashs
1 1 1
)(
,
)(
,,
)()()( mod)))()(((
iU  4l )-th signature, 
(3) executes the random distribution sub-procedure of the ( 3l )-th signature, 
(4) executes the random verification sub-procedure of the ( 2l )-th signature, and 
(5) executes the random production sub-procedure of the ( 1l )-th signature. 
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After all the k verifies that all 
s are the same and that the following final signature is a valid signature 
: 
ey holders execute the above procedures, S  
 )(ljr ’
of 
),( )()( ll sr
)(lmssg

  j
n
i ij
l qjr
1
(
1 )( . 
If the v on fa , the signatur enera  procedur tops. Otherwise 
outputs the signature. At this stage the key holders have the public and secret shares 
that are required to compute the (
ll sr )()( ,( lisi
)( mod)) (,
erificati ils e g tion e s S  
1l )-th signature. F example, when the first 
signature is erate ), then the key holders have the shares of the se
sign  2. 
 
2.5 im
A p  has been implemented on a smart card and the 
performance is estimated in the environment shown in Table 2.3. 
 
item description 
or 
 gen d ( 1l cond 
ature ( 2l ). The relation of the sub-procedures is illustrated in Table
 Performance Est ation 
rototype of the MSG scheme
Table 2.3: Environment of Performance Estimation 
 
t  1 
n  3 
CPU SLE66CX160S
Memory size 16K bytes 
OS MULTOS v4.0
Length of p  1,024 bits 
Length of q  16  bi0 ts 
Hash algorithm SHA-1 
Encryption algorithm Triple DES 
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Table 2.4: Performance 
 
Step Procedure Time (seconds)
1 Generation of 1.7 ),( ii sr  
2 Random Generation 11.4 
3 Random Distribution 3.0 
4 Random Verification 41.1 
5 Random Production 0.6 
N/A Total 57.8 
 
Some processes are different from th
the memory space. For example, )(,
l
ji , 
)(
,
l
ji , ji , ji
parameter generation sub-procedure, not the parameter distrib
T
e description in Section 2.3 in order to save 
, , and  are encrypted during the 
ution sub-procedure. 
he values of  and are calculated during the parameter 
verification sub-procedure. 
The performance of the p pe is show .4. The total time of the 
signature generation is ab t 58 seconds, and it cannot say that it is sufficiently fast as 
interactive use with human user. However, the scheme can be used in interactive way 
with the following changes: 
 
 The signature gener re is divid o parts, the generation of 
and the parameter sharing and the cessed as background. As a 
o r re procedure finishes in 1.7 
he , and this is sufficient 
performance for interactive use with human user. 
 The users might want to sign multiple messages at a time. In order to realize 
this, it is required that each of th om sharing procedures should process 
multiple randoms; the random produc rocedure generates , 
instead of just , and the random verification  
b
n
c
)(l
c
)(lv
 
)(lw
)(ln B 0,1 jj ,1 ijj
rototy n in Table 2
ou
ation procedu ed into tw
later is pro),( )()( li
l
i sr
result, it lo
seconds, t
ks for the human use  that the signatu
processing time of the generation of ( ), )()( li
l
i sr
k  
e rand
tion p )2()1( ,, klj
l
i CMTd
 
 procedure checks)1( lid

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)2()1( ,, klj
kl
j CMTCMT
   
6 Security f M
In this section, the comp
roved that the esen
DSA. We also discuss the
2.6.1 Compatibility with Original DSA 
e following theorem sh
 same
rem 1 (Compatibili
roof of the theorem is given
lo
ack even if adversary kn
in and so on. 
 
2.
atibility and esente me are presented; it 
is p h and ecure as the original 
ted. 
 
h ows that signatures ge  with the MSG are verified with 
the
Theo ty with the original DSA): The signature  is a valid 
The p  in Append
wing assumption: the original DSA is secure against the 
tt ows the first pa
stead of just )2( l , jCMT
of the pr
ible wit
 that may be 
nerated
ix B. 
rt of signature
o SG 
 security d sche
pr ted scheme is compat  as s
 security of the server corrup
T
 way as the original DSA. 
 
DSA signature of the message )(lmssg . 
 
 
),( )()( ll sr
2.6.2 Unforgeability of MSG 
It is shown that the MSG is as secure as the original DSA against the adaptive chosen 
message attack with the fol
a  r  previously, that is, the 
 
 
adversary can choose message with knowledge of the part. It is considered that this 
oes not give impact on the security because of the following reasons: assumption d
r  is generated randomly and out of control of the adversary as well as the honest 
key holders, and 
  from the valu , not the signature is calculated e of  hash , and it is )(mssg mssg
difficult to choose adequate mssg  for the attack. 
 
In case of the attack against the MSG, the concept of view is required; the view 
1U  is everything that 1U  sees during the execution of th  
n in Appendix C. 
of e key generation,
pa eneration . Example of the view of  is 
giv
rameter sharing and signature g
e
 procedures 1U
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An adversary X  fo SA is all a key holder as an 
oracle; 
r the original D owed to use 
X  tries to forge a signature e of a messag mssg  after it gets signatures of 
essag of its own choice. The oracle gives the first part of the signature m es r  before X  
The 
e is 
requests a signature. The orac
notation ( 'mssg ) is used to den
no such probabilistic polynomial time algorithm for 
le is different from on escribed in [PC1996]. 
ote the chosen messages . If ther
e d
,',' 21 mssgmssg
X , then it is called that the DSA is 
secure against the adaptive chosen message attack. The notation ),,,( PGqpX  is used 
to denote the random variable that takes a value of (),'(( mssgmssg
s
)), s, r  with 
ame ability that
the 
prob  X  queries   )'(mssg to the oracle and finally outputs
),,( srmssg  on input ),,,( PGqpX . 
An adversary Y  for the MSG of the DSA that cor
allowed to use n  key holders as an oracle; 
rupts up to key holders is t  
Y  tries to forge a signature of the target 
message mssg  with signatures of m
k
essages of its own choice  got from the 
ey hold including the corrupted key holders. The view of is the sum of the 
lyn
lled th t th SG of the DS  is secure against the
daptive message attack. The notation to denote t  
with the same probability 
hat to the  under 
em sho
DSA against the adaptive chosen message 
)'(mssg
Y  
ic 
A
)  is used 
(mssg
e following 
n  
 
he
the 
ws 
ers 
 chose
 queries 
t  
 
ones of the corrupted key holders. If there is no such probabilist omial time 
algorithm for Y , then it is ca a
a
po
,, r
e M
,(p
n |,,( PGqpY
)),, srmssg  
finally outputs 
),, PG . Th
random variable that takes a value of (),'((mssg
t
condition that the generated public key is
that the MSG is as secure as the original 
attack. 
 
Theorem2 (Unforgeability): For any adversary Y  for the MSG of the DSA, there is an 
adversary 
Y )'(mssg oracle and 
 q
)s
theor
X  for the original DSA such that 
 
))),,(),'(()|,,(Pr())),,(),'((),,,(Pr( srmssgmssgPGqpYsrmssgmssgPGqpX   
 
any public key (pfor  and any 
The  in A
6.3
ere problem. If the server is unavailable, the key holders cannot 
),,, PGq )),,(),'(( srmssgmssg . 
 
 proof of the theorem is given ppendix D. 
 
2.  Server Failure 
It is clear that S  is the weak point of the MSG, but it is considered that the failure of 
the server is not a sev
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generate e
 e y ca
y he
 signatures, how ver, the failure of the server does not affect the security of the 
scheme; ven if the server is corrupted, the adversar nnot get any information of 
secret keys of the key holders, nor generate valid signatures. This securit  level is t  
same as the one against the eavesdropping adversary of the case that 12  tn  
[GR1996].
The problem is that the key holders cannot generate valid signatures because 
of the disturbance of the server, a sort of denial of service (DoS) attack. This attack is 
considered to be difficult to prevent completely; an adversary can also do the attack by 
sending plenty of bogus data to the netw necting the key holders. 
ounter measure against the attack is to p
 
ork con
A c rotect the server and
such attack. This is the s
e
cheme is extended 
Usually
 network from 
ame availability as the other existing MSG schemes assuming 
secure channel between the key holders. If th  network between the key holders of the 
existing MSGs is under the DoS attack, they cannot generate signature, because they 
cannot exchange shares. 
 
2.7 Extension to Threshold Signature 
In this section, the presented MSG s to the threshold signature 
scheme. Firstly the use of the extended scheme is described.  out of  n M  
( 1 nM ) cards (key holders) are used to ignatures and the other nMgenerate s   
cards are kept in safe as spare cards. If one of the n  cards becomes unavailable, for 
example the card is broken or lost, then one of the nM   
e 
spare cards is us
lable card. Even if cards are lost, th system is secure under t
s.
ra ted  new combin
ards. 
The extension is applied basically to the key generation procedure;
distribute
ed
h
 instead of 
e condition 
ation of the n  
 each U  
the unavai t  
that there is no adversary in the n  card holder  When a spare card is newly used, the 
start-up pa meter sharing procedure is execu
c
 with the
i
generates ih  and s ji, qjha i mod)( to )1( MjU j  . The  
haring an signature generation slightly d
or  
 used, then th
random
mmations and 
 example, if
s d 
1 , are
 procedures are 
e ch
e final signature s  
ifferent; the su
osen n  cards. F
is calculated as follows: 
products are calculated with the indices of th
U2 ,, nU
   




 
1
1
1
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1 i
qsj . 
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2.8 MSG of Other Signature Schemes 
The MSG scheme can be applied to the other signature schemes based on the DLP, such 
as the Nyberg-Rueppel Signature (NRS) [IEEE1999]. The key holder chooses a random 
number c qZ  and calculates a signature ),( sr  of the NRS for the message mssg  as 
follows: 
 
qmssghashcGr mod))(),(exp(  , 
qracs mod)(   
where qZa  is the private key.  
The basic idea of the MSG of the NRS is exactly the same; the parameter r  is 
calculated before the actual signature generation. Key holder  processes  and iU jib ,
miB ,  in the same way as in Section 2.3.2 where , and then outputs the t n 1
following: 
 qmssghashBr
n
j
j mod))((
1
0,

 , 
 
 

n
j
n
j
ijiji qarbs
1 1
,, mod)( , 
and then the server outputs the final signature: 

  
n
i ij
i qsij
jrsr
1
).mod,(),(  
Comparing with the MSG of the DSA, the MSG of the NRS is secure against 
the eavesdropping attack even if 1n  key holders are corrupted, while the limit of the 
corrupted key holders is (  nt
DLP [KN1994] such as the Elliptic Curve DSA, the Elliptic Curve NRS [IEEE1999]. 
This is because a part of signature can be generated without he message to be signed. 
part of the signature is calculated with the message, the p
 
2/)1  in case of the DSA. 
The idea can be also applied to the digital signatures based on the elliptic curve 
 t
The other  re-generated 
parameter and the split key without simultaneous operations of all the key holders. 
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2.9 Differences with Existing MSG 
Many MSGs are presented in recent years. Comparing with the ones of the RSA 
cryptosystem [GN1999, MM1999], the presented MSG is more complicated and less 
efficient, se of the many interactions b en the key holders and server. Ho ver, 
be applie
fu
 becau etwe we
the presented system is more promising than the MSGs of RSA, because the MSG can 
d to the elliptic curve cryptosystem, which will be used more than RSA in near 
ture. 
Comparing with the ones based on the DLP [CM1993, GR1996, MK2001, 
PC1996], it is considered that the presented system has much advantage in the real 
se, be s not require simultaneous operations of the key 
holders and each of them can sign at her/his convenience. The basic idea is simple and 
obvious, t
 a ro
attack, the adaptive chosen message attack, with the assumption that the original DSA 
is se
world u cause the MSG doe
 but it was out of consideration of the previous works. As for the most cri ical 
security, the presented system is as secure as the original DSA gainst the st ngest 
cure against the attack even if adversary knows the first parameter r  previously. 
against the
w  d
As for attacks by corrupted key holders, the MSG is as secure as the existing system 
 eavesdropping attacks, even if the server is also corrupted. The server is the 
eak point, however, it is considered that the efect is supplemented by the advantage 
in the real world use. Note that the other schemes assume that the network between the 
key holders is secure, and its security is out of consideration. 
The least number of key holders is three; 12  tn  and . There 
multaneous user operations 
[MP2001], but it needs much more computation; the MSG needs more than twenty 
exponential computation per key holder during signature generation, while the 
proposed
 exc
system 
,7,5,3n
is a MSG of DSA for two holders which does not require si
 MSG is one. As a result, it is not realistic to implement the MSG on smartcard. 
The number of messages hanged between the key holders is greater than 
the other MSGs, for example DSS-Thresh-Sig-1 [GR1996], because the presented 
detects a malicious attack, and stops the key and signature generation 
procedures. This is also true as for the computational cost. However, it is shown that a 
signature is generated in 1.7 seconds in Section 2.5 and it is considered the performance 
is sufficient for interactive use with human user. 
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2.10 Conclusions 
In this chapter the MSG of the DSA without simultaneous processing is presented; with 
the pre-computation of a part of signature, the broadcast messages are hidden from the 
key holders, and it is possible for each key holder to process the signature generation at 
her/his convenience. The security of the scheme, the performance estimation of a 
prototype on a smartcard, the extension to the threshold signature and the application 
of the MSG to other signature schemes are also discussed. 
The MSG can realize secure key management that is easier to use than the 
existing MSGs. The MSG will be used widely from the view that the scheme can be 
directly applied to the elliptic curve cryptosystem. 
The remaining problem is the flexibility on constitution of key holders; the 
order of key holders’ processing is not fixed, but the constitution of key holders is fixed. 
It is convenient that any n  key holders out of M  sign a message, then a DSA 
signature of the message is produced. 
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Chapter 3 
Certificate Verification Service with Time Stamp Solving 
Invalidation of Signature by Certificate Revocation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes a user attribute with validity period extension field of a Public 
A PKC binds a public key to its owner with her/his name optionally including 
ffiliation with the signature of the issuer CA. A PKC user can get an authentic public 
key from the PKC, and verifies the signature of the PKC owner with the authentic 
public key. The PKC is just a static data and it may contain old information; the PKC is 
revoked when it is suspected that the private key was compromised or the affiliation of 
the owner changed, etc. The revocation is announced with a Certificate Revocation List 
(CRL) including the serial numbers of revoked PKCs. 
However, the revocation announcement with the CRL has three problems; 
firstly unavailability of the latest revocation information, secondly large CRL size, and 
thirdly invalidation of signature with the revocation. These problems lead the following 
practical issues and disturb widespread use of the PKI; for example, transaction request 
which is actually invalid is verified as valid, or conversely contract document which was 
valid at signing time is verified as invalid later. 
In order to solve these problems, a new extended field in the PKC called User 
Attribute with Validity Period (UAV) and a new on-line service, CVSTS are introduced. 
The targets of the two solutions are mainly the PKI applications which require the 
non-repudiation mechanism, such as secure messaging, digitally signed document, or 
business transaction. 
 This chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the problems of the 
current revocation announcement method, and Sections 3.3 and 3.4 include the 
description of the new extended field, UAV, and the new service, CVSTS. In Section 3.5 
Key Certificate (PKC) and a Certificate Verification Service with Time Stamp (CVSTS), 
which solve the problems of unavailability of the latest revoked certificate information, 
large size of the revocation information, and lack of non-repudiation mechanism of the 
PKI [CCITT1988]. 
a
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the performance 
discussions on th
of the CVSTS is evaluated, and Sections 3.6 and 3.7 include 
e cost, security, scalability of the CVSTS, and related work. Finally 
 
.2.1 Unavailability of Latest Revocation Information 
contain the latest PKC status because the CRL is issued 
ce a month, and a PKC user may get to know the revocation 
of members of the organization 
change 
 amendment [ISO1995] introduced two 
solutions
helps to distribute the CRL repositories in network according to 
e revo
Section 3.8 concludes this chapter. 
 
3.2 Problems of Current Revocation Announcement
3
A CRL does not always 
periodically, for example on
after the next CRL is issued. A simple solution to this problem is to issue the CRLs 
frequently and the user retrieves the latest CRL every time the user verifies a digital 
signature. But this solution is not feasible because of the problem described in the next 
subsection. 
 
3.2.2 Large Size of CRL 
The serial numbers of a revoked PKC are held in the CRL during the validity period of 
the PKC, and the CRL size may become large. Thus it may cost high for a user to 
retrieve the CRL through network and to hold it locally. This problem is serious in the 
case of an organizational CA; a major revocation reason of the PKC issued by the CA is 
the affiliation change of the owner; a large number 
their departments or branches periodically, say April and October, and the 
owner names change. As a result, the number of revoked PKCs is large, and the size of 
the CRL increases. For example, if 10% of 10,000 employees of a company change their 
affiliations, the CRL size becomes about 20K bytes, and it is not feasible to retrieve such 
sizeable data each time of verification. 
The version 2 CRL defined in the X.509
, delta-CRL and CRL distribution point. The delta-CRL contains only 
difference from the previously issued CRL. The CRL distribution point is used to split 
the revocation information according to reasons of revocation, such as unuse, key 
compromise or suspension of key use, and to identify the location where the split CRL 
can be obtained. This 
th cation reason, and to reduce the cost of retrieval of the CRL when only 
revocation due to a specific reason is concerned. 
With the help of the version 2 CRL, a CA can issue CRLs more frequently and 
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gives users more timely revocation information, because the transmission of the smaller 
CRL is lighter than the original CRL. However, a user machine that does not have 
secure storage for the revocation information needs to verify the base CRL and 
elta-CRL, and this makes the load of the user machine heavier. Therefore the version 2 
, it is not enough for messaging service; after the revocation of 
he PKC containing the public key of the originator, the signature of the signed message 
e 3.1, and there is no evidence that she/he has 
pudiate the fact that the originator sent 
ge firstly accesses a CRL repository to get the 
latest CR
d
CRL is not a complete solution against the CRL size problem. 
 
3.2.3 Lack of Non-Repudiation Mechanism 
With the timely PKC revocation information, a user that has machine with the secure 
storage for the revocation information can verify a digital signature at the time when 
the user receives it. This is adequate for verifying an origin of connection request or an 
update request of a database entry, because it is enough for such applications to 
authenticate the source of the request, and to detect unauthorized change of the 
application data. However
t
becomes invalid illustrated in Figur
created the message, and the originator can re
the message to the recipient or the content itself. Such applications are secure 
messaging, digitally signed document and business transaction data, etc. 
In order to solve this problem the recipient needs the evidence of the fact that 
the message had existed or been received before the PKC was revoked. A Time Stamp 
Service (TSS) [HS1991] proves the fact; a TSS server, which is a Trusted Third Party 
(TTP), stamps the time with data requested by a user, and the time-stamped data is the 
evidence of the existence of the data at that time. The recipient can bring the CRL and 
time-stamped data to court for resolution of the dispute between the originator and 
recipient. 
A recipient of a signed messa
L and a TSS server to get the time stamp, and then keeps them for future use. 
However, there still remains the size problem of CRL, that is, the recipient whose 
machine does not have secure storage for revocation information needs to retrieve the 
sizeable CRL every time of verification. There is another size problem; in order to 
resolve a future dispute, the recipient needs to keep the large CRLs (base and 
delta-CRL) in order to prove the PKC is not revoked. 
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 Figure 3.1: Invalidation of Signature with PKC Revocation 
 
In the following, solutions to the problems are presented; the UAV is the 
solution to the large CRL size problem, and the CVSTS is a solution to the 
unavailability of the latest revocation information problem and the lack of 
non-repudiation mechanism problem. The combination of the two solutions resolves the 
problem
ent name, title of the owner, with the validity period of the attributes. The 
owner n
CE { 
    type           OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
    value          ANY defined by type } } 
The userAttributes field is valid between notBefore and notAfter. Even if one of 
s caused from the current revocation mechanism of the PKI. 
 
3.3 User Attribute with Validity Period Field 
The UAV is introduced as a solution to the large CRL size problem, in particular in the 
case that the issuer CA is an organizational CA. The field contains user attributes, such 
as departm
ame field does not contain the department and/or branch name of the owner. 
The following Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) [RT1990] description gives its 
syntactical definition: 
UserAttributeWithValidityPeriod ::= SEQUENCE { 
  notBefore       UTCTime, 
  notAfter        UTCTime, 
  userAttributes  SEQUENCE OF SEQUEN
CRL
PKC 
CA 
Owner 
Public Key 
Attributes 
Recipient 
Serial Number 
Validity 
CA’s signature 
CA
Sends signed message
Originator
Issues PKC
CA 
Serial Numbers 
Issue Date 
CA’s signature 
PKC 
Invalid Signature Revoked PKC
time 
Issues
CRL
Requests revocation
Verification Success
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the attributes becomes invalid after notAfter, the issuer CA does not revoke the PKC. 
Synchronizi ity period of the UAV with the personnel changes can reduce the 
PKC revocation caused by the periodical pe gure 3.2 illustrates how to 
issue  the UAV e eri ersonnel changes every 
April and October validit KC ( d the validity 
perio alf a year nges he n 1999/10, the 
new ation is e UAV of the PKC (b) issued at the time. In 
this case, the key pair is also ch y period of the new PKC is two 
years. If the same key pair is required, the validity period of the PKC should be one and 
half a year (c), because the validity period depends o  lifetime of the key p nd 
the end of it, 2001/4, specified in the (a), should not is 
also issued to the memb
the next perso d. 
 solution without the UAV is to remove the department 
name fr a demerit and cannot be 
acceptab  of business use. Since the department name 
gives in iginator, the recipient can use it to judge the 
authenti ives such chance from the 
recipient 995] used to include the title/role 
of the ow
 
ng the valid
rsonnel change. Fi
 a PKC with  in the case that ther  are p odical p
. The 
AV is h
y period of the first P a) is two years an
d of its U . If the owner cha
stored in th
r/his affiliation o
affiliation inform
anged, and the validit
n the air, a
old PKC 
er whose affiliation does not 
be ch
change, and the 
anged. A new PKC 
UAV of the PKC is 
nnel change time, because the validity of the UAV has expire
 
1999/4 10 2000/4 10 2001/4 10 
(a) 
(b) 
 
Figure 3.2: Validity Period of PKC and UAV 
 
The simplest other
om the owner name. However, this solution has 
le for digitally signed message
formation on the role of the or
city of the message, and therefore the removal depr
. As for the userDirectoryAttribute field [ISO1
ner, the situation is the same. 
(c) 
: Start of UAV and PKC Validity
: End of UAV Validity
: End of PKC Validity
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3.4 Certificate Verification Service with Time Stamp 
3.4.1 Overall Architecture of CVSTS 
While the UAV is a solution for the CRL large size problem, the CVSTS aims to resolve 
the unavailability of the latest revocation information problem; the CVSTS solves the 
invalidation of signature and the lack of non-repudiation mechanism problems. The 
CVSTS provides fresh PKC status and time stamp services, and the two services give 
the non-repudiation mechanism. The basic idea [SY1997a] is simple and almost the 
same as the Electronic Signature Timestamp Server (ESTS) [LJ1995]; a CVSTS client 
sends a request including identification information of certification path and the 
message digest of the data to be time-stamped, and then a CVSTS server sends back a 
gned response including the status of the PKC(s), the message digest and the current 
time. The following subsections describe the CVSTS architecture, the secure 
transmission of PKC information over network, which are not covered by the ESTS 
architecture, and the interaction between the CVSTS client and server. 
Figure 3.3 describes the architecture of the CVSTS. A CA accepts a PKC issue 
or revocat equest from a public key owner. After certification of the request, the CA 
updates the PKC information database holding of all the information on issued PKCs as 
well as revoked PKCs. A PKC information server announces the update of the database 
periodically, that is, the iss tion, to a master CVSTS 
server. With help of the UAV ation can be reduced and the PKC 
information server can ann . The information also includes the 
update time. 
The CVSTS hich is a TTP. The 
aster CVSTS server archives the update information and sends the information to the 
slave ser
much impact on the security infrastructure 
ompared with that of end user. 
 
si
ion r
ued and revoked PKCs informa
, the size of the inform
ounce more frequently
server is operated by a CVSTS authority, w
m
vers. Each of the slave servers has a local database and directly communicates 
with CVSTS user clients through network. 
When the PKC users are quite many or scattered in large geographical region, 
then a hierarchical CA tree is constructed, and a high level CA receives PKC 
issue/revocation request from a low level CA. The high level CA announces the PKC 
revocation of the low level CA to the master CVSTS server as soon as the request 
arrives, because the revocation has 
c
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 Figure 3.3: CVSTS Architecture 
 
3.4.2 Secure Transmission of PKC Information between 
Servers 
The update information should be propagated securely; in particular data origin 
authenticity and integrity are essential. The data enveloping technique, for example 
KCS#7 digital envelope [RSA1993b], is used to achieve the security. It wraps 
application data and gives confidentiality, integrity and origin authenticity. Each of 
P
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enveloped update information is transmitted through an existing transport protocol. 
The CVSTS server needs to know not only the rev  also 
the validity period usage time, because the client may request the status at 
a certain tim ple the when the signature of a message was 
generated, and the server checks the s h the validity period of the PKC and the 
keyUsage field as well as the revocation ation. 
sport channel, such as the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
protocol [DT1999 ata orig authenticity and , the 
data enveloping technique is used with the following reasons: 
 
(1) The sign the CA or the PK ation server opera he CA proves 
that the information is authentic. 
(2) The update information will be used as evidence and audit trail in order to prove 
that the C  authority operates the service properly accord  the authentic 
inform e CA. 
 
3.4.3 Interaction between CVSTS Client and Server 
A user client accesses a slave CVSTS server; it sends a CVSTS request message 
containing identification information of a PK tification path of which status the 
user wants to know  digest ta that the user asks the server to 
time stamp. The server firstly checks the local database, secondly creates a message 
containing the status of certification path, the message digest contained in 
the request and the current time, thirdly signs with the private key of the server, and 
finally sends the signed message, the CVSTS response message, to the client. The 
following clauses include the description of the request and response messages defined
and encoded according to t le (BER) [RM1990]. If an 
rror occurs, such as server internal error, then an error response is returned to the 
(1) C uest 
ocation information, but
 and the key 
e point, for exam  time 
tatus wit
 inform
The secure tran
], also realizes the d in integrity. However
ature of C inform ted by t
VSTS
ation from th
ing to
C or cer
, and the message of the da
the PKC or 
 
he ASN.1 and Basic Encoding Ru
e
client. 
 
VSTS Req
The ASN.1 definition of the CVSTS request message is given in Appendix E, and the 
meaning of each field of the message is described as follows: 
 
 The field of version specifies the version of the message. 
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 The field of certificates field identifies the PKC(s) that the user wants to know the 
stat
 The
hm used to generate the 
message digest. 
he data to be time-stamped: 
ned by type } 
The first field type specifies the type of the information and the second field value 
inator, 
g of each field is described as follows: 
es the version of the message. 
rialNumber identify the PKC(s) of which the server has 
 The field of requestIdentifier is the identifier in the request. 
 PKC(s) which values and 
us. 
 The field of verificationRequestTime contains the time when the user wants to 
know the PKC status. Normally the field is void, and the latest status is sent back 
from the server. However, when the user wants to know the status at a certain time 
point, then the field is set to the time. 
 field of dataToBeTimeStamped is a message digest of the data that the user 
wants the server to time stamp. 
 The field of messageDigestAlgorithm identifies the algorit
 The field of additionalInformation contains a sequence of the following data and 
carries additional information of t
AdditionalInformation ::= SEQUENCE { 
  type   OBJECT IDENTIFIER, 
  value  ANY defi
contains the associated value. Examples of the additional information are orig
creator, format, or title of the data. 
 The field of requestOriginator is the name of the user that may be required to 
access the CVSTS server. 
 The field of requestIdentifier is the identifier of the request. 
 
The user optionally signs the message for the sake that the server can 
authenticate the requester. 
 
(2) CVSTS Response 
The ASN.1 definition of the CVSTS request message is given in Appendix E, and the 
meanin
 
 The field of version specifi
 The field of issuer and se
checked the status, and lastUpdate is the latest update time of the PKC 
information database of the issuer CA. 

 The field of verificationResult contains the status of the
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meanings are as follows: 
VerificationResult ::= ENUMERATE { 
I
status is included in this field. The last value unknown means that the status is 
u
n
 Th ason of the revocation. The possible 
reason dment [ISO1995]. 
 The fie ies the date and time when the PKC was 
 
 time of the lastUpdate fields. If the request includes the 
 at that time, the field 
is the same as the verificationRequestTime. If the server does not hold the status at 
the 
 The fields of dataToBeTimeStamped, messageDigestAlgorithm and 
 to those in the request message. 
 is the date and time when the server received the 
 The field of generationTime specifies the date and time when the response is 
 
valid (0), 
notYetValid (1), 
finished (2), 
revoked (3), 
hold (4), 
unknown (5) } 
f one of the PKCs is not valid, the PKC is specified in the invalidCertificate and its 
nknown with some reason such as the update information expected to arrive has 
ot yet arrived at the server. 
e field of revokedReason contains the re
s are the same as those of the amen
ld of revokedOrHoldTime identif
revoked or held. 
The field of invalidTime specifies the date and time when the key was actually 
compromised, etc. 
 The field of verificationTime specifies the date and time when the PKCs status is 
checked. This is the oldest
verificationRequestTime and the server holds the PKC status
requested time, it returns a response according to the nearest but earlier 
information. 

additionalInformation equal
 The field of requestedTime
request. The server, actually the CVSTS authority, certifies that the time-stamped 
data had existed before this time. 

generated and signed. 
 The field of responseIdentifier is the identifier of the response message. 
The field of serverCertificate is the PKC or certification path of the CVSTS server 
discussed in Clause 3.6.3 (2). 
 
All the above information is digitally signed with the private key of the server, 
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and fied with the public key contained in the PKC issued by 
the CV
 
3.5 Performance of CVSTS 
In order to e scalability of the CVSTS, the CVSTS server and client that 
handled the CVSTS request and response messages including a single PKC were 
implement er performance was measured in the environment described 
in 
pro
com ase processing, data decoding and encoding, etc. 
mes ated according to the 
 
 
 the signature can be veri
STS authority. 
 estimate th
ed and the serv
Table 3.1. 
It takes 0.00575 seconds for the server to process a CVSTS request; 91% of the 
cessing time is used for generation of the signature, and the remaining is 
munication processing, datab
For the purpose of the estimation of the scalability, the number of users of a 
saging system that a single CVSTS server can serve is estim
M/M/1 queuing model [CX1994]. 
Table 3.1: Evaluation Environment 
Item Name or Value 
CPU UltraSPARC-Ⅱ(296MHz) 
Memory 512MB 
OS SunOS 5.6 
Signature algorithm Elliptic Curve Encryption 
Key length 160 bits 
Number of PKCs 131,072 
Database Ndbm contained in the OS 
 
The mean service rate ( ) is 1 / 0.00575 = 174; in this case the processing time 
targ . The mean arrival rate (
at the client side and the transmission time of the messages are ignored, because the 
et of the estimation is the scalability of the server  ) is 
k the hor 
a
rec oned from statistics of received messages of the organization with which aut
is;  message gateway serving 3,705 people processed 151,981 in a week, so  = 151981 
 × 60 × 8 × 5) = 1.06. The total  = 1 / (60 waiting time is calculated with the equat   ion T
/ (   ) and the result is 0.00578 seconds. 
The mean arrival rate is considered to be proportional to the number of users, 
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and it is possible to calculate the number of users in the case of 1 second total waiting 
time; the total waiting time is 1 second when the mean arrival rate is 173, and the 
orresponding number of users is calculated as 605,000. 
jor business transaction, and it is said that a 
 billions transactions from July 1997 to June 
c
Credit card authorization is a ma
major credit company in the world dealt 16
1998. In this case the mean arrival rate is calculated as  = 16000000000 / (60 × 60  × 
24 × 365) = 510. This value is larger than the mean service rate, and the server cannot 
handle such huge number of transactions. 
 
3.6 Discussions 
By synchronizing the validity period of the UAV with the personnel changes, PKCs are 
not revo
an send the update information to the master CVSTS 
erver more frequently, and the service gives the fresher revocation information to users. 
The service also gives an sage, and this prevents 
repudiation of the message creation or sen by the originator. As a result, the UAV 
and CVSTS solve the prob escribed in Sec ollowing other matters 
concerning the U  CVSTS are discu
 
3.6.1 Scalability of CVSTS 
Evaluated in the previ ection erve hundreds of 
thousands users o be poor taking 
account of t uthorization transaction exceeds the 
capacity of the s h the adoptio y to the slave 
VSTS server, it can serve more clients and transactions. However, taking account of 
 between the servers and user clients in 
network
ked even if the owners move their departments. This reduces the size of CRL 
issued from an organizational CA. With the less revoked PKCs, the PKC information 
server of the organizational CA c
s
 evidence of the existence of a mes
ding 
lems d tion 3.2. In the f
AV and ssed. 
ous s
of messaging system, and this
, a single CVSTS server can s
 performance seems t
he size of the Internet. The credit card a
erver. Wit n of the clustering technolog
C
the network load balance and the reliability of the service, the introduction of multiple 
slave CVSTS servers is inevitable. 
When multiple CVSTS servers exist, another problem arises; how to disperse 
the service requests among the servers? A technique exists to disperse accesses to the 
servers; when a BIND server [VP1996] is asked an IP address of an application server 
with its domain name, it returns one of IP addresses of the duplicated servers. The 
server does not take account of the metric
 nor the load of the servers, but it is a practical solution. In order to apply the 
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technique, the domain name of the CVSTS servers is embedded in the PKC with a 
newly introduced extension field, say CVSTSLocation extension field, and the CVSTS 
client accesses the server whose address is obtained from the BIND server. More 
sophistic
STS Data 
Internet, there is no guarantee of the Quality of Service (QoS), 
n delay, and this makes the synchronization of the CVSTS local 
rvers must reserve resources for the 
ransmission of the update information within a specific delay. With the combination of 
e resource reservation will be realized in the 
e server with higher service quality. In this case the 
ated method is the single IP address architecture [SN1998]; the duplicated 
servers are assigned a single IP address, and a client accesses the nearest server in the 
sense of routing. 
 
.6.2 Synchronization of CV3
From the nature of the 
especially communicatio
PKC information databases difficult. Possible solutions to the problem are as follows. 
 
(1) Resource Reservation 
The first solution requires change of the Internet architecture as well as routers and 
reservation establishment protocol. The technique of resource reservation [BR1997] can 
be applied to guarantee the distributed database some level synchronization. All the 
routers in the path between the PKC information server and the master CVSTS server 
and between the master server and slave se
t
the differentiated services [BS1998], th
Internet architecture. 
 
(2) Best Effort 
The first solution requires change of routers in the Internet and will take some time to 
be realized. The second solution is ad hoc; the user judges the freshness of the PKC 
status with the lastUpdate fields in the response. If a user wants later status of a PKC, 
then the user accesses another slav
quality is specified with the CVSTSLocation field. 
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ted with the signature of the server. As a result the information is safe 
s long as the private keys are safe. 
f 
he methods to reduce the impact is to use different keys depending on the hash value of 
 be signed by the server. The CVSTS authority 
 the keys. The client needs to select the public 
response is within the period. 
Both of the above two measures lead to the increase of the public keys of the 
e client is required to hold the public keys to verify the response. 
h cost increase, the CVSTS authority establishes a CA issuing 
The use of the UAV helps to reduce the size of the revocation information, but it 
increases the cost of issue of the PKCs. Issuing procedure varies among CAs, but in the 
case of updating PKC issued from an organizational CA, the following steps can be 
adopted: 
a
 
(2) Measures against Key Compromise 
The private keys of the CVSTS servers must be protected by using every considerable 
means, because the compromise of the keys leads to the collapse of the service. One o
t
the response content, that is, the data to
needs to announce the rule of selection of
key according to the selection rule to verify the response. With the rule even a private 
key is stolen, the attacker that stole the key can only forge CVSTS responses that match 
the rule of the stolen key. 
Another measure to reduce the impact of the key compromise is to change key 
frequently. The shorter period of the private key usage leads to the less impact in the 
case of the compromise of the key. The key usage period is specified in the 
privateKeyUsagePeriod field [ISO1995]. In this case the client verifies that the 
generationTime of the 
CVSTS servers, and th
In order to avoid suc
PKCs of the CVSTS servers, and the CVSTS server puts its PKC in the 
serverCertificate field of the responses. The client holding the public key of the CA does 
not need to hold the public keys of the CVSTS servers, and can verify the responses. 
 
.6.4 Cost of UAV 3
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(1) A user creates a new key pair 
signs the update request with
and update request of the new public key, and the user 
 the old private key, 
Comparing with the processing of the CVSTS server described in Section 5, the 
 UAV additionally. The 
he retrieving time of the 
ecause the owner needs to hold old private keys to decrypt 
uished with the keyUsage field 
tribute Certificate 
e (PKIX) working group of the Internet Engineering Task 
n access to resources on a server. The AC is proposed for the two reasons: 
(2) the user sends the request to the PKC issuing server of the organizational CA, 
(3) the server verifies the request, and 
(4) the server creates a new PKC including the new public key and a new UAV retrieved 
from personnel database, and sends it to the user. 
 
issuing server needs to verify the request, retrieve the new
processing time can be estimated less than 0.02 seconds plus t
UAV. As a result if the retrieving time is not too long, the procedure of updating PKC 
described above is practical. 
 
3.6.5 PKC for Encryption 
Even if the key pair for signature changes frequently, there is no problem for the 
recipient as far as the PKC is available. But the situation is different in the case of the 
key pair for encryption, b
messages encrypted with the old public keys. Therefore it is desirable to use the same 
key pair for encryption as long as the key pair is safe. 
As a solution for this problem, the key pairs for signature and encryption are 
separated, and the public key for encryption is distributed in another PKC. The two 
PKCs for signature and encryption can be disting
[ISO1995]. Moreover the PKC for signature may include the pointer to that of 
encryption key in an extension field, for the sake of convenience to retrieve the PKC for 
encryption through a directory service. 
 
3.7 Related Works 
3.7.1 At
The Public-Key Infrastructur
Force (IETF) discusses the Attribute Certificate (AC) [FS1999], which binds a public 
key owner and its attributes with the same technique of the PKC. The AC is mainly 
used to make access control decision or authorization, when an application client 
requests a
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(1) Attributes of the public key owner do not have the same lifetime as the binding of the 
public key and its owner. If the attributes are put into the PKC, the lifetime of the 
ritative for the authorization information. 
lidity period mismatch problem 
ointed out in the first reason. The signer attributes such as department name, title or 
address 
tages of the UAV are the smaller cost to verify the AC and 
ss impact of changing the current PKI. 
stamp, data archiving and data 
retrievin
e composed in the large network environment 
like the Internet. 
e 
atus of the requested certification path at the time of 
S verifies the path at any time user requests. 
 wants to know the status at a certain time 
PKC becomes short. 
(2) The PKC issuer is not usually autho
 
The UAV field is another solution for the va
p
are required for the target applications, such as secure messaging, signed 
document, and business transaction. These attributes can be considered to be 
authorized from the same authority of the PKC issuer such as the organizational CA 
operated by its personnel and/or information system management department. 
Comparing the AC, the advan
le
 
3.7.2 Electronic Signature Timestamp Server 
The idea of the TSS is not new; for example, [HS1991] discusses how to realize privacy 
of the signed document and how to prevent back-dating of time stamp record. From the 
view point of PKC status verification, the most related work is ESTS [LJ1995]; the 
service supports certification path verification, time 
g. The differences between the ESTS and the proposed system are the 
following: 
 
(1) Architecture of Overall System 
The ESTS focuses on protocol between a user client and a server, but it was not 
studied how all the system should b
(2) Support of Verification Tim
The ESTS verifies the st
request, on the other hand the CVST
This feature is useful when the user
point, such as the time when the signature of a message was generated, because the 
recipient concerns that the PKC was suspended temporally at the time, or revoked 
after the signature was generated but before the recipient received the message. 
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3.7.3 Online Certificate Status Protocol 
The PKIX working group is also discussing the Online Certificate Status Protocol 
 only 
t the above two points but also in the following points: 
 
e fields of the OCSP request correspond to the 
requestOriginator, certificates and requestIdentifier fields of the CVSTS request. 
Responses of the 
or serviceLocator 
ond to the generationTime, certificates, verificationResult lastUpdate and 
serverCertificate fields of the CVSTS response. 
fields corresponding to the responseStatus and 
ame of the CVSTS server with the verification of the 
he 
nextUpdate field. 
The archiveCutoff field of the OCSP is used to indicate the cutoff date of retained 
(OCSP) [MM1999b] giving the PKC status. The CVSTS differs from the OCSP not
a
(1) Time Stamp Service 
The CVSTS supports additionally the time stamp service and consequently the 
non-repudiation service, and this is the most significant difference with the OCSP. 
As a result the request and response have fields that the OCSP does not include, 
such as dataToBeTimeStamped, requestedTime. 
(2) Fields in Request 
The requesterName, reqCert and nonc
The CVSTS does not have a field corresponding to the acceptable
OCSP, because the CVSTS supports a single response type. As f
field, the CVSTS request does not have such field, because the CVSTS authority has 
all the revocation information of the hierarchical CAs described in Section 3.4.1, and 
does not need to route a request to another server. 
(3) Fields in Response 
The fields of producedAt, certStatus, thisUpdate and certs of the OCSP response 
corresp
The CVSTS does not have 
responseType fields of the OCSP. This is because the CVSTS assumes no errors such 
as request syntax or internal errors, and the CVSTS supports a single response 
type. 
The client can confirm the n
response, so that the name of server field such as responderID field of the OCSP is 
omitted. 
The nextUpdate of the OCSP is used to indicate the next update time of the PKC 
information and the client does not trust the OCSP response when the time is past, 
because the indicated update information is not reflected to the response. In such 
case the CVSTS server returns the unknown result, instead of indication by t
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revocation information beyond the PKC expiration time
assume such archive and does not include the field. 
. The CVSTS does not 
n this chapter three problems of PKC revocation in the PKI, the unavailability of the 
ation, the large CRL size, and the lack of non-repudiation 
mec
an 
cha
tim pudiation services. A prototype of 
nted, the security and scalability of the service are discussed, and 
it i
resp
[AC
con
resp
dev f the service. IETF also defines 
rtification Server (DVCS) protocols which validates signature of 
sign
CV
sho KC status providing service which 
solv
vali
PK
 
 
3.8 Conclusions 
I
latest revocation inform
hanism are described, and then two solutions are proposed; the UAV is suitable for 
organizational CA in order to eliminate revocation caused by periodical personnel 
nges, and the CVSTS is an on-line service of combination of PKC verification and 
e stamp providing latest PKC status and non-re
the service is impleme
s shown the service can serve 605,000 message system users within one second 
onse time. 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) defines another time stamp protocol 
2001b], which is basically same as the time stamp function of CVSTS. The protocol 
tains additional information for time stamp service; the accuracy field in the 
onse specifies the time deviation of the time stamp. The CVSTS assumes the 
iation is specified in the service level agreement o
Data Validation and Ce
ed data as well as the PKC status. The service encompasses the function of CVSTS. 
STS is a basic service which contains the two services: a time stamp service which 
uld be provided by a trusted third party, and P
es the problems described the subsections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. The CVSTS does not give 
dation service of signed data, because the user can validate the signature with the 
Cs and status information in the CVSTS response. 
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Ch
erchange documents in an open systems environment. Deliberately the 
standard
luated. There are differences of 
yntax of the same data type and contradictions in the ODA security addendum. There 
is also a problem in integrating of an existing ODA editor with a filter program 
implementing the ODA security. Details of the differences, contradictions, and problem 
are described and resolutions are proposed after overview of the ODA. 
The author is not concerned here whether the ODA as a standard eventually 
wins the day, but he believes that many of the considerations which he has addressed in 
implementing secured the ODA described in this chapter would require resolution in 
any attempt to secure parts of complex documents. 
In this chapter, the definition of security attributes are changed; authenticity is 
separated into two attributes, integrity and authenticity, and non-repudiation is added 
apter 4 
Securing Parts of Document 
 
4.1 Introduction 
While the previous two chapters treat problems and solutions of the management of 
private and public keys of the public key technology, this chapter describes encryption 
and signing of office document with the public key technology. 
Office document is structured; it contains multiple chapters, clauses, pages, 
tables, figures, etc. The Open Document Architecture (ODA) [ISO1988] standard was 
developed to int
 does not consider the form of document transmission, via a network or with a 
floppy disk; it only specifies the form of an encoded octet stream called the Office 
Document Interchange Format (ODIF). In order to secure a whole ODIF stream, the 
general cryptographic envelops [RSA1993b, LJ1992] can be used, but such envelops 
cannot protect parts of document. On the other hand, the ODA security addendum 
[ISO1990] supporting partial encryption and signing is under standardization, but it is 
defined separately with the PKI standard [CCITT1988], compatibility with existing 
document editor. 
In this chapter, working of the author during stay at University College 
London (UCL), the activities of which in ODA and PKI is given in Appendix F, is 
described; the consistency of the ODA security with the PKI standard and connectivity 
of implementation to existing document editor are eva
s
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according to the d
Firstly, re
efinition of the ODA standard. Details are described in Clause 4.3.3. 
quirements for secure document interchange are described in Section 
. Secondly, problems and resolutions in 
tradictions of the ODA security, and a 
roblem integration with ODA editor are discussed in section 4.4. Next, application of 
e ODA security to document stores in Section 4.5. Finally, some conclusions are 
nterchange between two 
parties, 
ticity of origin of the document 
 Mai
 document level. 
Services
4.2, outline of ODA security in Section 4.3
compatibility of ODA security and PKI, con
p
th
presented in Section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Requirements for Secure Document Interchange 
Document interchange can be divided into three categories: i
circulation within a small group, and dissemination to a large number of people. 
In the following paragraphs, the security requirements of each category are described. 
 
4.2.1 Interchange between Two Parties 
Secured document interchange between two parties is the normal message exchange 
(e-mail) with security additions; the following security services are required: 
 
 Maintenance of the confidentiality of document content 
 Assurance of the integrity of document content 
 Assurance of the authen
ntenance of the confidentiality of document flow  
 Provision of proof of the exchange (submission and delivery) 
 
The last two services must be provided by the transfer system, such as the 
message or file transfer systems, and are out of scope of the document interchange 
security. The message transfer system may provide the first three services. Because the 
document security is required also after transmission, for example storing a document 
with a digital signature, it is desirable to support these services at the
 securing a whole document may be adequate, because securing parts of a 
document, such as paragraphs or figures, makes no sense when the document is sent to 
only one recipient from the originator. 
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4.2.2 Interchange in Group (Group Cooperative Work) 
In the case of interchange in a small group, security on parts of a document may be 
required. For example, as shown in Figure 4.1, the digital signature of a part of the 
document may be required because some parts may be written by multiple authors and 
other parts by another. Encipherment of parts of the document may be required because 
an author wants to restrict access to the parts to some members of the group. For these 
easons at least confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of parts of a document are 
ive 
 addition of a signature to the part which has been already signed by other 
 some other information 
Figure 4.1 Security Requirements in Group 
r
required. In addition, the following facilities may be required for group cooperat
authoring: 
 
 addition/modification/deletion of parts to/of/from an existing document while 
keeping signatures of other parts valid; 

members; 
 signing not only the content of parts of a document but also
such as time, location, signer’s role, etc. 
 
 
Document 
 
Page 
Figure 
Authors Readers 
readwrite
read
write read
read
read
write
: Encipherment of a part
: Signature to a part
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4.2.3 Interchange in Large Number of People 
There are two typical applications in this category: one is a network news service or a 
public mailing list; the other is a document archive, search and retrieval service. In the 
former case authenticity and integrity may be required without confidentiality because 
the documents are public; an example is documents indicating how to combat virus 
issued by the CERT or a software supplier. In the latter case some access control 
mechanisms on the document archive server may be required; an example of access 
control is one based on user’s identity, group, organisation which the user belongs to, 
user’s clearance, etc. Securing a whole document is normally adequate during 
ransmission from the server to the user. Signing parts of a document may be required 
 
4.2.4 Requirements for Secure Docum
 t
imp ecause there is a standard which specifies 
he secured ODIF and there has been already a non-secure document UA, while not 
having d detailed requirements for a document archive ser ext steps 
are to specify the requirements for a server, design access control mechanisms and the 
implement. Security services and facilities for a secure document UA are follows: 
 
 confidentiality, integrity, authentic  non-repudiation of origin of a whole, or 
parts of, a document; 
 addition, modification and deletion of parts of a docum hile keeping signatures 
of other parts valid; 
 addition of a signature to a pa document; 
 signing the content with other information 
 
Security ser hole document can be implemented with the DOCSEC 
[GS1990] or PKCS#7 messages [RSA1993b]. The DOCSEC supports the four security 
services of whole documents and arbitrary octet strings. PKCS#7 defines a 
cryptographic message syntax which supports the servic x; the 
enciphered content with or without encryption keys, th tures, etc. 
Both have been implemented as filters, using OSISEC for the application of security  
there are two program phered and digitally 
t
when the document is written by multiple authors. 
ent UA 
As he first step of securing document interchange, it was decided to start with the 
lementation of a document UA. This is b
t
 formulate ver. The n
ity and
ent w
rt of a 
vices of a w
es as well as other synta
e content with signa
;
s one of which encodes plain data into enci
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signed data and the other decodes the secured data into the original plain
For security services on parts of a document, the ODA secur
 data. 
ity addendum 
he ODA standard [ISO1988] describes an abstract view of an office document and a 
nt. A document 
es (logical and 
The ODA standard defines three kinds of document form; a processable form 
stru  a formatted process, and formatted processable form with 
process takes a formatted or formatted processable form and produces a final document. 
F stream in which all components 
[ISO1990] is adopted. This addendum supports the above security services on parts of a 
document, that is, ones of the document profile and the bodyparts. Security functions 
must be implemented to support as many existing document UAs as possible. The 
security information which users concern should be displayed, or if necessary input in a 
user-friendly manner. 
 
4.3 ODA and Security 
4.3.1 ODA Concepts 
T
document processing model as well as an interchange format of a docume
consists of components, that is, the document profile, generic structur
layout object classes), specific structures (logical and layout objects), styles (layout and 
presentation styles) and content portions. These components give two views of the 
document;  a logical structure which represents a logical view of the document such 
that a letter header consists of a date, an addressee, a subject, etc., and a layout 
structure which represents a layout view of the document such that a letter header page 
consists of a logo frame, a date frame, etc. 
with logical structures is created after an editing process, a formatted form with layout 
ctures is produced by
both logical and layout structures is also produced by a formatted process. An imaging 
All these document forms are encoded into the ODI
are represented as sets of attributes. 
 
4.3.2 Security of ODA Document 
In the security addendum [ISO1990] to the ODA standard, two concepts of document 
security are provided. While securing the whole document which is out of scope of the 
addendum, it suggests that the security policy of the domain to which the originator 
belongs may specify how the whole document should be handled as a single unit. One 
method to realize this is to use a secure transport mechanism such as a secure X.400 or 
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a secure File Transfer and Access Method (FTAM), etc. The second concept is the 
securing
in the addendum are confidentiality, integrity, 
f origin; each is described below. 
 Aut
ed to document components. The 
e to be sealed, and the other three 
 of parts of the document. A part means any part of the document profile or of 
the document body. The addendum does not specify any particular algorithm or scheme, 
but it provides the means to protect parts of the document. In the rest of this section the 
outline of the ODA security features are described, and the new attributes added to the 
document structures are introduced. 
 
4.3.3 Security Features 
The security features supported 
authenticity and non-repudiation o
 
 Confidentiality of specified parts of a document is achieved by enciphering specified 
parts, so that only privileged recipients can decipher and read them. 
 Integrity is demonstrated by ensuring that specified parts of a document cannot be 
changed or destroyed in an undetectable manner. The privileged recipient can 
verify that the specified parts have not been altered since the originator sealed 
them. The certainty provided by this property is limited to a detection of change; 
the replacement of the whole sealed parts and the seal itself cannot be recognised. 
Nevertheless, by sealing the whole document, tampering with its parts can be 
recognised. 
henticity is demonstrated to a privileged recipient, by allowing him/her to verify 
that the source of specified parts of a document is the claimed one. 
 Non-Repudiation of Origin assures that a person cannot deny being the source of 
specified parts of a document. Non-repudiation of origin can also be achieved by 
adding seals to the parts. 
 
.3.4 Protected Part Structures 4
Four new kinds of protected part structures are add
first structure includes a part of the document profil
structures include enciphered parts of the document profile, the document bodypart 
enciphered before and after a layout process. 
 
 Sealed Document Profile Descriptor 
 Enciphered Document Profile Descriptor 
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 Pre-enciphered Document Bodypart Descriptor 
 Post-enciphered Document Bodypart Descriptor 
 
4.3.5 Attributes of Document Profile 
A new attribute, document security, is added to the document profile. The 
ub-parameters of this attribute are described in the following. 
 Sealed Document Profiles 
 
te specifies information concerning each enciphered part of the 
 
ciphered after a layout process, the post-enciphered 
document bodyparts attribute is used. 
The sealed attribute is added to generic and specific structures and styles. This 
 identification of the sealing information of the 
s
 
 Oda Security Label 
This attribute specifies the ODA security label of the document, that is, security 
policy, sensitivity, protection level, etc. 

This attribute includes information about integrity, authenticity and 
non-repudiation of origin of parts of the document profile. 
 Sealed Document Bodyparts 
The protected information about sealing of bodyparts before a layout process can be 
found in the  pre-sealed document bodyparts attribute. When document bodyparts 
are sealed after a layout process, the post-sealed document bodyparts attribute is 
used. 
Enciphered Document Profiles 
This attribu
document profile. 
Enciphered Document Bodyparts 
The attribute pre-enciphered document bodyparts specifies the information 
concerning each document bodypart enciphered before a layout process. When a 
document bodypart is en
 
4.3.6 Attributes of Document Structure 
Two new attributes are added to the document structures and styles. 
 
 Sealed 
attribute specifies sealing status and
sealed bodypart. 
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 Enciphered 
The enciphered attribute is added to generic and specific structures. This attribute 
specifies enciphering status and identification of the information about the 
n general, OSI standards are defined without prior implementations; as a result 
b ctions with other standards are often introduced. This section 
outl
Slat CL which is described in Appendix F. 
4.4
stituents of sealed bodyparts is specified but how they 
ENCE OF CHOICE { 
[2] IMPLICIT  Layout-Object-Descriptor, 
IMPLICIT  Text-Unit, 
ICIT  Layout-Style-Descriptor 
} 
hen a part of a document body is sealed, the sealed attribute of the constituent must 
r e sealing status. The addendum specifies the attributes indicate “current 
stat
inclu
valu t is necessary to establish interoperability between different 
enciphered bodypart. 
 
4.4 Problems and Solutions 
I
am iguities and contradi
ines certain such problems uncovered during the integration of PDOCSEC and the 
e editor in the PASSWORD project at U
 
.1 Sequence of Constituents 
In the addendum, the order of con
should be encoded is not. The following ASN.1 type is used to encode constituents of the 
bodyparts. An agreement is necessary to establish interoperability between different 
systems. 
 
 Sequence-Of-Bodyparts ::= SEQU
 layout-object-class [1] IMPLICIT  Layout-Class-Descriptor, 
 layout-object 
 content-portion [3] 
 logical-object-class [5] IMPLICIT  Logical-Class-Descriptor,  
 logical-object [6] IMPLICIT  Logical-Object-Descriptor, 
 presentation-style [7] IMPLICIT  Presentation-Style-Descriptor, 
 layout-style [8] IMPL
 
 
4.4.2 Sealed Attributes 
W
rep esent th
us” of sealing, but does not specify whether these values of the attributes are 
ded or not in the message digest. Because the message digest result depends on the 
es, an agreemen
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systems. The current PDOCSEC calculates the message digest after the values are set. 
n the current PDOCSEC system, asymmetric encryption is used to seal the content and 
is used to encrypt the content, and a public 
sued from a CA. The X.509 recommendation 
=JP 
shiki Sameshima” belonging to an 
pment” of an organization “Hitachi 
 or a trusted public key can be retrieval from a local cache or a directory, but 
his is impractical in a large scale community. 
 type Distinguished Name is 
pe. 
, 
,  
me [4] IMPLICIT  DistinguishedName OPTIONAL 
} 
a privileged recipient can get an originator’s 
 
4.4.3   Personal Name 
I
to encrypt a content encryption key which 
key is retrieved from the X.509 certificate is
[CCITT1988] defines Distinguished Name (DN) to identify a user. Example of DN is as 
follows [KS1995]: 
 
 CN=Yoshiki Sameshima, OU=Research & Development, O=Hitachi Software, C
 
which represents an entity which name is “Yo
organizational unit naming “Research & Develo
Software” in Japan. However the ODA standard adopts Personal Name as a name of a 
user which includes a surname, a given name, initials, and a title. A user in a small 
community such as an organization could be identified with the information and a 
certificate
t
To solve this problem a new parameter name with
added to the Personal Name ty
 
 Personal-Name ::= [APPLICATION 6] IMPLICIT SET { 
 surname [0] IMPLICIT  Character-Data OPTIONAL
 givenname [1] IMPLICIT  Character-Data OPTIONAL
 initials [2] IMPLICIT  Character-Data OPTIONAL,  
 title [3] IMPLICIT  Character-Data OPTIONAL,  
 na
 
 
By using this parameter 
certificate via the directory service to verify its seal and an originator can get privileged 
recipient’s public key for encipherment. However, there is still a problem because the 
directory service is not yet sufficiently ubiquitous that every recipient can get 
certificates from it. 
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4.4.4   Certification Path 
One solution to getting an originator’s 
certificate path explained in Section 4.
certificate without directory access is to send the 
4 with the sealed information. Some applications 
e a complete forward certification path, the Certification Path 
ttribute imported from the X.509 standard is stored in a sub parameter of the sealed 
o  
ecipient has the top level CA’s public key, then he/she can get the originator’s public 
The Sealed Document Profiles and the Sealed Document Bodyparts attributes include 
la en a part is enciphered, the 
of the part sh ucing 
cause th
hem 
he attribute. Th m is 
. Other inf e 
ed; an agreement is necessary to establish interoperability. 
The current implementation encrypts the message digest and signature, 
actually
use this method;  for example, a PEM message may include Originator Certificate and 
Issuer Certificate fields, and an X.400 message has a certificates attribute in the 
envelope for this purpose. However there is no attribute which corresponds to the above 
attributes in the addendum. 
To includ
a
d cument profiles and sealed document bodyparts attributes.  If the privileged
r
key and verify the seal. This is useful when documents are stored for a long term, 
because it is necessary to store only the top level CA’s public key and not necessary to 
store other information such as users’ public keys. There still remains one problem. If 
the security policy of the privileged recipient’s domain enforces a check of the 
originator’s certification revocation list [ITU2001], the privileged recipient must access 
the list by some method. 
 
4.4.5 Seal Data 
p in message digests of parts of the document. However wh
message digest ould be encrypted to prevent an adversary from ded
the content. This is be e adversary can determine which of a list of candidate 
content (e.g., “yes” or “no”) is the actual content by comparing message digests of t
to one in t is is also true for signature, if the signature algorith
giving message recovery ormation, time and location, may be required to b
encrypt
 the ‘seal-info’ and ‘seal’ field of the ‘Seal-Data’ data structure illustrated in 
Figure 4.2, using the DES-CBC algorithm [NIST1977], and the key information 
encrypted with the privileged recipient’s public key is stored in a sub-parameter of the 
attribute. Only the privileged recipient knows the actual message digest value. 
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4.4.6 Method Information 
The Method Information type, which specifies the algorithm used for generation of a 
message digest, an enciphered document part, a seal, consists of two parameters; the 
object identifier and the character string which identifies the algorithm. However this 
definition is inappropriate when the algorithm requires parameters. In addition this 
type is incompatible with the Algorithm Identifier type defined in the X.509 standard 
which consists of two parameters, the object identifier identifying the algorithm and the 
DOCSEC stores the pair in the following ASN.1 type, 
ER-encodes and enciphers it, because ODA’s Method Information type does not have 
ifferent system may encode in other way, an agreement is 
eroperability. 
When a 
e plain 
ocument profile attributes which are the objects of signing. These attributes are also 
included in encrypted form in the ‘Protected-Doc-Parts’ data structure. 
required parameter to the algorithm. 
 
4.4.7 DES-CBC Key and IV 
The current implementation uses the DES-CBC algorithm [NIST1977] with a randomly 
generated pair of a session key and an initialization vector for the encipherment of parts 
of a document. Before the encipherment of the key pair, it must be encoded in 
accordance with some method. A typical method is that only the session key is 
enciphered, while the initialization vector is handled as the parameter of the algorithm. 
However the current P
B
the parameter field. As a d
necessary to establish int
 
 DES-CBC-Information ::= SEQUENCE { 
 deskey [0]  IMPLICIT  OCTET STRING, 
 vector [1]  IMPLICIT  OCTET STRING 
 } 
 
4.4.8 Protection of Document Profile 
part of a document profile is sealed, the part is stored in a sealed document 
profile descriptor. When a user enciphers and seals the same part of the document 
profile, the encipherment is ineffective because the ODIF stream contains the plain part 
of the document profile in plain form illustrated in Figure 4.2. The ‘Sealed-Doc-Profile’ 
data structure, actually ‘Sealed-Doc-Prof-Descriptor’ data structure, contains th
d
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To avoid this problem the plai
included in the secured ODIF stream; th
n sealed document profile descriptor is not 
e ‘Sealed-Doc-Profile’ data structure contains 
 
.2: Encryption Addendum 
the sealed time, the location 
the encrypted data which is also contained in the ‘Protected-Doc-Part’ data structure as 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. As described in  The verification process deciphers the 
corresponding enciphered part of the document profile and calculates the message 
digest. With this solution it is possible to seal and encipher the same part of the 
document profile.  
 
Protected-Doc-Parts Sealed-Doc-Profiles 
id: “7 0” id: “6 0” 
recipient-info: Key-Data recipient: X, Y, Z 
seal: Seal-Data 
Enciphered-Doc-Prof-Descriptor 
id: “7 0” 
enciphered-info: Encrypted-Data
Sealed-Doc-Prof-Descriptor 
id: “6 0” 
seal-info: Doc-Prof-Attributes 
Sealed-Data 
Figure 4 and Signing of Part of Document Profile in 
 
4.4.9 Sealed Information 
A seal is calculated from a message digest of the content, 
and the originator’s personal name and other information cannot be included into the 
seal. For example the following information may be required according to a security 
policy: 
 
 authenticated time 
This is time information authenticated by a third-party or a timestamp server. The 
time in the addendum is claimed by the originator. 
seal-method: RSA 
seal-info: Sealed-Information 
seal: Signature 
Doc-Prof-Attributes 
 
 
… 
document profile attribute
document profile attribute
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 role
e of attributes such as the authenticated attribute type of PKCS#7 
SA1993b]. 
 
Figure 4.3: Proposed Encryption and Signing Profile 
 
ion 4.2.4 are required. However addition and 
es of other parts valid and signing to additional 
ddition and Deletion of Parts 
d nd deletion of a part are not implemented because OCIDs are 
chan
obje  second one’s is “3 0 2”. If a new 
 name 
The Personal Name includes only title information as far as information of a 
person’s attribute. However it is desirable to include the role, the department name 
to which the originator belongs to, etc. 
 
To include any information in the seal, it is better to change the type to be 
sealed to a sequenc
[R
Protected-Doc-Parts Sealed-Doc-Profiles 
id: “7 0” 
recipient: X, Y, Z 
seal: Seal-Data 
id: “7 0” 
recipient-info: Key-Data 
 of Part of Document 
4.4.10 Integration with Slate UA 
Two of the functions described in Sect
deletion of parts while keeping signatur
information is not implemented. In the following the reasons and solutions are 
described. 
 
1) A(
Ad ition of a new part a
ged from originals and this makes seals invalid. For example, assume that the 
ct identifier of the first paragraph is “3 0 1” and the
Enciphered-Doc-Prof-Descriptor 
id: “7 0” 
enciphered-info: Encrypted-Data
Sealed-Data 
seal-method: RSA 
seal-info ealed-Information : Encrypted S
seal: Encrypted Signature 
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paragraph is added between the two paragraphs the Slate-ODA filter assigns “3 0 2” to 
the 
whic
part se the Slate editor does not know OCIDs at 
ll, and the Slate/ODA converter assigns new OCIDs to the sealed parts. However this 
is not a
riginal formats and vice versa. There are several possible solutions: 
 
  digest of a bodypart withou
 Assign OCIDs in advance for later addition of parts
 K n from newly assigne  OCIDs (the 
identifiers when the original message digest was parameter and 
use the old OCIDs during the verification time. 
 
(2) Signi
Signing time and location can be sea ddendum includes these 
attributes in the Sealed Information but other information such as ime 
is not supported because the Sealed Informat
previous section. 
 
.5 A
 techniques are applied to document 
an be implemented with PDOCSEC, 
tion and it will be applied to a document server. The project implements 
ccess facilities to this secure ODA documents database. The access methods use the 
a text retrieval system based on 
tions to deal with access control. 
new paragraph and “3 0 3” to the old second paragraph and seals containing objects 
h OCID is greater than “3 0 3” are not valid. It is same in the case of a deletion of a 
 from a signed document. This is becau
a
 particular problem to the Slate editor and Slate-ODA converter. This is a 
common problem of existing editors which use converters convertors to transform ODIF 
to the editor o
Generate the message t OCIDs. 
. 
eep mapping informatio d OCIDs to old
calculated) in a 
ng to Additional Information 
led because the a
 authenticated t
ion is not extensible as mentioned in the 
4 pplication to Document Stores 
This chapter does not describe in detail how these
archive servers. The security during transmission c
DOCSEC, or PKCS#7. The difficulty is the authorization mechanism when there are 
large numbers of users and documents. In UCL, an authorization mechanism based on 
capability scheme which uses PAC (Privilege Attribute Certificate) is under 
implementa
a
Wide Area Information Service technology [KB1989] (
ANSI Z39.50 [ANSI1988]) - but with certain modifica
The system has been integrated with the BBN Slate document editor. The database’s 
access environment is able to enforce personal access rights for read and search 
operations founded on authentication of the user identity. The service enables users to 
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trust information that they extract by allowing database user agents to check the 
integrity of the information supplied. This is done by authenticating trusted source 
servers. The basic WAIS client functionality has been improved to work with the WAIS 
server which manages the secure database.  The Secure WAIS Database Client is a 
powerful client, which offers users access to the full range of Secure WAIS Database 
Server services. From a security point of view, the Client/Server environment actually 
covers the following requirements: 
 
 ensuring the remote user that the received document has not been tampered with 
ceived document (document 
 osed to the specified remote users 
(document content confidentiality). 
d on the RSA public-key 
OSI security and the PKI, 
(document content integrity), 
 proving that the server is the source of the re
authenticity and non-repudiation of origin), (this property is only applied on 
demand, in order to offer reasonable look-up speed): 
ensuring that the given document is only discl
 
Authentication credentials for users are base
Cryptosystems [RSA1993b], where trust semantics are established through the use of 
key certifications defined in the X.509 Security Framework [CCITT1988]. Local 
mechanisms are required to maintain the confidentiality of user’s private key. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, compatibility problems between the 
contradictions in the OSI security, and problems in integrating the OSI security with an 
existing document editor have been pointed out. Resolutions for the problems and an 
application to storage have also been shown. Further work is needed, however, to 
ensure that the methods described do not incur unacceptable overheads in performance, 
and that the whole technology is sufficiently convenient and rugged for practical 
application. 
Currently there are two standards of structured office document format, Open 
Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) [OASIS2007] of OASIS 
standard and Open Office XML [ECMA2006] of ECMA standard. OpenDocument 
supports encryption of whole documents, but does not support encryption nor digital 
signature of part of document. Open Office supports digital signature of part of 
document, but does not support encryption of it. These two will be major office 
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document formats, because some major word processor programs, such as 
OpenOffice.org and Microsoft Office, support one of the two formats, and a convertor of 
the two formats is developed as an open source program. 
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Chapter 5 
uthorization with Security AttribuA tes and Privilege 
Delegation in Multiple Domains 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on access control or authorization in distributed environment, 
which has been paid less attention than other security elements such as encryption  
and digital signature of data. 
In the recent few years, a number of information systems such as World Wide 
Web (WWW) [BT1993], Gopher [AF1993], and Wide Area Information Server (WAIS) 
[MP1992], have deployed widely and various kinds of information are stored and 
retrieved over the Internet. Security of network data, for example authentication, 
integrity check, and confidentiality of the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic, is 
realized with the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocol [HK1995]. 
However, there is less deployment on access control or authorization of access; 
authorization is a process to grant an access of a subject, such as a human user or a 
client entity, to an object, such as a file or a server entity. For example, an OS realizes 
authorization of file access based on the ACL; an ACL entry, which is attached to an 
object, consists of a subject identity and permitted types of operation to the object, and 
reference monitor [DD1983] within the OS decides whether a subject is allowed or 
rejected to access the object by referring to the ACL. However, the application of the 
ACL scheme to the information servers does not seem to work, because the network to 
which such server is connected is divided to multiple security domains; a security 
domain is a collection of users, computers, and other resources, which are under 
management of a single authority. The reference monitor can authorize access of user to 
resources which belong to the same domain, but it cannot make decision if one of a user 
or resource does not belong to the domain, because the reference monitor does not have 
knowledge to judge. 
In order to authorize access of subject to object which do not belongs to the 
same security domain, the Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) [YH1995, KP1994] or 
proxy (certificate) [NC1993] is used, which conveys privilege of the subject to a server 
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across the bounda
the access to be al
ry of security domains, and the reference monitor of the server judges 
lowed or disallowed. 
, User X accesses Server F, then a 
r the authentication of user X (1). 
hen the process accesses local resource, the access is permitted after authorization of 
e Reference Monitor (RM) of the server (2). When the user asks a job which requires 
erver G in Domain B (3), the process in Server F sends a PAC 
er X with the job request. Then the service process of Server 
Delegation of privilege is an important element of security of a distributed 
system; the delegation happens when an entity asks another entity to work for the first 
entity as illustrated in Figure 5.1. In Domain A
process which has the user’s privilege starts afte
W
th
resource in Domain C to S
containing privileges of Us
G access the resource in Domain C with the PAC (4). 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Privilege Delegation crossing Domain Boundary 
 
Current delegation mechanism adopts chained PACs or proxies which contain 
privileges and restrictions on the privileges and are sent to a target, service process in 
Domain C in Figure 5.1, [KP1994, GM1990, NC1993]. The service must verify the 
chained PACs or proxies and decides whether an accessing entity, has access permission 
or not. 
However, the authorization and delegation mechanism has several problems. 
Firstly, the restriction on privilege contained in the PAC is not formulated; in order to 
prevent the delegated server from abuse of the privilege, the PAC contains restriction on 
(4)
(3)
Domain A User Y 
(1) 
User X 
 
Server F 
User X’s 
Process 
Resource User DB 
thorization
Rule 
Domain B
Au
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Server G 
RM
Resource
Authorization
Rule 
Service
Process
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Server H 
RM 
Resource 
Authorization 
Rule 
Service 
Process 
(2) 
RM 
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privilege, but the method of interpretation of the restriction is not formulated, and this 
leads to the problem of interoperability of different security domains. Next the 
verificat
 translates the chained PACs to a 
ingle one which the server can verify and check the permission effectively. 
 Section 5.2 illustrates access control requirements for information servers in 
an o na nd in a large scale network, and points out their features. 
Section 5.3 de es deficiencies of the ACL scheme and proposes the PAC/CAP scheme 
which is proper requirements. After problems of the current deleg n 
mechanisms as well as a solution ar a plementation u iz ion 
function and a d ver whic e function a es Section
and 5
 
5.2 Access Control R ments for ation 
Servers 
The following two sections illustrate authorization requirements for such information 
servers. 
 
ation, such as document servers, personnel information servers. 
 
ion of the chained PACs may fail, because the protection mechanisms of PACs, 
the privileges and the restrictions may be different in each domain. Thirdly 
authorization rule is not formulated; the interpretation of privilege of the reference 
monitors in a domain should be unified, and it is desirable to represent the 
authorization rule in a formalized form. The situation is illustrated in Figure 5.1. 
In this chapter, the meaning and interpretation of privilege and restriction in 
the PAC are formulated to solve the first and third problems. A new delegation 
mechanism is also proposed to solve the second problem, which uses a directory service 
to retrieve security information of other domains and
s
rganizatio l network a
scrib
 for the atio
e given, n im  of an a thor at
ocument ser h uses th re d cribed in s 5.4 
.5. 
equire  Inform
5.2.1 Information Servers in Organizational Network 
The followings are requirements for a server running on an organizational network 
which may consist of thousands hosts and provide information to thousands users in the 
organiz
 The server restricts a user’s access depending on a user’s identity, a role, a group, 
an authentication level, a network location etc. 
 The server controls a user’s access according to categories of the information and 
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need-to-know of the user; for example, people in a development department may 
not be permitted to access accounting information because their need-to-know is 
different from the category of the information. 
 The server grants a user’s access by comparing the clearness of the information and 
the clearance of the user; for example, very few people can access “top secret” 
information. 
 The
on, such as on organizations, people, research or commercial activities, press 
leases, products, documents, video, etc. 
 Th y distinguish users with their privilege classes which may be 
dif ing on the fee; for example, a privilege class “A” user paying a large 
 Only a small number of managers have write or modify permission. 
vided 
 A user may access the server from other security domains, often with security 
 encryption algorithms and trust 
 
 server may permit a delegated access from an entity which works for a user 
who has the access right; for example, a printing entity may be enabled to read a 
file for which the requesting user has the read permission. 
 The organizational network may be divided into a number of security domains, 
where the categories of information, the role names may be different. 
 
5.2.2 Information Servers on Large Network 
The followings are requirements for a (commercial) information server which runs on a 
large network and provides information to a large number of users. Examples of such a 
server are WWW, Gopher and WAIS servers in the Internet which store various 
informati
re
 
 A user may pay a fee and get read permission to a set of information on the server. 
e server ma
ferent depend
fee may be allowed to access a larger set of information than a privilege class “B” 
user. 

 Each user's privilege has an expiration date. 
 The number of information units may be very large but the units may be di
into less number of classes from the viewpoint of authorization management. 
 A user whose payment is small may be restricted on the access ability or availability, 
for example available when the server's load is low. 

policies different from those in the server’s domain. As a result, the user’s client 
and the server may support different sets of
different authorities. 
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5.2
grou
ACDF (Accesses Control Decision Function) [ISO1994], is required to authorize the 
cont
to r ject, and to decide the 
 Control Scheme 
ditionally an authority which provides the 
emantics of the attribute. A set of privileges with control information is signed by an 
 
serv
priv
following properties: 
ch as a role of the subject, groups to 
 s the 
 r which the PAC is valid, such 
 
 
ictions may be added when the privileges are delegated from 
the original subject to another entity which works on the behalf of the subject. A 
typical example of the restriction is an access type such as “read only.” The next 
.3 Features of Authorization 
While in the ACL scheme the access is controlled with the identity of the user or the 
p to which the user belongs and the operation type, the reference monitor or the 
access depending on various attributes of the user (subject), the information (object) and 
ext such as an access time or a subject’s location. As a consequence, it is necessary 
epresent varying characteristics of the subject and the ob
access control according to the characteristics. 
 
5.3 PAC/CAP Access
5.3.1 Mismatch of PAC and ACL 
The OSF/DCE security architecture [YH1995] and the SESAME architecture [PD1993] 
have adopted the PAC to specify and exchange the subject's characteristics; a unit of the 
characteristics is called a privilege and represented in the form of a security attribute, 
which consists of its type, value and ad
s
authority of the security domain to which the subject belongs [ISO1993]. The signed
PAC is distributed to the subject and the subject presents the PAC to the application 
er. The server verifies the PAC and grants the subject’s access depending on the 
ilege information and the access control information of the object. The PAC has the 
 
 The PAC provides privileges of the subject, su
which the subject belongs, need-to-know of the subject. 
The PAC may specify conditions which the subject should satisfy, such a
minimal authentication level, network location (access point). 
The PAC may restrict characteristics of the object fo
as an object’s name, a service type which the server supports. 
The PAC may specify a time interval in which the PAC is valid. 
The PAC contains not only privileges of the subject but also restrictions on the use 
of the privileges; restr
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section discusses the delegation of the privile
 The PAC is signed by the authority to prev
ges. 
ent unauthorized modification by the 
ion or a combination of such information 
annot be represented with the ACLs. Moreover the ACL does not directly match the 
 while the ACL 
unting,  Role=Manager,  SubjectLocation=LocalNetwork; 
category = Accounting,  Role=Manager,  AuthenticationLevel=Strong 
Whi identifier in the ACL, the 
cann
not  the PAC, nor how to 
d semantics of the 
cont
subject or during transmission and to make sure such PAC is valid. 
 
While the privilege attributes can represent the characteristics of the subject, 
there is no appropriate representation of characteristics of the object. The OSF/DCE 
architecture has adopted the ACLs that specify which subject, group or role is permitted 
to access the object with types of operation [OSF1992]. However, authorization based on 
context information such as time, subject’s locat
c
privilege because the privilege represents the subject's right of access,
represents permitted operations of the subject. 
 
5.3.2 Combination of PAC and CAP 
The Control Attribute Packages (CAPs) [ECMA1989] can solve the mismatch between 
the privilege attributes and the ACLs. A CAP, which is attached to an object, is a 
sequence of security attributes which represents characteristics of the objects, or 
characteristics of subjects which are permitted to access the object. 
The following shows an example of CAPs which requires that the subject’s 
need-to-know should include “accounting” and the subject’s role be “manager,” and its 
location should be in “local network” or strongly authenticated. 
 
category = Acco
 
le the role information can be handled as a subject 
category and the context information, such as subject location, authentication level, 
ot be represented with the ACL. 
The original document of the CAP specifies the data type of the CAP but does 
specify how to compare the security attributes in the CAP and
grant access according to them. The authors have refined classes an
security attributes in the PAC and the CAP, and specified how to make the access 
rol decision; the security attributes have been divided into the following six classes: 
 74
 
pability of the 
subject. Examples of the privileges are subject's clearance, need-to-know, role, 
 Negative Restriction 
rivilege including. Examples 
fied. Examples are 
clea
An exception security attribute of an object is a negative form of the condition; it 
de bject, 
or ss time, 
disallowed access point (subject’s location), etc. 
ACDF, including authenticated subject name, 
auth
and negative restrictions in the PAC, condition and exception attached to the object 
being accessed by the subject, and context information. Each of the condition and 
Privilege 
A subject’s privilege is represented with a privilege security attribute and 
transmitted in the PAC. The privilege represents access right or ca
group to which the subject belongs, etc. 
 Positive Restriction 
A restriction is represented with a positive or negative restriction attribute and 
transmitted with the privileges in the PAC. A positive restriction attribute 
describes a restriction in positive form, that is, represents a restricted privilege. 
Examples of positive restrictions are permitted access time, subject’s location, 
validity time of the PAC, subject’s name, object to delegate, target name or type (ex. 
file name, server service type), etc. 

A negative restriction attribute expresses disallowed p
are prohibited access type, time or access point, etc. 
 Condition 
Security attributes in the CAP are divided into two classes: condition and exception. 
A condition security attribute of an object characterizes the object, a subject which 
access to the object is permitted, or status which must be satis
rness, categories, required minimal authentication level of the subject, access 
time, etc. 
 Exception 
scribes a characteristic of a subject which is prevented from accessing the o
 prohibited context status including. Examples are prohibited acce
 Context 
Context information is represented with context security attributes, which are 
maintained by the server or the 
entication level, access count, seal algorithm of the PAC, authority name that 
issued the PAC, charging identity included in the PAC, access type, arguments of 
the operation, server's load, etc. 
 
The ACDF is called with six arguments, namely privilege, positive restriction 
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exception security attributes is compared against the attribute in the privilege or 
cont
or co
valu le of the ordered value attributes is the 
nce privilege and the clearness condition; both attributes take 
one 
secr
priv
has 
posi
cont s when the time interval contains the current 
parisons, that is, which attribute is compared with which 
attr
in C  has the following: 
 
 agement 
domain may require non-standard security attributes and the manager 
 
an operation may depend on the parameter of the operation as well as the 
 
An attribute value is not limited to a string or an integer; it can be an arbitrary type 
such
ext class, and each of the restriction security attributes against one of the condition 
ntext class, and the access is allowed when the all comparisons succeed. 
An attribute may have an ordered value, which matches a higher or lower 
e of another attribute. A typical examp
combination of the cleara
of values of “unmarked,” “unclassified,” “restricted,” “confidential,” “secret” or “top 
et” (in ascending order), and a read access is permitted when the subject’s clearance 
ilege is equal to or higher than the object’s clearness condition. Another attribute 
a time or a time interval value; for example, a value of the PAC validity time of the 
tive restriction class is a time interval and compared with the current time of the 
ext class, and the comparison succeed
time. The rule of the com
ibute and its method is described in tables; description and its semantics are given 
lause 5.5.1. The combination of the PAC and the CAP
 
Simple Semantics 
The semantics of the combination is simple and easy to understand; it is necessary 
only to compare attributes of the condition, exception, positive and negative 
restriction classes with corresponding attributes. 
Easy Man
A security 
of the domain needs to configure authorization rules. With the PAC/CAP scheme, 
this is an easy task because the manager only needs to specify matching rules of the 
security attributes. A configuration example is illustrated in a later chapter. 
Checking Parameters of an Operation 
Grant of 
operation type. For example, modification of salary to a value exceeding a specific 
amount may require an extra privilege. This authorization is realized by comparing 
a parameter attribute of the context class against a limit attribute attached to the 
object of the condition class. 
Various Syntax 
 as a time interval. 
 
On the other hand, the new combination has the following disadvantages: 
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 Efficiency 
The PAC/CAP scheme is more complicated and slower than the ACL scheme. 
How
itiator, the 
equested entity an intermediate, and the object a target. The most typical example is a 
n tiator asks a printing scheduler to print a file, the scheduler 
alloc
requ
inte sion of the file on the target. 
rchitecture [PD1993] has adopted the PAC chaining method; 
the 
the 
any 
aud ediate 
poses than the requested action. This is 
o allow the intermediate to act on the initiator’s behalf. 
ertificates, however, ones on targets or access 
hich is based on proxy, is proposed in [NC1993]. A proxy is 
 certificate that allows the intermediate which has the proxy key to operate with 
rom 
ever, each attribute of the restriction, condition and exception classes can be 
compared in parallel and it is possible to make the decision in a reasonable time. 
 Mismatch with Underlying OS 
Many operating systems support the ACL for the authorization of file access; this 
might cause mismatch with the CAP. 
 
5.4 Privilege Delegation across Domain Boundary 
5.4.1 Current Mechanisms 
It is a common requirement in a distributed system for a subject entity to request 
another entity to act for the subject on its behalf. The subject is called an in
r
pri ting service; an ini
ates the task to one of printer servers, and the assigned printer server reads the 
ested file from the target file server and prints it. In this case, the second 
rmediate, the printer server, needs the read permis
The SESAME a
chained PACs, which represent the delegated privileges, are included in the PAC for 
intermediate. This makes the intermediate can use the initiator’s privileges with 
action and makes it possible to trace the delegation route which is required for 
iting and charging. The initiator may want to make sure that the interm
cannot use the privileges for other pur
accomplished by specifying restrictions on the privileges. Typical examples are 
restrictions of access type (read + write → read only) and target (non-restriction → 
specifying a target or a target service type). 
In the Distributed System Security Architecture (DSSA) [GM1990], an initiator 
generates and signs a certificate t
Restrictions on time are included in the c
rights are not well formalized. 
A similar method, w
a
privileges of the initiator which granted the proxy. The proxy is protected f
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unauthorized modification by adding a seal of the grantor. The following three proxies 
s ined proxies, which implement a delegation from illu trates cha  to initiator
2mediate  via 1termediatein  where XKI _][  stands for information terin I  sealed 
 key of X : with
 
original proxy: initiatorKprivilege ]_,[  authorityK _
initiatorKtermediateinKnrestrictio _]1_,1[  delegated proxy1: 
delegated proxy2: 1_]2_,2[ termediateinKtermediateinKnrestrictio  
 
The top proxy specifies that the authority of the security domain permits initiator’s 
privilege , the next proxy sealed by initiator  specifies that initiator  allows 
1termediatein  to use privilege with 1nrestrictio , and finally the last proxy designates 
that 1termediatein  grants 2termediatein  to use the privilege with 2nrestrictio . All 
three proxies are sent to the target, which verifies the proxies and checks whether 
2termediatein  has or not privilege with restriction1 and 2nrestrictio . 
 
5.4.2 Deficiencies of Current Mechanisms 
The above delegation mechanisms have the following deficiencies in the case that the 
authority, the initiator, the intermediates and the target do not belong to a same 
security domain: 
 
 Policy and Authority 
PACs are issued from a Privilege Attribute Server (PA-Server) in the SESAME 
architecture, and proxies are generated by the initiator, the intermediates or an 
urity domains may fail since the target may not trust 
auth
authorization server in the proxy-based authorization scheme. However, the target 
domain does not accept the PACs or the proxies because the security policies of the 
domains may be different. Moreover the verification of seals generated by entities 
or authorities of other sec
orities in other domains. 
 Seal Algorithm 
The seal algorithm of the PAC may be different in each security domain and the 
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target may be unable to verify the seal and thus to check the chained PACs or 
proxies. 
nd Re ping 
target may f
 Privilege a striction Map
Each security domain may define privileges and restrictions of its own. Again the 
ail the translation of privileges or restrictions of the different security 
domain to local ones. 
 Complicated Computation of Restrictions 
The checking of the chained privileges and restrictions may be complicated and cost 
much. F re 5.2 the original privilege, privilege, does not have a 
restriction on the target, restriction1 added by initiator limits the target to printing 
service e A and the final target (file server1), and restriction2 
added by s the target only to file server1. 
The final target in domain B, target, needs to verify the fact that intermediate1 
domai  extra information to verify the fact. 
 
ion across Security Domain Boundary 
or example, in Figu
ntities in domain 
(printer scheduler) limit1termediatein  
provides a printing service in domain A. However, the fact is about the different 
n A and target in domain B needs
2termediatein  
(printer server2)
 
Figure 5.2: Delegat
 
In order to solve these problems, the SESAME architecture provides an 
(Printer server1)
1rmediate  
(printer scheduler)
initiatotein r
(1) 
(2) 
(3)
gettar  
(file server1)
security domain A 
governed by authority A
security domain B 
(file server2) 
governed by authority B 
(1): 1onrestricitiprivilege   
(2): 21 nrestrictioonrestricitiprivilege 
(3): 21 nrestrictioonrestricitiprivilege 
 79
inte
nece ons to the local representation. For the 
rp ain server must support the seal algorithm of 
PAC
info
How s true in a large network environment which consists of many 
 
5.4
A m
PAC or proxy which can be
initi
keys
by the 
PA-Server [ISO1993] may be used for the translation from the chained PACs to the 
single PAC; this service is originally intended to tailor set of privileges and controls the 
PAC, such as longer validity time, depending on the applications which the initiator 
wants to use. However, with the information of policies, trusted authorities, supported 
seal algorithms, privileges and restrictions of the final target, the refinePAC service can 
generate a  can be verified by the target, and  problems 
mentioned in the previous section. 
Figure 5.3 shows the translation of the PACs. User uest a job 
requiring access to resource in Domain C to Server G with Public Key Certificate (PKC) 
of the user, request signed e user, and PAC conta e user 
belongs to e, signed by the authority of Domain A (1). In order to 
access to the resource with the privilege, Server G requests a new PAC containing the 
privilege to PA-Se . The server authenticates that the 
request comes from  delegated to the server with the restriction 
attribute in the PAC, and then the server issues a new PAC containing the privilege 
with restriction of recipient, Server H (2). Server G accesses Server H with its PAC, 
request, and the new PAC taining the privilege of the original requestor, User X (3). 
The key point is the information of the policies, the trusted authorities, the sea
algorithms, the slation. In the 
se that the two domains trust each other, the information is held locally and the 
refinePA
r-domain server which can verify seals of PA-Servers of other domains and if 
ssary translate privileges and restricti
pu ose of these services, the inter-dom
s generated by the PA-Servers, get the PA-Servers’ keys, and know the mapping 
rmation of privileges and restrictions between the local domain and other domains. 
ever, this is not alway
different security domains. 
.3 New Mechanism 
ore practical solution is that the chained PACs or proxies are translated to a single 
 verified by the target, and the translation is done in the 
ator’s or the intermediate’s domain. If necessary, the keys or the certificates of the 
 issued by a trusted third party may be attached to the PAC. 
The refine Privilege Attribute Certificate (refinePAC) service provided 
single PAC which  can solve the
’s process req
 by th ining user’s privilege, th
Group S in this cas
rver with the PAC of the user
 Server G and the PAC is
 con
l 
 privileges and the restrictions which are used for the tran
ca
C service is enforced to use the seal algorithm, the privileges and the 
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restrictions supported by the target domain. When both domains do not trust each other, 
the refinePAC service needs to find a trusted third party which is trusted by the two 
domains and needs to know seal algorithms, privileges and restrictions which are 
commonly supported by both domains. The information can be retrieved via a directory 
service; each security domain needs to announce the following information: 
 
Figure 5.3: Delegation with Single PAC 
 
 Policy 
The security policy identifiers which specify policies adopted by the domain with 
qualifier information pertaining to the policies; the syntax of the information is 
given in the amendment to X.509 [ISO1995]. A security policy may specify 
acceptable use, cryptographic algorithms, user certification procedures or 
operational matters such as validity time length of certificates, etc. A domain may 
also specify prohibited policies which the domain cannot accept. The PA-Server 
needs to check that there is no contradiction between its policies and those of the 
(1) 
(2) 
(3)
  
PKC PKC 
subject=Server G subject=User X 
Domain A 
User X’s 
Process 
Domain B
 
 
 
 
 
Server G 
RM
Authorization
Rule
Service
Process
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Domain C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Server H 
RM 
Resource 
Authorization 
Rule
Service 
Process 
PAC 
subject=User X 
privilege=Group S 
delegated=Server G 
request 
PAC 
subject=Server G 
privilege=Group S
delegated=Server H
request 
PA-Server 
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target domains. 
 Authority 
A set of authorities trusted by the domain; the authority may specify the security 
policies which should be adopted by domains trusting the authority. The PA-Server 
of the initiator or the intermediate needs to find an authority which is commonly 
trusted by the initiator / intermediate domain and the target domain. 
 Seal Algorithms 
A set of seal algorithms which the domain A-Server uses an 
algorit monly supported b nd the target domain. 
In most thms specified by the 
used. A  policy of a domain may sp precedence of algorithms. 
 Privilege and Restriction 
A set  restrictions which the domain supports and optionally 
mappin ween standard efined locally; the 
PA-Ser rivileges and mote ones. In many 
cases, the privileges and the restrictions defined by the commonly trusted authority 
or adopted policies will be used. 
 tha he above t may need to be p
information, the refinePAC se erates a PAC which can epted i  the 
target domain, and is leads rvices. This met ing 
advantage antage: 
 Verification Cost 
The verification cost of privileges and restrictions at the target ced 
because the chained PACs and proxies have already been deleted at the n
side and the target r the verification of the 
single PAC. Instead of this, the cost of issuing the single PAC increases at the 
r’s side. However, normally this is not a problem because requests coming 
supports; the P
y the PA-Server ahm which is com
 case the algori
 security
commonly trusted authority will be 
ecify the 
of privileges and
g information bet  ones and ones d
ver translates local p restrictions to the re
 
Note t t  informa ion rotected; with forged 
rvice gen not be acc n
 th  to denial of se hod has the follow
 and disadv
 
side is redu
 i itiator’s 
can check authorization immediately afte
initiato
from many initiators make the target system’s load heavier than the initiator’s in 
general and it is desirable to distribute and reduce the cost of the verification. This 
is also true about the cost of the mapping of the privileges and the restrictions. 
 Trace Information 
The translation of the chained PACs to a single PAC makes the trace of the 
delegation path impossible. However, adding a new parameter, which includes the 
initiator and the intermediate(s), filled by the PA-Server to the PAC makes possible 
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sary information for auditing and charging. 
gned by the 
sted third party, and send back to the initiator through the 
inte
and
priv
e the 
 included in the PAC. While in the ECMA mechanism a 
PAC
serv
PAC
dom
the  third domain to the PAC. The privileges 
and restrictions contained in the PAC are acceptable in the target domain. 
he PAC and CAP in described in Section 5.3; six classes 
are defined and the decision method, which class attribute is compared against which 
mparing function defined by the attribute syntax, is also defined. 
The
PA-S
 
5.5
The 
ACD
docu ion 
hem is described in the following sections. As for the new 
dele
sing
 
 
The ECMA standard [ECMA1989] has proposed another inter-domain service 
mechanism; the initiator inter-domain service translates local privileges to standard 
ones and signs the PAC with the inter-domain service key, next the PAC is passed to an 
inter-domain server of a trusted third party. The PAC is verified and si
authority of the tru
r-domain server. Finally, the re-signed PAC is passed from the initiator to the target 
 the inter-domain server in the target domain, and is verified and translated to local 
ileges and restrictions. 
The differences between the ECMA’s mechanism and the proposed one ar
route of PACs and certificates
 is routed from the inter-domain server, the trusted third party, the inter-domain 
er, the initiator and finally to the target domain, in the proposed mechanism the 
 is directly passed to the target. The seal generated by the PA-Server in the initiator 
ain can be verified by the target because the PA-Server adds the key certificate of 
server issued by the authority of the trusted
With the combination authorization with PAC and CAP, and privilege 
delegation with single PAC, the problems stated in Section 5.1 are solved. Formulation 
of restriction and authorization rule, the first and third problem, are realized with 
classification of attributes in t
class attribute with co
 second problem, chained PACs, is also solved by translation to single PAC with 
erver described above. 
 Implementation of ACDF 
PAC/CAP authorization schema has been implemented on a WAIS server; a generic 
F has been implemented and the WAIS protocol (the initialization phase and the 
ment retrieval phase) has been extended to support the new authorizat
mechanism. Each of t
gation mechanism, the new refinePAC service which translates chained PACs into a 
le PAC will be implemented later. 
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5.5
The func
cludedSEOFPrintablestring: category:prv 
hing rule of 
the valu
or the purpose of simple description of the extend protocol, notations listed in Table 5.1 
.1 Access Control Decision Function 
tion takes six sequences of security attributes as arguments, namely, attributes 
of the privilege, positive and negative restriction, condition, exception and context 
classes, and returns OK which means the access is allowed, NG indicating the access 
denied and UNKNOWN when unrecognized attributes are given. 
The authorization rule is managed by security attribute tables; the following 
table shows how a condition attribute class is configured: 
 
category: In
clearness: smallerINTEGER:  clearance:prv 
accesstype: IncludeSETOFInteger:  accesstype:ctx 
subjectAddress: IncludeIPAddress:  address:ctx 
permittedAccesstime:  IncludeTime: accesstime:ctx 
minimalAithenticatedLevel: SmallerINTEGER: authenticatedLevel:ctx 
 
Each line specifies a condition security attribute and consists of three tuples: the 
attribute name, the attribute syntax which defines value type and the matc
es, and the attribute name of the privilege (indicated with :prv) or context (:ctx) 
class which is compared with the condition attribute. For example, the last line specifies 
that the “minimal authentication level” condition attribute must be smaller than the 
“authentication level” attribute value of the context. The authorization rules for 
exception, positive and negative restriction classes are configured in the same manner. 
 
5.5.2 Initialization Phase 
F
are used in the following. 
 
(1) Initialization Request 
The subject’s privileges and the restrictions are transmitted in the initialization phase 
in the form of the PAC as well as authentication information and a secret session key; 
all information is carried in the idAuthentication parameter of the InitializeRequest of 
the WAIS protocol. 
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},,{: KeyPackPACAuthInfoSC  
where 
)(},,{ CprvKeytimerandomSAuthInfo   
)(},,,,{ PSprvKeyPSidRPerserialNumbPAC    
)(},,,{ SpubKeyrandomtimeSSKKeyPack   
 
Table: 5.1 Notations 
 
Notation Description 
C  Client 
S  WAIS server 
PS  PA-se r rve
AuthInfo  Authentication information 
KeyPack  Session key package 
 kI  Information I  singed with key k  
kI}{  Information I  encrypted with key k  
)(XpubKey  Public key of enitity X  
)(XprvKey  Private key of enitity X  
P  Privileges 
R  Restrictions 
id  Audit identifier and charging identifier 
SK  Session key 
dek  Data (document) encryption key 
)(IMD  Message digest of information I  
 
The authentication information ( ) is same as the bind-token of the 
directory access protocol [CCITT1988]; it es the intended recipient ), a random 
led client's private key ( ) of 
AuthInfo
 includ
 with the 
( S
number and the current time, and sea )(CprvKey
the RSA encryption algorithm [RSA1993a]. The client’s public key certificate 
[CCITT1988] might be attached to the authentication information. 
The PAC contains a serial number, privileges P , restrictions R , an authority 
name PS  and identifiers for auditing and charging . The PAC is sealed with the 
A  private key and distribute ff-line ma r. 
 id
d in an o-Server's )(PSprvKey  nneP
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The format is different from one defined in [ECMA1989]; the validity time is 
 because it is included in the positive restriction, the restriction type is changed 
because of simplicity and direct comparison against condition and context security 
attributes, and the contained PAC parameter is omitted because the PAC is always 
packed into a single PAC described in the rameter is not 
used. 
A randomly generated session key , time and a 
andom number are encrypted with the se  public key and packed in 
the session key package 
 
(2) Initialization Response 
The server verifies the authentic tion with the client’s public key which 
might be stored in a local cache o  from the public key certificate attached to 
the authentication informa e server checks whether 
the included time noug ent time of the server, and the 
random number the PAC, the server 
checks the positive res rictions of  case 
the server needs to ch he subject. 
The server decrypts the  with the server’s private key, 
confirms that the included name  na e, and checks the included 
time and random in he same way he authentication information. The session 
key is used to reali  integrity a ality of documents during transmission 
from the server to th client. 
The server s s back th IS initialization response in the current 
version. For the mutual authent e client, the server 
needs to send back the uthent  t e idAuthentication 
arameter of the InitializationResponse: 
kage. With
sion key is shared 
between
omitted
 previous chapter and the pa
SK
rver's
, the intended recipient S
 r )(SpubKey
KeyPack . 
ation informa
r retrieved
tion. If the verification succeeds, th
tim is ee  
random
h to close to the curr
 was not used before. After verification of 
t  the PAC which might restrict the subject. In this
eck the authenticated client equal to t
 session key package
is same as the server’s m
 t  as one of t
ze nd confidenti
e 
end e normal WA
ication between the server and th
a ication information of itself in h
p
)(},,{: SprvKeytimerandomCCS    
where the random ( random ) equals to the random in the session key pac  the 
verification of the information, the client can authenticate the server and make sure 
that the session key package is correctly decrypted and the ses
 the two entities. 
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5.5.3 Document Retrieval Phase 
Each time the client requests to retrieve a document, the ACDF is called with 
arguments of the six classes of the security attribute, namely, the privileges and the 
restrictions got from the PAC, context information managed by the server, the 
conditions and the exceptions of the associated access control class; each document is 
tagged w  an
tributes. 
e of conf  retrieved document, a randomly 
enerated data encryption key is used for the encipherment of each document, 
t is encrypted with the session key. For 
ocument is encrypted with the session key 
wo services and 
the MD5
 
ion especially for information servers running 
on an organizational scale and a large sc twork are enumerated, the problems of 
the ACL-based authorization are pointed out, and the PAC/CAP authorization scheme 
hich h
 of a WAIS server and a client has been presented. 
urrently the PAC is signed by the authority with an asymmetric encryption algorithm 
and distributed in an off-line manner; in later versions an on-line distribution of the 
ith an access control class identifier d each access control class is associated 
with a CAP, a sequence of condition and exception security at
For the purpos identiality of the
dek  g
and send with the enciphered document after i
the sake of integrity, a message digest of the d
and send with the enciphered document. Since only the client and the server share the 
session key, the client can decrypt the enciphered document and check integrity. These 
three components is handled as a single document in the protocol. 
 
 SKdek documentMDdocumentCS )}({,}{:  
 
Currently the DES-CBC algorithm [NIST1977] is used for the t
SKdek ,}{
 message digest algorithm [RR1992] in order to generate message digests of 
documents. In view of security, the retrieval request should be authenticated; the 
request should be sealed with the shared session key by the client. However, there is no 
appropriate parameter it the WAIS protocol, the authentication of the request is not 
implemented. 
5.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter requirements of authorizat
ale ne
has been proposed w as several advantages when it applied to such information 
servers. Next delegation problems have been pointed out and a solution using 
translation of chained PACs into a single PAC with help a directory service has been 
proposed. Finally an implementation
C
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PAC supported by the new refinePAC service will
frontier of security which the authors have not addre
 be introduced. Auditing is a new 
ssed yet. The current ACDF library 
ultiple domains 
becomes
st t
’s privilege, but it is 
more complicated, and processing costs much. 
The PERMIS Project [CD2002a, CD2002b] realized the hierarchical 
ole-Based Access Control (RBAC) based on the X.509 Attribute Certificate (AC) 
[ITU200
elegation of privilege from a user to a service entity is required during 
b processing in distributed computing environment, while delegation of role 
 PERMIS, which is not used during job processing. 
AC, and AC are protected with signature based on public key 
records only what subject with what auditing identifier is permitted or rejected to 
access to which object. This auditing trail might not be enough because the context 
information is not recorded which cannot be traced after the decision. The authors will 
examine what kind of information is necessary during authentication, authorization 
and real processing of requests from the subject, and implement in later version. 
With the advent of the grid computing, authorization in m
 a real problem. In UNICORE delegation model [SD2004], an end user signs job 
and sub-job as en endorser, reque hem to a server. The server transfer the sub-job to 
another server as a cosigner, and then the sub-job is executed with the privilege of the 
endorser, the end user. Moreover, if the server is explicitly trusted, the server can play a 
role as the endorser on behalf of the end user. Comparing the UNICORE model, the 
privilege of an end user is transferred in the PAC in the proposed delegation scheme. 
The proposed scheme has more flexibility to represent the end user
R
1], implemented ACDF with JAVA API. The implementation is used in reality 
[CD2002b], while the ACDF of the proposed scheme is a just prototype. Both of AC and 
PAC convey user’s privilege in a certificate, and it is used by ACDF. The distinguishing 
characteristic of PERMIS is the hierarchical RBAC model; with the model the role 
specification is more compact and then understandable. The proposed scheme is more 
flexible when d
jo
assignment is supported in
All of the PKC, P
cryptography. However, it is also possible to protect the certificates with secret key 
cryptography; authentication and authorization scheme with secret key and privilege 
attribute certificates [SY1996b, SY1997b] was realized and used in commercial 
products. The reasons why the standardized certificate was not adopted were firstly the 
slow speed of the public key algorithm implemented on computers of that time, and 
secondly licensing cost of the algorithm. 
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Chapter 6 
Prevention of Virus Infection and Secret Leakage with 
Secure OS and Virtual Machine 
 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, integration of e-mail clients which are separated in data isolation 
system is described. The system is introduced as a countermeasure for unknown virus, 
but a user of the system should change PC operations from the current usage. The 
integration reduces burden of the user, because the user does not need to be aware of 
separation of data. 
The top two IT security threats are virus infection and secret leakage including 
PC theft [GL2006, SYM2007, MCA2007]. The best practice to prevent virus infection is 
to use v
US2001, 
LP2001]
sources with what kind of operations. 
Another solution is behavior based virus detection [CM2005]. Virus has some 
specific behavior; some of virus code is encrypted to bypass the virus protection system, 
and decryption of code is one of features of the virus. Another virus sends many e-mail 
irus protection software and install security patch. However, the practice is 
becoming less effective, because of the following two reasons: The first reason is 
zero-day attack [SYM2007]; the attack code appears soon after vulnerability is 
announced, for example the attack code of MS07-002 [MS2007] appeared three hours 
later after the patch was released. As a result, virus definition file cannot be in time. 
The second reason is targeted attack [FS2006]; while existing attack codes aim to be 
spread over many victims, the target of the new attack is very limited, for example a 
single organization or few people. As a result, there is less chance to detect the target 
attack and the virus definition file may not be issued. 
A solution against the virus threat is to utilize secure OS [ARG
. The OS supports the Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [DD1983], and the 
damage of attack to vulnerability of application is limited only to the application; the 
attack code cannot access file nor execute process which are not permitted in security 
policy, even if the code gets the administrator privilege. The secure OS is used mainly 
for server, but not client PC, because of management of the security policy; it is difficult 
for end user or system administrator to configure the security policy specifying which 
process is permitted to access to which re
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messages of its o
detects the virus,
wn copy. The new technology watches such behavior of virus and 
 but the new virus detection may miss targeted attack, because the 
curity threat is leakage of secret 
 
C or storage media, but other reason is intentional leakage by authorized user and 
y virus. 
secret leakage are file encryption and prohibition of portable 
tions. 
fe workstation isolated from the 
Internet,
mpares 
with the
virus targets specific organization or information, and the virus may be tuned so as not 
to be detected by such virus protection software. 
On the other hand, more serious IT se
information or secret leakage [MCA2007]. The main reason of secret leakage is lost of
P
exposition to the Internet b
Solutions against 
storage media/printer. The Windows OS supports file encryption, and its security policy 
can enforce to stop use of USB memory. However, these solutions are not effective for 
intentional leakage through e-mail or HTTP by authorized user; it is possible to stop 
sending e-mail outside or posting via HTTP, however, this is not practical for 
commercial organiza
NetTop [HP2004, MR2000] is a countermeasure of the two threats; it is 
designed for intelligence community, and the goal is data isolation. User of NetTop 
accesses classified information of multiple categories and operates multiple 
workstations which are integrated into a single PC with Trusted Linux and Virtual 
Machine (VM). The workstations are separated virtually at physical level, so the threats 
do not happen. However, the user should always be aware that which workstation 
she/he is operating and needs to switch the two workstations. This is acceptable for 
users of intelligence community, but it is very troublesome for office workers of 
commercial companies. 
“Windows Vault” is proposed as system isolation which usage is as same as a 
normal Windows as possible. The user operates a sa
 but she/he can access the external information that comes from the Internet 
on the safe workstation without threats of virus infection or secret leakage. The word 
‘Vault’ means a room with thick walls and strong doors where valuables can be kept 
safely; Windows Vault is a vault running Windows, that is, a Windows workstation 
guarded by secure OS and gateways which establish secure data exchange between the 
isolated workstation and the external environment including the Internet. 
In this chapter, the architecture of Windows Vault is described in Section 6.2, 
evaluation of performance, security and usages in Section 6.3 through 6.5, co
 previous works in Section 6.6, and concluded in Section 6.7. 
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6.2 Concepts of Windows Vault 
The principal of Windows Vault is very simple; data is divided into two categories, safe 
secret and unsafe non-secret, and the later includes information on the Internet and 
may con
also divided; Internal Workstation is connected to 
Internal
needs to access the Internet and utilize information of the 
Internet
 between the two 
orkstations for e-mail and copy & paste operation. In the following, the overall 
architecture, platform OS, and four gateways are described. 
tain virus. Windows Vault processes the two data categories with two virtual 
workstations; Internal Workstation for safe secret, and External Workstation for unsafe 
non-secret, and the two workstations are integrated into a single physical PC with use 
of VM and secure OS. Network is 
 Network and External Workstation to External Network including the 
Internet. 
The above architecture realizes very high level security, as far as user 
processes the two categories in completely separated manner. But such use is not 
realistic. While main task of user of commercial company is processed on Internal 
Workstation, the user also 
 as part of secret; text on Web and spread sheet data attached to e-mail from 
business partner are examples of such information. It is also desirable to use a single 
e-mail client; the user does not want to use two clients on Internal and External 
Workstations, because it is different from the current e-mail client usage. As for web 
browser, the other most used network application, it is normal that user operates 
multiple browser windows, and it is desirable that the user can operate browser window 
accessing a site on the Internet in the same operation of the window on Internal 
Network. As a result, the following functions are required with security guaranteed 
form: 
 
 Data import: data is imported from External Workstation to Internal Workstation. 
 Mail retrieval and sending on Internal Workstation: user operates e-mail client on 
Internal Workstation, retrieves and sends messages with the client from/to Internal 
and External Networks. 
 Browsing Internet sites from Internal Workstation: user operates web browser on 
External Workstation from Internal Workstation. 
 
With the above functions, the user needs to use Internal Workstation only and 
she/he can process information on External Workstation on Internal Workstation. Four 
gateways connect the two workstations and realize secure channel
w
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6.3 Architecture of Windows Vault 
med that the network devices connected to Internal Network are managed, that 
is, only identified and authorized devices are connected to the network, and virus 
Inte
Net rkstation, and each gateway is connected to the virtual 
Wor he configuration of Platform OS. 
6.3.1 Overall Architecture 
The overall architecture of Windows Vault is shown in Figure 6.1. Platform OS is the 
base of security, and the Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) [LP2001] is adopted, 
which supports the MAC based on the Type Enforcement model. Each of Internal and 
External Workstations consists of VM, Windows OS, and applications. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Architecture of Windows Vault 
 
Two LANs, Internal and External Networks, are connected to Platform OS. It 
is assu
External Network Internal Network
infected PCs are not connected. 
The virtual networks on Platform OS are configured as shown in Figure 6.2; 
rnal Workstation is connected to Internal Network and the virtual Internal 
work, so on External Wo
networks and External Network. Data exchanged between Internal and External 
kstations is limited only through the gateways by t
 
6.3.2 Platform OS 
In order to prevent user from changing configuration of Platform OS, direct access to 
Platform OS must be prohibited. The following configuration realizes this: 
 
IW    EW 
 
     … 
PC Hardware 
Windows OS 
AP AP … 
VM 
Platform OS 
G
atew
ay
Windows OS 
AP AP … 
VM 
IW    EW 
 
     … 
Server PC Hardware 
Windows OS 
AP AP … 
VM 
Platform OS 
Server 
G
atew
ay
Windows OS 
AP AP … 
VM 
FW 
Internet 
…
Windows 
Vault 
EW: External W/S
IW: Internal W/S 
AP: Application 
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Figure 6.2: rtual Internal Networks 
 
 The default run level is changed to level 4. 
 ss starts services required to manage examp  
“syslogd,” and doe
 The starting script kicks the following programs: the X window system display 
serv
latform OS is configured as shown in Figure 6.3. The 
init proc
llows: 
Gateways on Vi
The “init” proce  Platform OS, for le
s not start “getty,” nor trap ctl-alt-del. 

er, four gateways, two VMs, and screen lock program. 
 The shutdown process runs after both the VMs end. 
 
The security policy of P
ess launches the xinit command, and the command starts the X window system 
display server, VMs and gateways. Each VM accesses three files, log, configuration, and 
virtual disk image, and each of the files is assigned a different type of SELinux. The 
access kind of each type is minimal, for example, wv_int_log_t, the type of log file of 
Internal Workstation, is written only by wv_int_t, the domain of Internal Workstation. 
 
6.3.3 Gateways 
The first request, data import from External Workstation to Internal Workstation 
without virus infection, is realized by Clipboard Gateway, which works as fo
Windows Vault 
POP Gateway 
Display Gateway 
Clipboard Gateway 
Terminal Gateway 
Virtual IN 
IW EW
Virtual EN
ENIN 
IN: Internal Network
EN: External Network
IW: Inte
 Ext
rnal W
l W/S EW: erna
/S 
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X Display S
wv_xserv
erver Log File 
wv_int_log_t 
init 
init_t er_t 
 
Figur f Platform OS
 
 The clipboard watch agent on External Workstation transmits object on the 
clipboard to the gateway ies object. 
 The gateway checks the object type, and transmits the object if the type is not file. 
Otherwise the
 The agent copies the object to the clipboard of Internal Workstation. 
Exte  accesses two POP servers 
Gat tion and decapsulation 
c
POP gateway encrypts each attached file with a randomly generated AES key, 
encrypts
 
n Internal Workstation. 
m the Internet are opened in External Workstation and they 
ternal Workstation through Terminal Gateway. Actually the 
from 
Internal Workstation to Terminal Gateway and the other from the gateway to External 
e 6.3: Security Policy o  
 when the user cop
 gateway does not transmit. 

 
In order to realize part of the second requirement, e-mail retrieval from 
rnal Network, the e-mail client on Internal Workstation
on Internal and External Networks, and the client accesses the later through POP 
eway, which encapsulates attached files. The encapsula
pro esses are shown in Figure 6.4. 
 the random key with an encryption key of RSA, and signs the encrypted 
random key and file with a signature key of RSA. When the user opens the attached file 
received from External Network, it is sent to Display Gateway, the gateway checks the 
signature with the verification key corresponding to the signature key, forwards the 
encrypted key and file to the display agent on External Workstation, and then the agent 
decrypts the file and displays it. The e-mail from Internal Network is opened normally
o
Attached Files fro
are accessed safely from In
gateway is a remote access client or terminal client running on a remote access server or 
terminal server; as shown in Figure 6.5, combination of two remote accesses, one 
r/w
w/o
r/o
xinit 
wv_start_t 
POP Gateway
wv_pop_gw_t 
VM 
wv_ext_t 
VM 
wv_int_t 
Configuration File 
nt_cnf_t wv_i
call 
Virtual Disk File 
_int_dsk_t … wv
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Workstation, realized a remote access from Internal Workstation to External 
Workstatio
 
isplay Gateways, the user can open an attached file 
of e-mai
n. 
 
Figure 6.4: Encapsulation and Decapsulation of Attached File 
 
With use of Terminal and D
l from the Internet with the same operation of opening attached file from 
Internal Network; the file is automatically displayed in the terminal client on Internal 
Workstation, and it looks almost the same as file opened in Internal Workstation locally 
as shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Terminal Gateway as Combination of Two Remote Accesses 
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F ame  d 
ternal Workstation (left) 
 
6.4 Performance Evaluation 
The authors  measured 
erformance in the environment shown in Table 6.1 with the benchmark program, 
CrystalM
Table 6.1: Environment 
m on 
igure 6.6: The S  Files Opened in Internal Workstation (right) an
Ex
 have implemented a prototype of Windows Vault and
p
ark 2004R2 [CDW], and result is shown in Table 6.2. The column M is the 
result of the mean score of Internal and External Workstations measured 
simultaneously, S is one of Internal Workstation, and W is a normal Windows PC with 
Intel Core Solo (1.66GHz). 
 
Ite Descripti
Platform OS Cent OS release 5 
VM VMware Workstation 5.5.2 
Windows . + SP2 Windows XP Pro
CPU I o (2.16GHz)ntel Core 2 Du
Memory 2GB 
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Table 6.2: CrystalMark Results 
 
Item M S W 
Integer 8,361 8,383 3,901
Float 9,511 9,465 4,584
Memory 10,447 10,722 4,764
HD 11,457 11,985 4,485
GDI 1,979 2,205 1,426
 
Comparing with the normal Windows, the performance of Internal Workstation 
and External Workstation is better, and each of the workstations has shown enough 
performance as a Windows PC. 
The performance of retrieving e-mail and opening attached file is shown in 
Table 6.3. The column N is the time without POP Gateway, and the column P s the case 
through ission 
and decryption tim Display Gateway. There is overhead of 
ncryption and decryption, however, it is not so heavy to give impact on usability. 
play Process 
 i
 the gateway. The overhead is about 0-90%. The column D is the transm
e of encrypted file through 
e
 
Table 6.3: Performance of POP Gateway and Dis
 
File Size (B) Msg. Size (B) N (sec) P (sec) P/N D (sec) 
10K 15K 0.198 0.198 1.00 0.018 
345K 467K 0.206 0.280 1.36 0.438 
3,262K 4,406K 0.522 0.977 1.87 1.954 
 
6.5 Security Conside
6.5.1 Attacks from External Workstation/Network to 
Int
Internal Workstation  directly ork, but there are four 
routes of attack from  Netw o Internal Workstation. The first route is via 
-mail; the e-mail client receives messages from External Network through POP 
ateway which encrypts attached files, and the files cannot be opened on Internal 
orkstation. As a result, there is no possibility to infect virus via e-mail attached file. 
rations 
ernal Workstation 
 is not  connected to External Netw
 External ork t
e
G
W
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Virus might be included in ay should check character 
code and line length, and sanitize if they do ot meet the protocol specification. 
The second is via VM; External Workst on ma e infected with virus which 
attacks the base VM, and such virus station. But the MAC of 
Platform OS does not al ess be  In  an rnal Workstations, and 
such attack cannot happe
The thir . ly u es and selects an object, 
and copies it to the clipbo o the p ity s in oard object, which is not 
 file, is considered to be low, but the object might contain virus code. In order to avoid 
such pos
bject consists of type and data, and the gateway checks 
the 
The ansmits the 
keyboard and mouse events from Internal orkstation to External Workstation and 
graphical om rk  I  W ta irus code 
cannot come into Internal Workst . No  a r  access protocol supports 
clipboard sharing ver, Term atew ls t ct and  infection 
through Terminal Gateway does not happen. 
 
User may try to leak a secret file on Internal Workstation to External Workstation 
because the signature verification at the gateway fails. Consequently, there is no secret 
leakage o ation to External Workstation or Network 
header or text body, so the gatew
 n
ati y b
 may attack Internal Work
low acc tween ternal d Exte
n. 
d is via Clipboard Gateway Normal ser se
ard, s ossibil  of viru  clipb
a
sibility, the following object check functions of the gateway are useful: 
 
 Plain text only: A clipboard o
type and only text object is transmitted to Internal Workstation. The size of text 
data and character code are also be checked. 
 Strictly defined data: If the object data type is strictly defined, it is possible for the 
gateway to check the clipboard object meets the definition and does not contain 
virus. 
 
fourth route is via Terminal Gateway; basically the gateway tr
 W
screen data fr  External Wo station to nternal orks tion, so v
ation rmally emote
, howe inal G ay kil he fun ion,  virus
6.5.2 Attacks by User 
through Display Gateway, but the file is not forwarded to External Workstation, 
f file created on Internal Workst
through Display Gateway. The information flow of POP Gateway and Clipboard 
Gateway is only from External Workstation to Internal Workstation, therefore secret 
leakage does not happen. Terminal Gateway transmits display image, mouse and 
keyboard events, and secret leakage from Internal Workstation to External Workstation 
cannot happen except that a malicious user leaks secret text by typing keyboard. 
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The user can change consoles of character terminals or X Window by typing 
ctl-alt-function key, however, Platform OS is configured as no getty and screen lock 
program
s knowledge of Linux management can access Platform OS 
by trapp
llenger, 
the TPM returns the hash value with signature generated within the chip. With this 
softw
atta tions and gateways. The TPM is also 
d
wor
the decryption key, and this countermeasure makes the attack of direct access to hard 
isk useless. 
, attacker may get the control of the gateway and can 
n or steal secret from Internal Workstation. It is the 
ses is 
 is running on the X Window console, so the user can only access Internal and 
External Workstations. As a result, normal office worker cannot access Platform OS, 
nor change its configuration. 
But the user who ha
ing the boot process or direct access to hard disk. Possible solutions are change 
of the init process program, physical lock of the PC hardware or use of the Trusted 
Platform Module (TPM) [TCG2007]. The TPM is a chip on a PC motherboard and 
calculates hash values of software components. On request from a remote cha
attestation process, the remote challenger can authenticate PC hardware and verify 
are integrity of Platform OS, and as a result, it is possible to detect physical 
cks such as replace of PC hardware, worksta
use  as a key storage; it is possible to encrypt the virtual disk images of the two 
kstations and decrypt only on the specific PC hardware that has the TPM storing 
d
A few services, such as system logging, are running on Platform OS, and it 
might be possible to attack such services. However, each service is given a domain and 
separated from the other processes by the MAC, so Internal Workstation cannot be 
attacked through a service even if there is vulnerability of the service. 
 
6.5.3 Vulnerability of Gateways and Enhancements 
If POP Gateway has vulnerability
inject virus to Internal Workstatio
same as Clipboard and Display Gateways. The MAC of Platform OS cannot cover the 
weakness of the three gateways, and the security quality of the gateways is very 
important. However, it is possible to enhance the security by dividing function of each 
gateway as follows: 
Display Gateway has three functions; firstly it receives encrypted and signed 
file from Internal Workstation, secondly verifies the signature and strips it, and finally 
sends the file to External Workstation. The three functions can be realized by three 
processes of different domains, receive process of r_display_t domain, verify process of 
v_display_t domain, and send process of s_display_t domain. Data between proces
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passed 
Comparing the original implementation of the gateway, the new gateway is 
ocess, and there is no other pass of attack, because the other pass is 
proh
via files of different types; the receive process receives file from Internal 
Workstation and saves it of rv_display_t type, the verify process verifies and strips the 
signature and saves data as file of vs_display_t type, and the send process sends it to 
External Workstation. The permitted operations between the domains and types are 
shown in Figure 6.7. 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Domains and Types of Security-Enhanced Display Gateway 
  
more secure, because of the following reasons: 
 
 An attacker, which might be the user, must exploit the vulnerability through file, 
which is enforced by the MAC, and the attack through file is more difficult than one 
through TCP/IP communication channel, because the former is not interactive and 
less measures of attack. 
 The order of attack is fixed; first the reception process, next the verification process, 
then the send pr
ibited by the MAC, and the attacker has less means to attack. 
 Each process realizes one function and the code is simpler, so that it is more secure 
than process supporting multiple functions. 
 Even if an attacker succeeds to exploit all the processes, the information flow is 
limited from Internal Workstation to External Workstation by the MAC, and there 
w/o w/or/o r/o
Receive Process 
r_display_t 
Verify Process 
v_display_t 
Send Process 
s_display_t 
Encrypted File 
+ Signature 
rv_display_t 
Encrypted File 
 
vs_display_t 
Security-Enhanced Display Gateway
Encrypted File 
+ Signature 
Encrypted File 
Internal Workstation External Workstation 
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is no chance virus infection of Internal Workstation. 
 
The situation of Clipboard Gateway is very similar to Display Gateway. The 
gateway has three functions; firstly it receives clipboard object from External 
Workstation, secondly verifies the type object, and finally sends the object to Internal 
Workstation. The security of the gateway can be enhanced in the same way of Display 
Gateway. 
teractive protocol, the way is 
different from ateways, but the basic ide e first process 
receives mess  client, the next encrypts and signs the attached files, and 
the third behaves as a POP server and sends the messages to Internal Workstation. 
W ecurity o ways befor ents leads 
to catalysis, the channel through Te way is safe ev  vulnerability 
in the gateway. The gateway consists wo applicat , termin erminal 
client which domains s a result, if an attacker gets control of one 
application, the attac et one of the other. Even if one application has 
vulnerability and an  tr ype of data, the other 
application transmits only graphical display data, keyboard and mouse events, so that 
the secu
 
6.5.4 Another Data Category: Unsafe Secr
Current 
et. Online banking is a typical example; 
account umber, password, balance sheet are secret, but the web page data sent from 
busi
with
s Vault processes such data as unsafe non-secret, because 
Exte
trus he Internet. An 
wor secret cannot be leaked out 
Since the POP is an in situation of POP Gate
 the other two g a is the same; th
ages as a POP
hile the fail of s f the three gate e the enhancem
rminal Gate en if there is
 of t ions al server and t
 are different. A
ker cannot g
attack code succeeds to ansmit any t
rity of the gateway is guaranteed. 
et 
Windows Vault processes two data categories, safe secret and unsafe non-secret, 
but there is another category data, unsafe secr
n
the server may contain virus. Another typical example is e-mail message sent from a 
ness partner; an attached file contains business secret but the file might be infected 
 virus. 
The current Window
it comes from External Network, and there is a risk that such secret data is stolen from 
rnal Workstation. A solution is the third type workstation, which can access only 
ted web sites through encrypted and authenticated channel over t
attached file of e-mail is transmitted through Display Gateway and opened on this 
kstation; even if the workstation is infected with virus, 
to the Internet, because the workstation is connected only the trusted web sites. 
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6.6  
In the fo
ent implementation, user can receive e-mail message from External Network 
with e-m
rk, 
the only
hed file to open, and then the file is sent to 
xternal Workstation through Display Gateway, an e-mail client opens the file and 
eration through 
yed on 
Internal Workstation. This function can be realized with HTTP Gateway which calls 
 Usability of Network Applications
llowing, usability of sending e-mail and web browsing is described. 
 
6.6.1 Sending Message to External Network 
In the curr
ail client on Internal Workstation, but cannot reply to the message, because 
Internal Workstation cannot access External Network, and this leads to inconvenience. 
It is also true that the user cannot send a new message from Internal Workstation to 
External Network. As far as user sends from Internal Workstation to External Netwo
 solution is encryption; all messages from internal to trusted external recipient 
are encrypted by the fifth gateway, SMTP gateway, which is connected to the Virtual 
Internal Network and External Network, and encrypts all received e-mail from Internal 
Workstation. 
A solution to reply to message from External Network is to add the original 
whole message as an attached file to the message; POP gateway encrypts and signs the 
whole message, and then adds it as the last attached file. When user wants to reply to 
the message, the user selects the last attac
E
displays the original message, and then the user replies with normal op
Terminal Gateway. 
As for a new message to External Network, the user needs to send it with the 
e-mail client on External Network. However, by sending carbon copy to the user own 
account on Internal Workstation, the user can access the new message on Internal 
Workstation. 
 
6.6.2 Web Browsing 
With click of links, user can brows web pages without consciousness of the page location. 
Windows Vault divides OS and network into internal and external, so the user needs to 
be conscious of which network the accessing site belongs to, and changes browsers on 
Internal and External Workstations. This is big change of usage of web browser. 
In order to realize ‘smooth browsing from internal to external,’ it is better that 
with click of link to external page on internal page, the external page is displa
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web browser on External Workstation. The gateway is conn
Network and Internal Network, and behaves as follows: 
ected to the virtual External 
 The web browser on Internal Workstation accesses the gateway according to the 
requested URL to 
us may be contained it the URL. 
kers of commercial companies. On the other hand, the user 
of Windo
om Internal Workstation through HTTP and Terminal Gateways. This is 
convenient for users who do not aware of multi-category security. 
ains framework [GJ2005] is a kind of system isolation 
le [TCG2007]. The goal of the framework is to establish 
main, 
but no c
 

proxy configuration of the browser. 
 The gateway returns an error page to the browser, and sends the 
the HTTP agent on External Workstation. 
 The agent directs browser on External Workstation to access the URL. 
 The browser accesses the page of the URL, displays the external page, and user can 
access the page from Internal Workstation through Terminal Gateway. 
 
With the gateway, the user can smoothly brows from a page on Internal 
Network to a page on External Network in the same as the current operation. The 
reverse direction browsing is also possible, but it needs to sanitize the URL in external 
page, since vir
 
6.7 Related Works 
NetTop also consists of Trusted Linux and VMs, and Windows’ on VMs exchange data 
via ‘Regrade Server’ with explicit user authorization [MR2000]. The user of NetTop is 
enforced to use two Windows OSs, two mail clients, two documentation tools, etc., and 
this is a burden for office wor
ws Vault accesses only Internal Workstation basically; the user can receive and 
read text body of e-mail from the Internet, open and read attached files with the same 
operation as the normal Windows. It is also true that the user can access web pages on 
the Internet fr
The Trusted Virtual Dom
based on Trusted Platform Modu
secure communication channels between software components with the integrity 
assurance of the other components. The framework also utilizes multiple VMs and 
software components of different domains running on a hardware platform. There is a 
secure communication channel between the software components of the same do
ommunication between those of different domains. However, Windows Vault is 
focusing the air gap between the different domains or workstations, and has established 
secure user data exchange between the two workstations. 
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VIRTUS [IH2006] is a new processor virtualization architecture for 
security-oriented next-generation mobile terminals. It creates OS instances, called 
domains, for pre-installed applications and downloaded native applications. VIRTUS 
the communication between Internal Workstation 
infe
6 8
n this chapter, Windows Vault is described; it consists of two Windows workstations, 
one for 
orkstation to 
External Workstation. Comparing with the existing data isolation system, the proposed 
rity without change of current user operations of e-mail or 
ecurity of intelligence community. 
 
supports inter-domain communications, but it does not clearly specify its security. On 
other hand, in Windows Vault the 
and External Workstation/External Network is designed carefully not to cause virus 
ction nor secret leakage. 
 
.  Conclusions 
I
safe secret and the other for unsafe non-secret. The two workstations are 
integrated into a single PC with use of VM and secure OS, and connected securely by 
gateways. These gateways transmit data between the two workstations without virus 
infection of Internal Workstation or secret leakage from Internal W
system realizes the same secu
awareness of multi-category s
Windows Vault which contains only Clipboard gateway is released as a 
commercial product from Hitachi Software. Later release will contain the other gateway 
to increase usability as described in this chapter. 
A remaining problem is countermeasure against vulnerability of the web site 
such as cross site scripting or cross site request forgery; this is a problem of web site, not 
client side, however it is desirable this problem is solved by dividing domain of web 
browser according to the accessing web site. The most difficult remaining problem is 
proof of security of the architecture; the security is discussed in Section 6.4, but it is not 
formalized proof, and it is desirable to give a formalized proof. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
 
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
In this dissertation, solut
threats to confidentiality 
ions to the problems of the existing countermeasures for the 
and authenticity of documents are described. The solutions 
 networks composed of 
multiple
f DSA without simultaneous users’ 
operatio
 certificate verification 
ervice with time stamp have been introduced. The trusted third party service provides 
he evidence that a public key certificate of a signer was valid and that a signed 
document existed at a certain time point, therefore, the signature of the document was 
valid at that point. A prototype of the service has shown that a single server has 
performance to server hundreds of thousands end users. 
In Chapter 4, firstly the security requirements of document interchange have 
been defined, and the security of ODA which supports encryption and multiple signing 
of parts of office document was described. Next, differences of syntax between ODA and 
PKI, contradiction of the ODA standard, problem of integration with an existing ODA 
are not limited to improvement of security, but they also include improvement of 
convenience of end user. 
Chapter 1 has listed the security threats to confidentiality and authenticity of 
documents from view of document location, and then existing countermeasures are 
classified into two categories, protection by document itself and protection outside 
document. As problems of the first category, those of management of private and public 
keys and protection of structured documents are pointed out. As problems of the second 
category, problems of access control of documents on servers on
 domains and convenience of an end user of a system to protect evolving attacks 
are also described. Finally research strategies to solve the problems have been shown. 
In Chapter 2, the scheme of MSG o
ns has been proposed. With the prior calculation of the random part of a DSA 
signature, the key holders can sign a document with one-round, sequential signature 
operations of them. A prototype on a smartcard has shown that the performance is 
suitable for practical use. Security consideration against the adaptive chosen message 
attack and application to other signature scheme have also been discussed. 
In Chapter 3, the attribute with validity period and
s
t
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editor have been d
In Chapt
iscussed in details. 
er 5, firstly requirements of a document server have been specified. 
scheme with the combination of a PAC and a CAP, and privilege 
rossing boundary of domains are proposed. Attributes in the PAC 
d CAP, which specify privilege of user, restriction of the privilege, and condition of 
ject allowed to access, have been classified into six categories and access control 
a result delegation crossing security domain 
, and safe integration of e-mail clients is realized, in order to 
realize t
(1) Form
s expected. 
In order
(2) Isola
Next, authorization 
delegation scheme c
an
ob
decision has been formulated, and as 
boundary has been realized. 
In Chapter 6, Windows Vault is described, which is comprised of two Windows 
workstations running on virtual machines separated by secure OS. The two Windows’ 
are connected with gateways implementing encapsulation of attached files of e-mail 
which may contain virus
hat the user can read all the messages on the safe workstation with ordinary 
operations. Performance and security of the gateway have been evaluated in details. 
 
7.2 Future Directions 
The author has come to the consideration that there are two directions toward the 
further study. 
 
al Proof of Security 
Security of the proposed systems has been evaluated but they are not formally proved 
except the security of the MSG of DSA against the chosen message attack described in 
Chapter 2. The proof is of the MSG scheme, not of the implementation of the prototype 
on a smartcard. Generally it is very difficult to prove that a system is implemented 
exactly as specification, and that the system in the specification is secure a
 to prove the security of the system, it is firstly required to make a model of the 
system, to define security on that model, and then to prove the security of the model. 
The author considers that it is possible to make models of the privilege delegation and 
authorization scheme in Chapter 5 and Windows Vault in Chapter 6, and to prove the 
security of the models. This is the first future study. 
 
tion of Web Sites 
Currently the attack caused by vulnerabilities of web servers becomes a big problem; 
there are many servers hosting viruses which are embedded through attack to the 
vulnerabilities. Some vulnerability leads to leakage of secret data of end users; if a user 
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clicks a trap on a compromised web page, secret data on the web browser of the user, 
such as bank account information, is sent to attacker’s site. The second future direction 
is an extension of data or system isolation described in Chapter 6; in order to isolate 
each secret, such as account information and balance of a bank, from another web site, 
the web servers accessed from the third workstation processing unsafe secret are 
separated automatically according to the secret, and then each secret is only sent to the 
corresponding web site. 
 
 107
  108
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to thank Professor Norihisa Komoda of the Graduate School of Information 
Science and Technology at Osaka University for his countless suggestions and 
constructive comments on this research activity and on writing this dissertation. 
I am cordially grateful to Professors Toru Fujiwara, Shinji Shimojo, Shojiro 
Nishio, Fumio Kishino, and Associate Professor Masanori Akiyoshi of the Graduate 
School of Information Science and Technology at Osaka University for their numerous 
suggestions for revising this dissertation. 
My sincere appreciation also goes to Vice President and Executive Officer 
Hiroyuki Maezawa of Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. for giving full 
accommodation to study in the Graduate School of Information Science and Technology 
at Osaka University. 
I would like to also express my gratitude to Professor Peter T. Kirstein of the 
Department of Computer Science at University College London for his primary 
supervision and valuable suggestions during my visit, and to Vice President and 
Professor Jun Murai of Keio University for giving full accommodation to study in the 
Department of Computer Science at University College London. I would like to tender 
my acknowledgments to Professor Tsutomu Matsumoto of the Graduate School of 
Environment and Information sciences at Yokohama National University, Professor 
Hiroaki Kikuchi of Department of Information Media Technology at Tokai University, 
Mine Sakurai of NEC Corporation for their valuable comments to my research. 
I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Atsushi Kawasaki, ex-executive 
director of Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd., Professor Kazuko Oyanagi of 
Institute of Information Security, and Dr. Takashi Onoyama of Hitachi Software 
Engineering Co., Ltd. for their support and many useful advices ever since my joined 
Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. I would like to also give my thanks to my 
seniors, colleagues, and juniors of the company. 
Finally I would like to show my deepest gratitude to my wife Yumiko, who has 
been encouraging and supportive; I would like to pay my heartfelt respects and 
gratitude to my mother Emi who died during writing this dissertation. 
 
 109
 
 
 110
References 
 
[AC2001a] C. Adams, P. Sylvester, M. Zolotarev, and R. Zuccherato, Internet X.509 
Public Key Infrastructure, Data Validation and Certification Server Protocols, 
IETF RFC 3029, 2001. 
[AC2001b] C. Adams, P. Cain, D. Pinkas, and R. Zuccherato, Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure, Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP), IETF RFC 3161, 2001. 
[ACT2003] Act on the Protection of Personal Information (in Japanese), Law no.57, 
http://www5.cao.go.jp/seikatsu/kojin/houritsu/index.html, 2003. 
[ACT2004] Act on Use of Information and Communications Technology in the Course of 
Retaining, etc. Documents Conducted by Private Entities (in Japanese), Law 
no.149, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/e-bunsyo_h.html, 2004. 
[AF1993] F. Anklesaria, M. McCahill, P. Lindner, D. Johnson, D. Torrey, and B. Alberti, 
The Internet Gopher Protocol, a Distributed Document Search and Retrieval 
Protocol, IETF RFC 1436, 1993. 
[ANSI1988] ANSI Z39.50, 1988. 
[ARGUS2001] Argus Systems Group, Inc., PitBull .comPack, OS-level Security for 
Solaris and AIX, White Paper, 2001. 
[BBN1990] BBN, SLATE: Multimedia Document Communication System Reference, 
Manual Version 1.2, Bolt, Berank and Newman, 1990. 
[BF1993] F. Borenstein, MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions): Mechanisms 
for Specifying and Describing the Format of Internet Message Bodies, IETF RFC 
1521, 1993. 
[BR1997] R. Braden, L. Zhang, S. Berson, S. Herzog, and S. Jamin, Resource 
reservation protocol (RSVP), IETF RFC 2205, 1997. 
[BS1998] S. Blake, D. Black, M. Carlson, E. Davies, Z. Wang, and W. Weiss, An 
Architecture for Differentiated Services, IETF RFC 2475, 1998. 
[BT1993] T. Berners-Lee, R. Cailliau, and N. Pellow, A Secret, The World-Wide Web 
Initiative, in Proceedings of INET’93, DBC1-5, 1993. 
[CC2002] CertCo Inc., Unique Technology, http://www.certco.com/uniquetech.shtml, 
2002. 
[CCITT1988] CCITT, The Directory - Authentication Framework, Recommendation 
X.509, 1988. 
[CD2002a] D. Chadwick and A. Otenko, RBAC Policies in XML for X.509 Based 
Privilege Management, in Proceedings of IFIP TC11 17th International 
 111
Conference on Information Security 
[CD2002b] D. Chad
(SEC2002), pp.39-53, 2002. 
wick, An X.509 Role-based Privilege Management Infrastructure, in 
Business Briefing: Global Infosecurity 2002, http://www.permis.org/files/ 
[CDW
[CM1 atsumoto, and H. Imai, Efficient and Secure Multiparty 
nce, vol.E76-A, 
[CM2 and R. Bryant, 
[CX1 g Systems, 
[DD1
The TLS protocol version 1.0, IETF RFC 2246, 1999. 
vol.IT-22, pp.644-654, 1976. 
Definitions 
[FN1
rmat of Internet Message Bodies, IETF RFC 2045, 1996. 
c509prof-01.txt, 1999 (work 
ches, The SANS 
rn, and R. Caceres, Trusted 
in System Dependability, 2005. 
ystem, in Proceedings of the 1990 IEEE Symposium on Research in 
[GL2
article1_chadwick.pdf, 2002. 
] Crystal Dew World, http://crystalmark.info/?lang=en. 
993] M. Cerecedo, T. M
Generation of Digital Signatures based on Discrete Logarithms, IEICE Trans. on 
Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Scie
no.4, pp.532-545, 1993. 
005] M. Christodorescu, S. Jha, S. Seshia, D. Song, 
Semantics-Aware Malware Detection, in Proceeding of 2005 IEEE Symposium on 
Security and Privacy, pp.32-46, 2005. 
994] X. Cao, Realization Probabilities, the Dynamics of Queuin
Springer-Verlag, 1994. 
983] Department of Defense, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, 
CSC-STD-001-83, 1983. 
[DT1999] T. Dierks and C. Allen, 
[DW1976] W. Diffie and M. Hellman, New Directions in Cryptography, IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory, 
[ECMA1989] ECMA, Security in Open Systems - Data Elements and Service 
Standard, ECMA-138, 1989. 
[ECMA2006] ECMA, Office Open XML Format, ECMA-376, 2006. 
996] N. Freed and N. Borenstein, Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) 
Part One: Fo
[FS1999] S. Farrell and R. Housley, An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for 
Authorization, INTERNET-DRAFT, draft-ietf-pkix-a
in progress). 
[FS2006] S. Frantzen, Targeted Attack: Experience from the Tren
Institute, http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=1345, 2006. 
[GJ2005] J. Griffin, T. Jaeger, R. Perez, R. Sailer, L. Doo
Virtual Domains: Toward Secure Distributed Services, The First Workshop on Hot 
Topics 
[GM1990] M. Gasser and E. McDermott, An Architecture for Practical Delegation in a 
Distribution S
Security and Privacy, 1990. 
006] L. Gordon, M. Loeb, W. Lucyshyn, and R. Richardson, 2006 CSI/FBI 
 112
Computer C m te, 2006. 
1
[GR1 H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin, Robust Threshold DSS 
 1996. 
D
[GS1 A. Montaser-Kohsari, ODA Activities at University 
[HK19 SSL Protocol, Internet Draft, 1995. 
Whitepaper2.pdf, 2004. 
 and CRL Profile, IETF RFC 2459,1999. 
 
[IEEE19 y, Draft Version 
[IH20 akai, and M. Edahiro, VIRTUS: A New 
ed Next-Generation 
S
[ISO1 vised Text of ISO 8613/DAD 4, Information Processing - Text and 
A
S
[ISO1 ege Attribute Security Application with 
19
[ISO1 I essing - Open Systems Interconnection - Security 
rime and Security Survey: Co puter Security Institu
[GN1999] N. Gilboa, Two party RSA key generation, in Proceedings of Crypto’99, pp. 
16-129, 1999. 
996] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, 
Signatures, in Proceedings of Eurocrypt ’96, pp.354-371,
[GS1990] S. Golkar, et. al., The Specification of Security Facilities for Securing Whole 
ODA Documents, Task 2/2/6, TR111, internal document of Piloting of the Office 
ocument Architecture, ESPRIT Project 2374, 1990. 
991] S. Golkar, P. Kirstein, and 
College London, Computer Networks and ISDN Systems, vol.21, no.3, pp.187-196, 
1991. 
95] K. Hickman and T. Elgamal, The 
[HP2004] HP NetTop: A Technical Overview, http://h20331.www2.hp.com/enterprise/ 
downloads/HP_NetTop_
[HR1999] R. Housley, W. Ford, W. Polk, and D. Solo, Internet X.509 Public Key 
Infrastructure Certificate
[HS1991] S. Haber and W. Stornetta, How to Time-Stamp a Digital Document, in
Proceedings of Crypto ’90, pp.437-455, 1991. 
99] IEEE, Standard Specifications for Public Key Cryptograph
13, 1999. 
06] H. Inoue, A. Ikeno, M. Kondo, J. S
Processor Virtualization Architecture for Security-Orient
Mobile Terminals, in Proceedings of the 43rd annual conference on Design 
automation, pp.484-489, 2006. 
[ISO1988] ISO, Information Processing - Open Systems Interconnection, Text and Office 
ystems - Office Document Architecture (ODA), IS-8613, 1988. 
990] ISO, Re
Office Systems - Office Document Architecture (ODA) and Interchange Format -
ddendum 4: Security, 1990. 
[ISO1991] ISO, Information Processing - Open Systems Interconnection, The Digital 
ignature Scheme giving Message Recovery, IS-9676, 1991. 
993] ISO, Authentication and Privil
Related Key Distribution Functions - Part 3: Service Definitions, Working Draft, 
93. 
994] ISO, nformation Proc
Frameworks in Open Systems Part3: Access Control, Draft International Standard, 
 113
DInterconnection - The Directory: Authentication Framework, 
[KB1 oncepts, Technical Report, 
[KB1
[KH1 . Kikuchi, K. Abe, and S. Nakanishi, Performance Evaluation of Certificate 
Security Proceedings of 4th Joint European 
[KP1 ijser, T. Parker, and D. Pinkas, SESAME: The Solution to Security for 
[KS1
1
, University College 
[KS
21, 1992. 
[LP2001] P. Loscocco and S. Smalley, Meeting Critical Security Objectives with 
IS-10181-3, 1994. 
[ISO1995] ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 21/WG 4 and ITU-T Q15/7, Information Technology - 
Open Systems 
Amendment 1: Certificate Extensions, Draft Amendment 1 to ITU X.509 and 
ISO/IEC 9594-8, 1995. 
[ITU2001] ITU-T, The Directory - Authentication Framework, Recommendation X.509, 
2001. 
989] B. Kahle, Wide Area Information Server C
Thinking Machines Ltd, 1989. 
992] B. Kaliski, The MD2 Message-Digest Algorithm, IETF RFC 1319, 1992. 
999] H
Revocation Using k-Valued Hash Tree, in Proceedings of the Second International 
Workshop on Information Security (ISW'99), Springer, LNCS 1729, pp.103-117, 
1999. 
[KN1994] N. Koblitz, A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography, Second Edition, 
Springer-Verlag, 1994. 
[KP1993] P. Kirstein and P. Williams, Preparing to Pilot OSI Authentication and 
 Services on a Medium-scale, in 
Networking Conference, pp.50-54 1993. 
994] P. Ka
Open Distributed Systems, Computer Communications, vol.17, no.7, pp.501-518, 
1994. 
991a] S. Kille and J. Onions, The PP Manual, Version 6, University College London, 
991. 
[KS1991b] S. Kille, C. Robbins, M. Roe, and A. Turland, The ISO development 
environment: User’s manual version 7.0, Volume 5: QUIPU
London, 1991. 
1995] S. Kille, A String Representation of Distinguished Names, IETF RFC 1779, 
1995. 
[LJ1992] J. Linn, Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I Message 
Encryption and Authentication Procedures , IETF RFC 14
[LJ1995] J. Lowry, Location-independent information object security, in Proceedings of 
the Symposium on Network and Distributed System Security, pp.54-62, 1995. 
Security-Enhanced Linux, in Proceedings of the 2001 Ottawa Linux Symposium, 
2001. 
 114
[MC  J. Messing, and L. Notargiacomo, Beyond the Pale of MAC and 
[MCA
 Collapse, Press Release, http://www.symantec.com/about/ 
[MD1989] D. Miller, Access Control by Boolean Expression Evaluation, in Proceedings 
[MK2 ragi, A Threshold Digital Signature Scheme for a 
onics, 
[MM1
R
osium,1999. 
n
frastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP, 
[MM1
R etwork and Distributed System Security 
[MP1 . Marshall, WAIS: The Wide Area Information Server or Anonymous 
[MP2  MacKenzie and M. K. Reiter, Two-Party Generation of DSA Signatures, in 
[MR20
ications, NSA Tech Trend Notes, vol.9, ed.4, pp.1-8, 2000. 
8, 1992. 
C 7. 
S i C ed 
[NIST a
[NIST U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and 
1990] C. McCollum,
DAC -- Defining New Forms of Access Control, in Proceedings of the 1990 IEEE 
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pp.190-200, 1990. 
2007] McAfee, Inc., Releases New Research Suggesting Data Loss Will Lead To 
Next Major Corporate
news/release/article.jsp?prid=20070319_01, 2007. 
of the Fifth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, pp.131-139, 1989. 
001] K. Miyazaki and K. Taka
Smart Card Based System, IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals of Electr
Communications and Computer Science, vol.E84-A, no.1, pp.205-213, 2001. 
999a] M. Malkin, T. Wu, and D. Boneh, Experimenting with shared generation of 
SA keys, in Proceedings of the 1999 Network and Distributed System Security 
Symp
[MM1999b] M. Myers, R. Ankney, A. Malpani, S. Galperi , and C. Adams, X.509 
Internet Public Key In
IETF RFC 2560, 1999. 
999c] M. Malkin, T. Wu, and D. Boneh, Experimenting with Shared Generation of 
SA keys, in Proceedings of the 1999 N
Symposium, http://www.isoc.org/isoc/conferences/ndss/99/proceedings/papers/ 
malkin.pdf, 1999. 
992] P
What???, 1992. 
001] P.
Proceedings of CRYPTO 2001, pp.137-154, 2001. 
00] R. Meushaw and D. Simard, NetTop, Commercial Technology in High 
Assurance Appl
[MS1992] S. Micali, Fair Public-Key Cryptosystems, in Proceedings of CRYPTO'92, pp. 
113-13
[MS2007] Microsoft Cooperation, Vulnerabilities in Microsoft Excel Could Allow Remote 
ode Execution (927198), Microsoft Security Bulletin, MS07-002, 200
[NC1993] C. Neuman, Proxy-Based Authorization and Accounting for Distributed 
ystems, In Proceed ngs of the 13th International onference on Distribut
Computing Systems, pp.283-291, 1993. 
1977] National Bureau of Standards, Data Encryption Stand rd, FIPS 46, 1977. 
1995] 
 115
Technology, Secure Hash Standard, FIPS 180-1, 1995. 
1998] U.S. Department of Commerce/National Institute of Standards and 
echnology, Digital Signature Standard, FIPS 186-1, 1998. 
[NIST
T
K
D  ISDN Systems, vol.21, no.3, 
[OASI
[OSF
[PC19 ature 
[PD19 , and P. Kajser, Secure European System for Applications 
[PJ19
[PT19 buted Provers with Applications to Undeniable Signatures, 
[PT19
[RB1 /MIME Version 3 Message Specification, IETF RFC 2633, 1999. 
 Public Key Cryptosystems, Communications of ACM, vol.21, 
[RR19 , IETF RFC 1319, 1992. 
essage Syntax Standard, 1993. 
[SB19 ons, Inc., 
[SC19
 1989. 
 
[NJ1991] J. Nelson, C. Bathe, I. Campbell-Grant, M. Coon, K. Fischer, P. Kirstein, G. 
rönert, and M. Mabrouk, The Role of the PODA Project in the Adoption and 
evelopment of ODA, Computer Networks and
pp.175-185, 1991. 
S2007] OASIS, Open Document Format for Office Applications (OpenDocument) 
v1.1, OASIS Standard, 2007. 
1992] Open Software Foundation, Introduction to OSF DCE, Revision 1.0, 1992. 
96] C. Park and K. Kurosawa, New ElGamal Type Threshold Digital Sign
Scheme, IEICE Trans. on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and 
Computer Science, vol. E79-A, no.1, pp.86-93, 1996. 
93] D. Pinkas, T. Parker
in a Multivendor Environment - an Introduction, Issue 1.2, 1993. 
82] J. Postel, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, IETF RFC 821, 1982. 
91a] T. Pedersen, Distri
in Proceedings of Eurocrypt’91, pp.221-238, 1991. 
91b] T. Pedersen, A Threshold Cryptosystem without a Trusted Party, in 
Proceedings of Eurocrypt’91, pp.522-526, 1991. 
999] B. Ramsdell, S
[RR1978] R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman, A Method for Obtaining Digital 
Signatures and
pp.120-126, 1978. 
92] R. Rivest, The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm
[RSA1993a] RSA Data Security, Inc., Public-Key Cryptography Standards #1: RSA 
Encryption Standard, 1993. 
[RSA1993b] RSA Data Security, Inc., Public-Key Cryptography Standards #7: 
Cryptographic M
[RT1990] M. Rose, The Open Book, A Practical Perspective on OSI, Prentice-Hall, 1990. 
96] B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Second Edition, John Wiley & S
1996. 
89] C. Schnorr, Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards, in 
Proceedings of CRYPTO ’89, pp.239-252,
[SD2004] D. Snelling, S. Berghe, and V. Li, Explicit Trust Delegation: Security for
Dynamic Grids, Fujitsu Science Technical Journal, vol.40 no.2, pp.292-294, 2004. 
 116
[SH2 ficiency Considerations for 
Co
[SN1
Ne
Jo n Processing Society of Japan, vol.39 no.2 pp.86-90, 1998. 
Ag NA, 6th Joint European Networking Conference, 
Ag p
[SY19
Di
on Framework 
In
Pro  Security Workshop 1997 (ISW’97), 
Pr
vol 4, 1997. 
using 
W istributed Systems, pp.85-92, 1997. 
No ucture, IEICE Transactions on 
[SY20  Sameshima, H. Saisho, and T. Matsumoto, Multiparty DSA Signature 
ISE
Sig  
001] H. Saisho, Y. Sameshima, and T. Matsumoto, Ef
Multiparty DSA Signature Generation System Using Smart Cards, in Proceedings of 
mputer Security Symposium, pp.349-354, 2001. 
[SI1993] I. Schiller, An Alternative PEM MIME Integration, Internet Draft, 1993. 
998] N. Shigechika, O. Nakamura, N. Sasagawa, and J. Murai, Construction of the 
twork and the Information Service System for the Nagano Olympic (in Japanese), 
urnal of Informatio
[SY1995] Y. Sameshima and P. Kirstein, Secure Document Interchange - A Secure User 
ent, in Proceedings of TERE
pp.323-1-10, 1995. 
[SY1996a] Y. Sameshima and P. Kirstein, Secure Document Interchange: A Secure User 
ent, Com uter Networks and ISDN Systems, vol.28, no.4, pp.513-523, 1996. 
96b] Y. Sameshima, Security Architecture based on Secret Key and Privilege 
Attribute Certificates, in Proceedings of the IFIP/IEEE International Conference on 
stributed Platforms, pp.357-369, 1996. 
[SY1997a] Y. Sameshima, Problems and Solution of X.509 Authenticati
(in Japanese), in Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on Cryptography and 
formation Security, 8B, 1997. 
[SY1997b] Y. Sameshima, A Key Escrow System of the RSA Cryptosystem, in 
ceedings of the First International Information
pp.135-146, 1997. 
[SY1997c] Y. Sameshima and P. Kirstein, Authorization with Security Attributes and 
ivilege Delegation: Access Control beyond the ACL, Computer Communications, 
.20, no.5, pp.376-38
[SY1997d] Y. Sameshima and H. Miyazaki, Privacy Enhanced Message System 
Secret-Key and User-Attribute Certificates (in Japanese), in Proceedings of the 5th 
orkshop on Multimedia and D
[SY2000] Y. Sameshima and T. Tsutsumi, Reducing Certificate Revocation and 
n-Repudiation Service in Public Key Infrastr
Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences, vol.E83-A, 
no.7, pp.1441-1449, 2000. 
01] Y.
Generation without Concurrent Processing (in Japanese), Technical Report of IEICE, 
C 2001-66, pp.97-104, 2001. 
[SY2004] Y. Sameshima, H. Saisho, K. Oyanagi, and T. Matsumoto, Multiparty DSA 
nature Generation without Simultaneous User Operations, IEICE Transaction on
 117
Information and Systems, vol. E87-D, no.8, pp.2095-2105, 2004. 
Y2005] Y. Sameshima and H. Saisho, Prevention of Information Leakage and Virus 
nfection with use of Secure OS and Virtual Machin
[S
I e (in Japanese), in Proceedings of 
ation 
[S
kers’ Financial Gain, News Release, http://www.symantec.com/ 
[T view, 
[V
[YH E 1.2 Global Groups Functional Specification, Open 
[YY
s (in Japanese), in Proceedings of the 1996 Symposium on 
 
 
the 13th Workshop on Multimedia and Distributed Systems, pp.151-155, 2005. 
[SY2007] Y. Sameshima, H. Saisho, T. Matsumoto, and N. Komoda, Windows Vault: 
Prevention of Virus Infection and Secret Leakage with Secure OS and Virtual 
Machine, in Pre-Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop of  Inform
Security Applications 2007 (WISA 2007), pp.249-261, 2007. 
YM2007] Symantec Reports Rise in Data Theft, Data Leakage, and Targeted Attacks 
Leading to Hac
about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20070319_01, 2007. 
CG2007] Trusted Computing Group, TCG Specification Architecture Over
Specification Revision 1.4, 2007. 
P1996] P. Vixie, Name server operations guide for BIND, release 4.9.5, Internet 
Software Consortium, 1996. 
[WP1994] P. Williams, et. al., The OSI Security Package: OSISEC User’s Manual, 
Release 2.3, University College London, 1994. 
1995] H. Yu and M. Burati, DC
Software Foundation, RFC 87.0, 1995. 
1996] Y. Yamane and K. Sakurai, How to restrict investigators’ tapping in Key 
Escrow System
Cryptography and Information Security, 7C, 1996. 
 118
Ap
A
descr
pendix 
. Verifiable Secret Sharing 
In this section, the ),1,( Mtt   verifiable secret sharing [PT1991a, PT1991b] is 
ibed shortly. It is assumed .1 tM  
 
Firstl
A.1 Distribution of Secret Shares 
y the dealer distributes the secret qZs  as follows: 
(1) chooses a random polynomial f  of degree t  over Z : q
t
t xfxffxf  10)(  
where, sf 0 , qt Zfff ,,, 21  , and 0tf , 
(2) computes the secret shares )1()( MiZifsi q   and the public shares 
)0(),exp( tmZfGF qmm  , and 
ds is  and tFF ,,0   to iU  in secure form. (3) sen
erification of Distributed Secret Shares 
Secondly each key holder verifies his secret share 
 
(1)  verifies that 
 
(2) If the verification fails, then the secret sharing stops. Otherwise,  broadcasts 
to the other key holders. 
(3) confirms that the received were sent from the other key holders, and 
that they are the same as the received from the dealer. If the confirmation 
fails, then the secret sharing stops. 
 
 
A.2 V
iU  is : 
iU



t
m
m
mi piFsG
0
.mod)),exp((),exp(  
 iU
tFF ,,0   
iU tFF ,,0   
 ones iU  
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A.3 Secret re-Construction 
egree  satisfying  for 
key h
a, where 
Since there is one and only one polynomial of d t qsif i mod)( 
1t  values of i , any olders, for example ,,, 11 tUU   can reconstruct the 
secret with the Lagrange formul
1t  
 1,,1  : j t
qif
iji ij1  
xjxf
t
mod)()(
1   
 qs
ij
xjt
i ij
1
1

  

i mod , 
and then 
)( od)0( qs
ij
jfs i  . m
1
1
t
i ij

 
 
B. Proof of Theorem 1 
Put , , , and  as follows: 
, 
. 
)()( xb l )() xc(l (l )() xv )(xh
 n ljl qxbxb )()( mod)()( , 
j 1



n
j
l
j
l qxcxc
1
)()( mod)()( , 
nl q)( , and 


j
l
j xvxv
1
)( mod)()(



n
j
j qxhxh
1
mod)()( . 
Then 
qivic llll mod))())( )()()()( ibdi ))((((
qqbbGr ll
n
j
l
j
l
i mod)mod))0(())0(()),0(,exp(exp(
1)(1)(
1
)()( 

  c
qqcbbG lll mod)mod))0(())0(()),0(,exp(exp( 1)(1)()(   
qcG l mo)mod))0((,xp( 1)(  qde  
,)(lr  
qchrmssghashs lll mod))0))0()((( )()()(   
hrmssghash
n
ll )()( 
l ()(
qc l
i
i mod))0())(((
)(
1
0,

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Comparing the original DSA, it is clear tha
 
C. View of the MSG 
following is he view 1U . The suffix )(l  is omitt
 
t is a valid signature. 
The t  of ed. 
(1) The view of during the key generation procedure is as follows: 
 (polynomial of degree ) 
 
),( )()( ll sr  
1U  
1h t
)1(mod)(1,1 njqjha j   
)1( njAj    
 )0,1(, tmnjA mj   
)2(,1 njK j    
)2(}{ ),1(,1 nja jEj    
  
)1,(1, jEj
a  and )2( nja j   1,
 and    ),1(1 ' jSA )2( njA   ' )1,( jSj 
(2) The view of during the random sharing procedure is as follows: 
 , , and 
 
1U  
1b 1c , 1v 1w  
)1(mod)(1,1 njqjbb j   
)1(mod)(1,1 njqjcc j    
)1(mod)(1,1 njqjvv j    
)1(mod)(1,1 njqjww    j
  and mjB , )0,1(, tmnjC mj   
  and mjV , )21,1(, tmnjW mj   
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 CMT  and   2( jCMT  1 )),(1 njiS 
   )n  2(
)1,(
jCMT
jSj

  
),1(,1,1,1,1 jEjjjj
,,, wvcb  and   )2(,
)1,(1,1,1,1,
nj
jEjjjj
  ,, wvcb
 b , v , and )2( njw, 1,jc 1,j 1,j   1,j
  and   ),1(1 jSBCVW   )2()1,( njBCVW jSj   
 
(3) The vi  during the signature generation procedure is as follows: 
 
 
1d  
1U  ew of
mssg  
)2( njd j    
 

 
 
D. Proof of Theorem 2 
Without loss of generality, it is assumed 
1r  
)(mssghash   
1s  
that  corrupts . tUU ,,1  X  is Y
constructed which uses Y  as a subroutine. X  provides Y  with ( ), P,, Gqp  and 
the cont  of ap  ofent  the random t e  Y . X  generates the following view key 
generation procedure,  the ou ut key the
 
key holders is 
of the 
 where tp public  of  n  P , and 
provides it to Y : 
 
(1) generates polynomials of degree  as t   thh ,,1  Yt  does, 
(2) calculates ))0(,exp(,)),0(,exp( 010,1 tt hGAhGA ,   , 
(3) generates randomly pnt ZAA  0,10,1 ,,
, etc.,
 with some  such that 
 and calculates 
pt Zh  )0(1
pn ZA))exp(,1t GA  satisfying 0(, 10  th 0,
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pod( , AP jn
j
m)0,
1

calculates 1(, iK ji(4) ),,1, jijt n   
calculates the following: 
 )(, jha iji
(5) 
)1,1(mod njtiq 
 
, 
  , 1(
),(,
a
jiEji
)1, njti 
,  1(, iAi )0, tmtm 
nd

(6) generates ra omly )1( njtiZa , qij  , 
calculates  (7) 
),(,
a
ijEij
)1( njti  , 
(8) calculates (, tA mj  satisfying the following: ),0, tmnj 



t
m
ijaG , (),exp(
with ,1 ti  and 
m
mj piA
0
, mod)),exp(  
(9) calculates the following: 
 )1(),,( ,0, njAAhashA tjjj   , 
 )1(),,(' ,0,1 njAAhashA tnj   , 
   ),1,1( jinjtiA S  , ),( jii
  , 1(Aj ),1, jinjti),( ijS  
   , and ),1, jinjti 1(' ),( jiSi A
   1('
),(
iA
ijSj
 ),1, jinjt  . 
 
Note that the probability distribution of this view is identical to the one of the 
adversary. This is because the polynomials of degree are generated as t  Y  does in 
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Step (1), and because in Step (3) and  in Step (6) ija , )1( njti A 0,j  are 
e omly wh obability distribu on is as the same gen rated rand ose pr
U
ti as the one generated 
by the honest key holders j )( njt  . 
Next  calls Y  
 of th
as a subr
e chosen m
X outine
signatures ’s ess
 a
ages 
nd gives the view generating the 
’s. X  calculates the first )',' s(r mssg
parameters of the ( 1l ) through ( 4l )-th signatures with the knowledge of r ’s
n during the si
gnature generations
-th signature is focused to and 
 got 
from the  are giv gnature 
generation of e s  is 
independ e
) ’s
s of th
, the l
oracle before 
oced
ent from th
the actual signatures 
cause each 
her signature gen
','( sr
view
e
i pr ure.
e ot
 Be
 
ration
the suffix )(l  is omitted. If Y  requests a signature of a message 'mssg , X  obtains 
the signature sr  from the oracle. Note that )','( Y  
gnatures.
knows the first parameters and 
gives the sichooses messages before the oracle  X  
ced
generates the following 
ures where the outpview of the  signature g  p ut  parameter s
)
h
and prov
aring and
ides it to 
eneration ro
signature is ( ',' sr  Y : 
 
(1) generates polynomials of degree t as Y  doe
 
 
s: 
n
)1( tibi  , 
, 
mod q
 i  )1( tci
(2) calculates the following: 
 ) , 
n
1,1( ti)(, jjbb iji  
1,1( ti ) , 
bof i
mod q)(, jjcc iji  
thm t )tm0,1()exp(, ticoefficienB mi , theG  , 
)tm
 
thm

 t 0,1()exp(, ticoefficienC mi , theG cof i  , 
nstant terms are ze
 
 and iw  of (3) generates polynomia whose co ro as ls iv degree t2  
Y  does, and calculates the following: 
mod q n)1,1( ti)(, jjvv iji   , 
 )1,1(mod)(, njtiqjww iji  , 
 )21,1(),exp( tmtivoftcoefficienthmtheGV , imi  , 
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 1,1()exp(, tioftcoefficienthmGW imi )2, tmwthe 
(1) calculates 
 
, 
  )1,1(
),(,
njtiw
jiEji
,,, ,,, vcb jijiji    
(2) generates r omly )1(,,, ,,,. njtiwvcb ijijijijand  , and calculates 
   )1(,,,
),(,,.,
njtiwvcb
ijEijijijij
 , 
 )1(mod))()((
1
,
1
,
1
, tiqvcbd
n
j
ij
n
j
ij
n
j
iji  

, 
(3) generat  randomly a polynomial d  of degree atisfying 
)1()(mod)( tidid i  , and then calculates )()(mod)( njtqjdj 
es  st2
q d  , 
(4) calculates psmssghashGr mod))')'(,(exp(' 1*  , 
(5) generate )(  satisfying s randomly 0, njtB j 
  nn dkBr 1* mo)(,exp('
  j jk jj j qjk11 0, )d  
in the same way as the case of 
(6) calculates 
    B
j
j
1
0,

n
qd 1 )mod)0(,exp(  
0,jA , 
)1,(, tmnjtB mj   satisfyin
with , 
g 



t
m
m
mjij piBbG
0
,, mod)),exp((),p(  ex
ti 1
(7) calculates )(,, ,, mjmj , njtWVC mj   satisfying 
iCcG m
t
 pmj
m
ij mod)),(exp(),exp( ,
0
, 

, 
, 
, 
piVvG mmj
t
m
ij mod)),(exp(),exp( ,
2
1
, 


piWwG mmj
t
m
ij mod)),(exp(),exp( ,
2
1
, 


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with , 
(8) calculates the following: 
, 
ti 1
CMT  ),( jiSi
 
),( ijSj
CMT , 
, and   ),( jiSBCVW
  ),,1(),( jinjtiBCVW jiS   
 
(10) generates a polynomial fying
(9) calculates  and )1( tisi  , and 
 s of degree t2  satis  )1(mod)( tiqsis i  and 
d then puts ')0( ss  an )(tmod)( njqjss j  . 
Note that the probability distribution of this view is identical to the one of the adversary 
, because of the same reason in the case of the key generation. Now XY  obtains the 
whole view and gives it to Y , which outputs . In this way )','( sr X  d es the adaptive 
ge attack, and it is cle equation (1) of Theorem 2 holds. 
 
S Request and Response 
    
version   [0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, 
certificates   SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 
issuer   Name, 
er  INTEGER }, 
RequestTime  IONAL, 
dataToBeTimeStamped [2] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 
messageDigestAlgorithm [3] Al
additionalInformation 
[4] SEQUEN ditionalInformation OPTIONAL, 
requestOriginator  [5] Name OPTIONAL, 
requestIdentifier  [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } 
 
o
chosen messa ar that the 
E. ASN.1 Definition of CVST
CVSTSRequest ::= OPTIONALLY SIGNED SET {  
serialNumb
verification [1] UTCTime OPT
gorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
CE OF Ad
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CVSTSResponse ::= SEQUENCE { SIGNED SET { 
[0] INTEGER DEFAULT 0, 
certificates  SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { 
issuer   Name, 
serialNumb INTEGER, 
lastUpdate  UTCTime }, 
requestIdentifier [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 
verificationResult  VerificationResult, 
invalidCertificate  [2] SEQUENCE { 
issuer  Name, 
serialNumber INTEGER } OPTIONAL, 
vokedReason OPTIONAL, 
, 
ime   [5] UTCTime OPTIONAL, 
UTCTime, 
dataToBeTimeStamped [6] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, 
generationTime  UTCTime, 
i i
DA and the security area. 
1], culminating in 
ent editor, Slate 
DIF back-end. It has also integrated the Slate User Agent 
(UA) [GS1991] with seve IME 
[BF do  Mailbox (AAM) which 
stor DA ]). In the context 
rst of the PODA-SAX and later the PASSWORD Project [KP1993], UCL has also 
version   
 
er  
 
revokedReason  [3] Re
revokedOrHoldTime  [4] UTCTime OPTIONAL
invalidT
verificationTime  
messageDigestAlgorithm [7] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
additionalInformation 
[8] SEQUENCE OF AdditionalInformation OPTIONAL, 
requestedTime  [9] UTCTime OPTIONAL, 
responseIdentifier  [10] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }, 
serverCertificate  CertificationPath OPTIONAL } 
 
F. UCL Act v ties in ODA and Security 
F.1 PASSWORD Proj t ec
University College London (UCL) has been active in both the O
In the context of the Piloting ODA (PODA) series of projects [NJ199
the PODA-SAX Project, UCL has extended an existing compound docum
[BBN1990] by adding an O
ral message systems, such as X.400 [KS1991] and M
1993], and with a cument store, an Autonomous Active
es or returns an O  document via the message systems [GS1991
fi
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developed an OSI security toolkit OSISEC [WP1994] and various secured applications. 
a n 8]; it contains encryption 
o s orities (CAs). The 
nted and used in the project. 
een established; a single top level CA, 
onal CAs certified by policy CAs. 
u quired to attach a 
 the signer, the 
 te and the policy CA which issued 
the ient who has the trusted public key of 
the r
ORD Project. The 
orig while PDOCSEC secures 
ith the Slate UA. 
in 1990, DOCSEC contains little 
E [LJ1992], except 
y toolkit, OSISEC [WP1994] contains libraries which 
implement asymmetric 91], 
 digest algorithms MD2/5 
[KB ting CAs. Applications based on 
OSI lemented a hey are secured 
dire ISH E DUA PEM [LJ1992] and 
ecured X.400 UA [KP1993]. 
F.2 Implementation of Document UA 
OSISEC is b sed o  the X.509 Security Framework [CCITT198
libraries and t ol  for managers operating Certification Auth
applications based on OSISEC have been impleme
In the project, three kinds of CAs have b
policy CAs certified by the top level CA, organisati
Organisational CAs iss e certificates for users. All applications are re
complete forward certification path to the signed content; certificates of
organisational CA which issued the signer’s certifica
certificate of the organisational CA. The recip
oot CA can verify the signature. 
Two ODA utilities have been developed during the PASSW
inal DOCSEC [GS1990] secures a document as a whole, 
each part of a document individually. Both utilities are integrated w
While reasonably novel when it was developed 
functionality additional to what can now be achieved with PEM/MIM
the way it uses Directories to obtain certificates. 
The OSI securit
encryption such as RSA encryption [RSA1993a], DSS [ISO19
the DES symmetric encryption algorithm [NIS1977], message
1992, RR1992], and tools for managers opera
SEC have been imp nd used in the PASSWORD Project. T
ctory services (D /D  and QUIPU DSA [KS1999b], 
s
 
F.2.1 Slate Multimedia UA 
The Slate editor [BBN1990] from Bolt Bonarek and Newman can handle multimedia 
information such as text, raster-graphics, geometric-graphics, audio and spreadsheet; it 
is configurable to work with an external message handling system. UCL has developed 
Slate/ODA converters which supports the FOD026 Document Application Profile (DAP) 
and integrated the editor with X.400 and SMTP message handling systems [GS1991]. In 
these neither audio nor spreadsheet have been supported because they have not yet 
been included in the ODA standard. 
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secured 
documen
s which transform the original format into 
 and produces a secured ODIF stream. 
o support security services on parts of a document, the Slate/ODA converters are 
. For sending a secured 
 on the screen by selecting a 
pe and the names of privileged recipients is 
 tag into the output Slate file as well as the 
ment, first the secured ODIF stream is converted 
t editor in order to support the security services. The other is to implement a 
filter which encodes an ordinary plain ODIF stream to a secured ODIF stream and 
decodes the secured ODIF stream to the plain ODIF stream; the filter must be 
integrated with the non-secure document editor. 
The second choice is adopted for two reasons; first a document editor is 
normally very complex and hard to change; secondly, since many document editors 
support ODIF input and output or have filter
the ODIF and vice versa, the filter procedure is applicable to all such document editors. 
The UCL implementation of the filter is called PDOCSEC; it consists of two 
programs, namely an encoder and a decoder. The encoder requires information about 
identities of parts of a document to be sealed and enciphered, the names of the 
privileged recipients, the sealing location, the date and the time. It enciphers and 
generates seals of specified parts of the document
The decoder verifies and deciphers parts of the document of which the associated 
privileged recipient is the user and produces a plain ODIF stream. The decoder also 
outputs information on which parts of the document are passed or failed during 
verification and decipherment. 
 
F.2.3 Integration of PDOCSEC with Slate UA 
T
changed to support handling some security information
document, a user can attach a tag to a part of the document
menu; the tag with a security service ty
displayed on the screen. The editor stores the
document content. The security information is placed before or near a Slate object, such 
as text, graphics, etc., in the Slate file. The Slate-ODA filter converts the Slate file into a 
plain ODIF stream and produces a file including lines each of which contains security 
information that consists of a service type, privileged recipients and an object or class 
identifier (OCID). The PDOCSEC encoder reads this file and the plain ODIF stream 
and produces a secured ODIF stream which is sent to a message transfer system. 
On receipt of a secured docu
 129
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to a plain ODIF stream with the PDOCSEC decoder. The PDOCSEC decoder writes 
consists of an OCID, a security 
erify and decipher result and 
ring and it can be transferred by any 
in
security information including records each of which 
service type, the names of privileged recipients, a v
optionally originators to an external file. The ODA-Slate filter reads this file and the 
plain ODIF stream, and converts into a Slate file in which security information is placed 
before or near a Slate object in the tag form. Note that the slate editor does not know 
OCIDs at all. 
A secure ODIF stream is just an octet st
message systems such as X.400, MIME+SMTP. But care must be paid to handling of the 
whole document. Because deletion of seal information (Sealed Document Profiles, 
Sealed Document Bodyparts and Sealed Attributes) is undetectable, some process must 
be applied to the exported data stream. 
There are three options to send a secured ODIF stream; DOCSEC+X.400, 
PKCS#7+X.400 and MIME+PEM+SMTP. Both DOCSEC and PKCS#7 support 
confidentiality and integrity of a whole ODA document and the secured whole document 
can be sent by X.400 as a bilaterally or externally defined body part. MIME [BF1993] 
supports ODA application subtype where ODIF is encoded into printable characters 
according to the base64 encoding rule. A MIME message containing ODA can be 
enclosed in PEM body according to the PEM-MIME integration working draft [SI1993]. 
Currently the third method MIME+PEM+SMTP has been implemented. Other methods 
will be realized later. 
 
 
